Allocation de crédit et création de valeur par les banques : l’impact de la banque relationnelle en temps normal et en temps de crise
Revue d'économie financière,
Cet article passe en revue la littérature sur l’allocation de crédit et la création de valeur par les banques. Il se concentre sur l’activité de banque relationnelle, à savoir le fait qu’une banque et un emprunteur se lancent dans de multiples interactions et que chacun des deux agents s’efforce d’obtenir des informations spécifiques sur l’autre. Il montre comment la banque relationnelle génère des coûts et des bénéfices à la fois pour les entreprises et pour les banques, mais qu’en règle générale, elle est source de valeur pour chacun d’eux. Néanmoins, l’incidence de ce type de relation est en grande partie fonction du contexte économique (période normale ou période de crise). Est aussi abordée la manière dont l’allocation de crédit, mesurée par la spécialisation sectorielle, affecte les entreprises et les banques. Enfin, l’examen de la littérature récente en matière de titrisation et de relation bancaire permet de mettre en évidence la manière dont la titrisation affecte les effets de la banque relationnelle.
Fiscal Policy and the Great Recession in the Euro Area
American Economic Review: Papers and Proceedings,
How much did fiscal policy contribute to euro area real GDP growth during the Great Recession? We estimate that discretionary fiscal measures have increased annualized quarterly real GDP growth during the crisis by up to 1.6 percentage points. We obtain our result by using an extended version of the European Central Bank's New Area-Wide Model with a rich specification of the fiscal sector. A detailed modeling of the fiscal sector and the incorporation of as many as eight fiscal time series appear pivotal for our result.
Crises, rescues, and policy transmission through international banks
Bundesbank Discussion Paper 15/2011,
The World Financial Crisis has shaken the fundamentals of international banking
and triggered a downward spiral of asset prices. To prevent a further meltdown of
markets, governments have intervened massively through rescues measures aimed at recapitalizing banks and through liquidity support. We use a detailed, banklevel dataset for German banks to analyze how the lending and borrowing of their foreign affiliates has responded to domestic (German) and to US crisis support schemes. We analyze how these policy interventions have spilled over into
foreign markets. We identify loan supply shocks by exploiting that not all banks
have received policy support and that the timing of receiving support measures
has differed across banks. We find that banks covered by rescue measures of the
German government have increased their foreign activities after these policy
interventions, but they have not expanded relative to banks not receiving support.
Banks claiming liquidity support under the Term Auction Facility (TAF) program
have withdrawn from foreign markets outside the US, but they have expanded
relative to affiliates of other German banks.
Introducing Financial Frictions and Unemployment into a Small Open Economy Model
Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control,
Which are the main frictions and the driving forces of business cycle dynamics in an open economy? To answer this question we extend the standard new Keynesian model in three dimensions: we incorporate financing frictions for capital, employment frictions for labor and extend the model into a small open economy setting. We estimate the model on Swedish data. Our main results are that (i) a financial shock is pivotal for explaining fluctuations in investment and GDP. (ii) The marginal efficiency of investment shock has negligible importance. (iii) The labor supply shock is unimportant in explaining GDP and no high frequency wage markup shock is needed.
What Might Central Banks Lose or Gain in Case of Euro Adoption – A GARCH-Analysis of Money Market Rates for Sweden, Denmark and the UK
IWH Discussion Papers,
This study deals with the question whether the central banks of Sweden, Denmark and the UK can really influence short-term money markets and thus, would lose this influence in case of Euro adoption. We use a GARCH-M-GED model with daily money market rates. The model reveals the co-movement between the Euribor and the shortterm interest rates in these three countries. A high degree of co-movement might be seen as an argument for a weak impact of the central bank on its money markets. But this argument might only hold for tranquil times. Our approach reveals, in addition, whether there is a specific reaction of the money markets in turbulent times. Our finding is that the policy of the European Central Bank (ECB) has indeed a significant impact on the three money market rates, and there is no specific benefit for these countries to stay outside the Euro area. However, the GARCH-M-GED model further reveals risk divergence and unstable volatilities of risk in the case of adverse monetary shocks to the economy for Sweden and Denmark, compared to the Euro area. We conclude that the danger of adverse monetary developments cannot be addressed by a common monetary
policy for these both countries, and this can be seen as an argument to stay outside the Euro area.
Government Interventions in Banking Crises: Effects of Alternative Schemes on Bank Lending and Risk-taking
Scottish Journal of Political Economy,
We analyse the effects of policy measures to stop the fall in loan supply following a banking crisis. We apply a dynamic framework in which a debt overhang induces banks to curtail lending or to choose a fragile capital structure. Government assistance conditional on new banking activities, like on new lending or on debt and equity issues, allows banks to influence the scale of the assistance and to externalise risks, implying overinvestment or excessive risk taking or both. Assistance without reference to new activities, like granting lump sum transfers or establishing bad banks, does not generate adverse incentives but may have higher fiscal costs.
Central and Eastern European Countries in the Global Financial Crisis: A Typical Twin Crisis?
This paper shows that during the Great Recession, banking and currency crises occurred simultaneously in Central and Eastern Europe. Events, however, differed widely from what happened during the Asian crisis that usually serves as the model case for the concept of twin crises. We look at three elements that help explaining the nature of events in Central and Eastern Europe: the problem of currency mismatches, the relation between currency and banking crises, and the importance of multinational banks for financial stability. It is shown that theoretical considerations concerning internal capital markets of multinational banks help understand what happened on capital markets and in the financial sector of the region. We discuss opposing effects of multinational banking on financial stability and find that institutional differences are the key to understand differing effects of the global financial crisis. In particular, we argue that it matters if international activities are organized by subsidiaries or by cross-border financial services, how large the share of foreign currency-denominated credit is and whether the exchange rate is fixed or flexible. Based on these three criteria we give an explanation why the pattern of the crisis in the Baltic States differed markedly from that in Poland and the Czech Republic, the two largest countries of the region.