Democracy and Credit
Manthos D. Delis, Iftekhar Hasan, Steven Ongena
Journal of Financial Economics,
im Erscheinen
Abstract
Does democratization reduce the cost of credit? Using global syndicated loan data from 1984 to 2014, we find that democratization has a sizable negative effect on loan spreads: a 1-point increase in the zero-to-ten Polity IV index of democracy shaves at least 19 basis points off spreads, but likely more. Reversals to autocracy hike spreads more strongly. Our findings are robust to the comprehensive inclusion of relevant controls, to the instrumentation with regional waves of democratization, and to a battery of other sensitivity tests. We thus highlight the lower cost of loans as one relevant mechanism through which democratization can affect economic development.
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Public Bank Guarantees and Allocative Efficiency
Reint E. Gropp, Andre Guettler, Vahid Saadi
Journal of Monetary Economics,
im Erscheinen
Abstract
A natural experiment and matched bank/firm data are used to identify the effects of bank guarantees on allocative efficiency. We find that with guarantees in place unproductive firms receive larger loans, invest more, and maintain higher rates of sales and wage growth. Moreover, firms produce less productively. Firms also survive longer in banks’ portfolios and those that enter guaranteed banks’ portfolios are less profitable and productive. Finally, we observe fewer economy-wide firm exits and bankruptcy filings in the presence of guarantees. Overall, the results are consistent with the idea that guaranteed banks keep unproductive firms in business for too long.
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Lending Effects of the ECB’s Asset Purchases
Michael Koetter
Journal of Monetary Economics,
im Erscheinen
Abstract
Between 2010 and 2012, the European Central Bank absorbed €218 billion worth of government securities from five EMU countries under the Securities Markets Programme (SMP). Detailed security holdings data at the bank level affirms an effective lending stimulus due to the SMP. Exposed banks contract household lending, but increase commercial lending substantially. Holding non-SMP securities from stressed EMU countries amplifies the commercial lending response. The SMP also improved liquidity buffers and profitability without compromising credit quality.
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Financial Incentives and Loan Officer Behavior: Multitasking and Allocation of Effort under an Incomplete Contract
P. Behr, A. H. Drexler, Reint E. Gropp, Andre Guettler
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,
im Erscheinen
Abstract
We investigate the implications of providing loan officers with a nonlinear compensation structure that rewards loan volume and penalizes poor performance. Using a unique data set provided by a large international commercial bank, we examine the main activities that loan officers perform: loan prospecting, screening, and monitoring. We find that when loan officers are at risk of losing their bonuses, they increase prospecting and monitoring. We further show that loan officers adjust their behavior more toward the end of the month when bonus payments are approaching. These effects are more pronounced for loan officers with longer tenures at the bank.
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Borrowers Under Water! Rare Disasters, Regional Banks, and Recovery Lending
Michael Koetter, Felix Noth, Oliver Rehbein
Journal of Financial Intermediation,
im Erscheinen
Abstract
We show that local banks provide corporate recovery lending to firms affected by adverse regional macro shocks. Banks that reside in counties unaffected by the natural disaster that we specify as macro shock increase lending to firms inside affected counties by 3%. Firms domiciled in flooded counties, in turn, increase corporate borrowing by 16% if they are connected to banks in unaffected counties. We find no indication that recovery lending entails excessive risk-taking or rent-seeking. However, within the group of shock-exposed banks, those without access to geographically more diversified interbank markets exhibit more credit risk and less equity capital.
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Interactions Between Bank Levies and Corporate Taxes: How is Bank Leverage Affected?
F. Bremus, Kirsten Schmidt, Lena Tonzer
Journal of Banking & Finance,
2020
Abstract
Regulatory bank levies set incentives for banks to reduce leverage. At the same time, corporate income taxation makes funding through debt more attractive. In this paper, we explore how regulatory levies affect bank capital structure, depending on corporate income taxation. Based on bank balance sheet data from 2006 to 2014 for a panel of EU-banks, our analysis yields three main results: The introduction of bank levies leads to lower leverage as liabilities become more expensive. This effect is weaker the more elevated corporate income taxes are. In countries charging very high corporate income taxes, the incentives of bank levies to reduce leverage turn insignificant. Thus, bank levies can counteract the debt bias of taxation only partially.
