Public Bank Guarantees and Allocative Efficiency
Reint E. Gropp, Andre Guettler, Vahid Saadi
Journal of Monetary Economics,
im Erscheinen
Abstract
In the wake of the recent financial crisis, many governments extended public guarantees to banks. We take advantage of a natural experiment, in which long-standing public guarantees were removed for a set of German banks following a lawsuit, to identify the real effects of these guarantees on the allocation of credit (“allocative efficiency”). Using matched bank/firm data, we find that public guarantees reduce allocative efficiency. With guarantees in place, poorly performing firms invest more and maintain higher rates of sales growth. Moreover, firms produce less efficiently in the presence of public guarantees. Consistently, we show that guarantees reduce the likelihood that firms exit the market. These findings suggest that public guarantees hinder restructuring activities and prevent resources to flow to the most productive uses.
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Banks’ Funding Stress, Lending Supply and Consumption Expenditure
H. Evren Damar, Reint E. Gropp, A. Mordel
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking,
im Erscheinen
Abstract
We employ a unique identification strategy linking survey data on household consumption expenditure to bank-level data to estimate the effects of bank funding stress on consumer credit and consumption expenditures. We show that households whose banks were more exposed to funding shocks report lower levels of non-mortgage liabilities. This, however, only translates into lower levels of consumption for low income households. Hence, adverse credit supply shocks are associated with significant heterogeneous effects.
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Managerial Effect or Firm Effect: Evidence from the Private Debt Market
Bill Francis, Iftekhar Hasan, Yun Zhu
The Financial Review,
im Erscheinen
Abstract
This paper provides evidence that the managerial effect is a key determinant of firms’ cost of capital, in the context of private debt contracting. Applying the novel empirical method developed by an earlier study to a large sample that tracks the job movement of top managers, we find that the managerial effect is a critical and significant factor that explains a large part of the variation in loan contract terms more accurately than firm fixed effects. Additional evidence shows that banks “follow” managers when they change jobs and offer loan contracts with preferential terms to their new firms.
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Borrowers Under Water! Rare Disasters, Regional Banks, and Recovery Lending
Michael Koetter, Felix Noth, Oliver Rehbein
Journal of Financial Intermediation,
im Erscheinen
Abstract
We show that local banks provide corporate recovery lending to firms affected by adverse regional macro shocks. Banks that reside in counties unaffected by the natural disaster that we specify as macro shock increase lending to firms inside affected counties by 3%. Firms domiciled in flooded counties, in turn, increase corporate borrowing by 16% if they are connected to banks in unaffected counties. We find no indication that recovery lending entails excessive risk-taking or rent-seeking. However, within the group of shock-exposed banks, those without access to geographically more diversified interbank markets exhibit more credit risk and less equity capital.
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Financial Incentives and Loan Officer Behavior: Multitasking and Allocation of Effort under an Incomplete Contract
P. Behr, A. H. Drexler, Reint E. Gropp, Andre Guettler
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,
im Erscheinen
Abstract
In this paper we investigate the implications of providing loan officers with a compensation structure that rewards loan volume and penalizes poor performance versus a fixed wage unrelated to performance. We study detailed transaction information for more than 45,000 loans issued by 240 loan officers of a large commercial bank in Europe. We examine the three main activities that loan officers perform: monitoring, originating, and screening. We find that when the performance of their portfolio deteriorates, loan officers increase their effort to monitor existing borrowers, reduce loan origination, and approve a higher fraction of loan applications. These loans, however, are of above-average quality. Consistent with the theoretical literature on multitasking in incomplete contracts, we show that loan officers neglect activities that are not directly rewarded under the contract, but are in the interest of the bank. In addition, while the response by loan officers constitutes a rational response to a time allocation problem, their reaction to incentives appears myopic in other dimensions.
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The Economic Impact of Changes in Local Bank Presence
Iftekhar Hasan, Krzysztof Jackowicz, Oskar Kowalewski, Łukasz Kozłowski
Regional Studies,
im Erscheinen
Abstract
This study analyzes the economic consequences of changes in the local bank presence. Using a unique data set of banks, firms and counties in Poland over the period 2009–14, it is shown that changes strengthening the relationship banking model are associated with local labour market improvements and easier small and medium-sized enterprise access to bank debt. However, only the appearance of new, more aggressive owners of large commercial banks stimulates new firm creation.
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Deleveraging and Consumer Credit Supply in the Wake of the 2008-2009 Financial Crisis
Reint E. Gropp, J. Krainer, E. Laderman
International Journal of Central Banking,
im Erscheinen
Abstract
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Cross-border Transmission of Emergency Liquidity
Thomas Kick, Michael Koetter, Manuela Storz
Journal of Banking & Finance,
im Erscheinen
Abstract
We show that emergency liquidity provision by the Federal Reserve transmitted to non-U.S. banking markets. Based on manually collected holding company structures, we identify banks in Germany with access to U.S. facilities. Using detailed interest rate data reported to the German central bank, we compare lending and borrowing rates of banks with and without such access. U.S. liquidity shocks cause a significant decrease in the short-term funding costs of the average German bank with access. This reduction is mitigated for banks with more vulnerable balance sheets prior to the inception of emergency liquidity. We also find a significant pass-through in terms of lower corporate credit rates charged for banks with the lowest pre-crisis leverage, US-dollar funding needs, and liquidity buffers. Spillover effects from U.S. emergency liquidity provision are generally confined to short-term rates.
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Lock-in Effects in Relationship Lending: Evidence from DIP Loans
Iftekhar Hasan, Gabriel G. Ramirez, Gaiyan Zhang
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking,
im Erscheinen
Abstract
Do prior lending relationships result in pass-through savings (lower interest rates) for borrowers, or do they lock in higher costs for borrowers? Theoretical models suggest that when borrowers experience greater information asymmetry, higher switching costs, and limited access to capital markets, they become locked into higher costs from their existing lenders. Firms in Chapter 11 seeking debtor-inpossession (DIP) financing often fit this profile. We investigate the presence of lock-in effects using a sample of DIP loans. We first account for selectivity bias by using the inverse mills ratio form a first stage. Then, in a second stage, we jointly estimate the relationship between loan price and non-price terms accounting for selectivity bias. We find that the existence and intensity of prior lending relationships are associated with higher interest costs, longer maturities, and smaller DIP loans. Taken together, our study provides direct evidence that prior lending relationships do create a lock-in effect under certain circumstances, such as DIP financing.
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Spillovers of Asset Purchases Within the Real Sector: Win-Win or Joy and Sorrow?
Talina Sondershaus
IWH Discussion Papers,
Nr. 22,
2019
Abstract
Events which have an adverse or positive effect on some firms can disseminate through the economy to firms which are not directly affected. By exploiting the first large sovereign bond purchase programme of the ECB, this paper investigates whether more lending to some firms spill over to firms in the surroundings of direct beneficiaries. Firms operating in the same industry and region invest less and reduce employment. The paper shows the importance to consider spillover effects when assessing unconventional monetary policies: Differences between treatment and control groups can be entirely attributed to negative effects on the control group.
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