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Trading away Incentives
IWH Discussion Papers,
Equity pay has been the primary component of managerial compensation packages at US public firms since the early 1990s. Using a comprehensive sample of top executives from 1992-2020, we estimate to what extent they trade firm equity held in their portfolios to neutralize increments in ownership due to annual equity pay. Executives accommodate ownership increases linked to options awards. Conversely, increases in stock holdings linked to option exercises and restricted stock grants are largely neutralized through comparable sales of unrestricted shares. Variation in stock trading responses across executives hardly appears to respond to diversification motives. From a theoretical standpoint, these results challenge (i) the common, generally implicit assumption that managers cannot undo their incentive packages, (ii) the standard modeling practice of treating different equity pay items homogeneously, and (iii) the often taken for granted crucial role of diversification motives in managers’ portfolio choices.
Regional Effects of Professional Sports Franchises – Causal Evidence from Four European Football Leagues
The locational pattern of clubs in four professional football leagues in Europe is used to test the causal effect of relegations on short-run regional development. The study relies on the relegation mode of the classical round-robin tournament in the European model of sport to develop a regression-discontinuity design. The results indicate small and significant negative short-term effects on regional employment and output in the sports-related economic sector. In addition, small negative effects on overall regional employment growth are found. Total regional gross value added remains unaffected.
Measuring the Indirect Effects of Adverse Employer Behaviour on Worker Productivity – A Field Experiment
We conduct a field experiment to study how worker productivity is affected if employers act adversely towards their co-workers. Our employees work for two shifts in a call centre. In our main treatment, we lay off some workers before the second shift. Compared to two control treatments, we find that the lay-off reduces the productivity of unaffected workers by 12%. We find suggestive evidence that this result is not driven by altered beliefs about the job or the management’s competence, but caused by the workers’ perception of unfair employer behaviour. The latter interpretation is confirmed in a prediction experiment with professional HR managers. Our results suggest that the price for adverse employer behaviour goes well beyond the potential tit for tat of directly affected workers.
Regionale Wachstums- und Beschäftigungseffekte professioneller Fußballvereine – Eine europäische Analyse
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
Steigt ein Fußballverein ab, leiden die Fans. Leidet auch die Region? Der Beitrag nutzt abstiegsbedingte Änderungen in der räumlichen Verteilung der Vereine in vier großen europäischen Profifußballligen, um den kausalen Effekt des Abstiegs eines Erstligavereins auf das regionale Beschäftigungs- und Wirtschaftswachstum zu testen. Die Ergebnisse zeigen signifikant negative kurzfristige Effekte eines Abstiegs auf die Entwicklung der regionalen Beschäftigung und der Bruttowertschöpfung in sportbezogenen Wirtschaftszweigen. Darüber hinaus finden sich negative Auswirkungen auf das gesamte regionale Beschäftigungswachstum.
SSRN Working Papers,
We examine the relationship between protracted CEO successions and stock returns. In protracted successions, an incumbent CEO announces his or her resignation without a known successor, so the incumbent CEO becomes a “lame duck.” We find that 31% of CEO successions from 2005 to 2014 in the S&P 1500 are protracted, during which the incumbent CEO is a lame duck for an average period of about 6 months. During the reign of lame duck CEOs, firms generate an annual four-factor alpha of 11% and exhibit significant positive earnings surprises. Investors’ under-reaction to no news on new CEO information and underestimation of the positive effects of the tournament among the CEO candidates drive our results.
On DSGE Models
Journal of Economic Perspectives,
The outcome of any important macroeconomic policy change is the net effect of forces operating on different parts of the economy. A central challenge facing policymakers is how to assess the relative strength of those forces. Economists have a range of tools that can be used to make such assessments. Dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models are the leading tool for making such assessments in an open and transparent manner. We review the state of mainstream DSGE models before the financial crisis and the Great Recession. We then describe how DSGE models are estimated and evaluated. We address the question of why DSGE modelers—like most other economists and policymakers—failed to predict the financial crisis and the Great Recession, and how DSGE modelers responded to the financial crisis and its aftermath. We discuss how current DSGE models are actually used by policymakers. We then provide a brief response to some criticisms of DSGE models, with special emphasis on criticism by Joseph Stiglitz, and offer some concluding remarks.