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Do Conventional Monetary Policy Instruments Matter in Unconventional Times?
Manuel Buchholz, Kirsten Schmidt, Lena Tonzer
Journal of Banking & Finance,
2020
Abstract
This paper investigates how declines in the deposit facility rate set by the ECB affect euro area banks’ incentives to hold reserves at the central bank. We find that, in the face of lower deposit rates, banks with a more interest-sensitive business model are more likely to reduce reserve holdings and allocate freed-up liquidity to loans. The result is driven by banks in the non-GIIPS countries of the euro area. This reveals that conventional monetary policy instruments have limited effects in restoring monetary policy transmission during times of crisis.
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Trade Shocks, Credit Reallocation and the Role of Specialisation: Evidence from Syndicated Lending
Isabella Müller
IWH-Diskussionspapiere,
Nr. 15,
2020
Abstract
This paper provides evidence that banks cut lending to US borrowers as a consequence of a trade shock. This adverse reaction is stronger for banks with higher ex-ante lending to US industries hit by the trade shock. Importantly, I document large heterogeneity in banks‘ reaction depending on their sectoral specialisation. Banks shield industries in which they are specialised in and at the same time reduce the availability of credit to industries they are not specialised in. The latter is driven by low-capital banks and lending to firms that are themselves hit by the trade shock. Banks‘ adjustments have adverse real effects.
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Lokaler Schock trifft lokale Bank: Die Folgen der Hochwasser des Jahres 2013 für das deutsche Finanzsystem
Benjamin Freudenstein, Michael Koetter, Felix Noth
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
Nr. 2,
2020
Abstract
Welche Auswirkungen makroökonomische Schocks in Form von Naturkatastrophen auf Banken haben und welche realwirtschaftlichen Implikationen sich daraus ergeben können, wurde unter dem Titel „Katrina und die Folgen: Sicherere Banken und positive Produktionseffekte“ bereits an früherer Stelle in der „Wirtschaft im Wandel“ dargestellt. Daran anknüpfend stellt dieser Artikel einen Forschungsbeitrag vor, der die Folgen der Hochwasser des Jahres 2013 in Deutschland für die Sparkassen und Genossenschaftsbanken und deren Unternehmenskunden untersucht. Im Mittelpunkt steht die Frage, ob lokale Banken die negativen Effekte des Hochwassers mildern, indem sie die Kreditvergabe an Unternehmen ausweiten. Der Befund ist erstens, dass Banken, die Beziehungen zu betroffenen Unternehmen haben, ihre Kreditvergabe um 3% relativ zu Banken ohne Beziehungen zu betroffenen Unternehmen ausweiten, und zweitens, dass bei Sparkassen mit Zugang zu nicht betroffenen regionalen Märkten keine signifikante Erhöhung des Kreditrisikos zu beobachten ist. Ein gegenüber regionalen Katastrophen widerstandsfähiges Finanzsystem sollte somit aus lokalen Banken bestehen, die gleichwohl überregional verbunden sind, damit ausreichende Möglichkeiten zur Diversifikation bestehen.
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The Cleansing Effect of Banking Crises
Reint E. Gropp, Steven Ongena, Jörg Rocholl, Vahid Saadi
IWH-Diskussionspapiere,
Nr. 12,
2020
Abstract
We assess the cleansing effects of the recent banking crisis. In U.S. regions with higher levels of supervisory forbearance on distressed banks during the crisis, there is less restructuring in the real sector and the banking sector remains less healthy for several years after the crisis. Regions with less supervisory forbearance experience higher productivity growth after the crisis with more firm entries, job creation, and employment, wages, patents, and output growth. Supervisory forbearance is greater for state-chartered banks and in regions with weaker banking competition and more independent banks, while recapitalisation of distressed banks through TARP does not facilitate cleansing.
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