Compensation Regulation in Banking: Executive Director Behavior and Bank Performance after the EU Bonus Cap
Journal of Accounting and Economics,
The regulation that caps executives’ variable compensation, as part of the Capital Requirements Directive IV of 2013, likely affected executive turnover, compensation design, and risk-taking in EU banking. The current study identifies significantly higher average turnover rates but also finds that they are driven by CEOs at poorly performing banks. Banks indemnified their executives by off-setting the bonus cap with higher fixed compensation. Although our evidence is only suggestive, we do not find any reduction in risk-taking at the bank level, one purported aim of the regulation.
Gender Pay Gap in American CFOs: Theory and Evidence
Journal of Corporate Finance,
Studies document persistent unexplained gender-based wage gap in labor markets. At the executive level, where skill and education are similar, career interruptions and differences in risk preferences primarily explain the extant gender-based pay gap. This study focuses on CFO compensation contracts of Execucomp firms (1992–2020) and finds no gender-based pay gap. This paper offers several explanations for this phenomenon, such as novel evidence on the risk preferences of females with financial expertise and changes in the social and regulatory climate.
23.05.2023 • 14/2023
Analyse von Finanzmarkt-Gesprächen: Schwafelnde Manager schaden dem Unternehmen
Verweigert eine Top-Führungskraft gegenüber Profi-Investoren die Auskunft, sinkt danach der Börsenwert des Unternehmens. Das zeigt eine Studie des Leibniz-Instituts für Wirtschaftsforschung Halle (IWH) nach Auswertung von 1,2 Millionen Antworten aus Telefonkonferenzen.
Gleichstellung & Antidiskriminierung
Chancengleichheit am IWH ...
Finanzsysteme: Die Anatomie der Marktwirtschaft Wie ist das Finanzsystem aufgebaut, wie funktioniert es, wie...
The Impact of Overconfident Customers on Supplier Firm Risks
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization,
Research has shown that firms with overconfident chief executive officers (CEOs) tend to overinvest and are exposed to high risks due to unrealistically optimistic estimates of their firms’ future performance. This study finds evidence that overconfident CEOs also affect suppliers’ risk taking. Specifically, serving overconfident customers can lead to high supplier risks, measured by stock volatility, idiosyncratic risk, and market risk. The effects are pronounced when customers aggressively invest in research and development (R&D). Our results are robust after addressing self-selection bias and using different CEO overconfidence measures. We also document some real effects of customer CEO overconfidence on suppliers.
Does Gender Affect Innovation? Evidence from Female Chief Technology Officers
In this paper, we examine the impact of female Chief Technology Officers (CTOs) on corporate innovation. We find that firms with female CTOs are more innovative (as captured by both patent counts and patent citations) than firms with male CTOs. This effect is more pronounced for firms with a stronger innovation-supportive culture, firms with female CEOs, and when female CTOs are more powerful. Using mediation analyses, we further validate that female CTOs’ transformational leadership style is a plausible mechanism through which they affect innovation positively.
Executives with Customer Experience and Firm Performance in the B2B Context
European Journal of Marketing,
This paper aims to examine the presence of an executive with customer experience (ECE) in a supplier firm’s top management team (TMT). The role of ECE presence remains understudied in the marketing literature. This study attempts to examine the relationship between ECE presence and firm performance.
This paper draws on the resource-based view of the firm and adopts a panel firm fixed effects estimator to test the proposed hypotheses. The empirical analysis uses a sample of 1,974 firm-year observations with 489 unique supplier firms. Selection-induced endogeneity is mitigated through the Heckman procedure.
ECE presence improves firm performance. Additionally, firms benefit less from ECE presence if a board member with customer experience (BCE) is also present, if a chief executive officer commands a higher pay slice (compared to other executives), and if a TMT is more functionally diversified. However, ECE presence is particularly beneficial if the overall economy is in contraction. Comparing the functional positions held by ECEs reveals that ECE in the marketing function (as a chief marketing officer) offers the largest benefit to an average supplier firm. ECE presence is also associated with other firm outcomes (e.g. bankruptcy odds, innovation and customer orientation).
19.09.2019 • 19/2019
Spätfolgen der Treuhand: Preisgekrönter US-Ökonom startet Forschungsprojekt am IWH
Es ist eine der wichtigsten Auszeichnungen des deutschen Wissenschaftsbetriebs: Der mit 1,5 Millionen Euro dotierte Max-Planck-Humboldt-Forschungspreis geht in diesem Jahr an den Volkswirt Ufuk Akcigit von der Universität Chicago. Am Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung Halle (IWH) will Akcigit mit innovativen Methoden untersuchen, warum die Wirtschaft in Ostdeutschland bis heute hinter der westdeutschen zurückbleibt – und welche Rolle die Treuhandanstalt dabei spielt.