Expectation Formation, Financial Frictions, and Forecasting Performance of Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium Models
Historical Social Research,
Special Issue: Governing by Numbers
In this paper, we document the forecasting performance of estimated basic dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models and compare this to extended versions which consider alternative expectation formation assumptions and financial frictions. We also show how standard model features, such as price and wage rigidities, contribute to forecasting performance. It turns out that neither alternative expectation formation behaviour nor financial frictions can systematically increase the forecasting performance of basic DSGE models. Financial frictions improve forecasts only during periods of financial crises. However, traditional price and wage rigidities systematically help to increase the forecasting performance.
Benign Neglect of Covenant Violations: Blissful Banking or Ignorant Monitoring?
Theoretically, bank‘s loan monitoring activity hinges critically on its capitalisation. To proxy for monitoring intensity, we use changes in borrowers‘ investment following loan covenant violations, when creditors can intervene in the governance of the firm. Exploiting granular bank-firm relationships observed in the syndicated loan market, we document substantial heterogeneity in monitoring across banks and through time. Better capitalised banks are more lenient monitors that intervene less with covenant violators. Importantly, this hands-off approach is associated with improved borrowers‘ performance. Beyond enhancing financial resilience, regulation that requires banks to hold more capital may thus also mitigate the tightening of credit terms when firms experience shocks.
Are there Business Cycles “beyond GDP“? Alternative Measures to GDP at Business Cycle Frequencies
Applied Economics Quarterly,
We discuss properties of alternatives or complements to GDP as a measure of welfare at business cycle frequencies. Our results imply that the suggested indicators show practically no cycle at all and their methodologies can be questioned. First, data are not available at an appropriate quality and frequency. Second, the suggested time series sometimes correlate negatively with each other. Third, cross-section and quasi-panel evidence based on different samples of countries reveals no impact of the stance of the business cycle on some suggested welfare measures. Therefore, alternative welfare measures do not show an equal picture on business cycle frequencies compared to GDP-based measures.
Understanding the Great Recession
American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics,
We argue that the vast bulk of movements in aggregate real economic activity during the Great Recession were due to financial frictions. We reach this conclusion by looking through the lens of an estimated New Keynesian model in which firms face moderate degrees of price rigidities, no nominal rigidities in wages, and a binding zero lower bound constraint on the nominal interest rate. Our model does a good job of accounting for the joint behavior of labor and goods markets, as well as inflation, during the Great Recession. According to the model the observed fall in total factor productivity and the rise in the cost of working capital played critical roles in accounting for the small drop in inflation that occurred during the Great Recession.
Konjunkturelle Effekte des Ölpreisfalls in den Jahren 2014 bis 2016
Wirtschaftskammer Österreich: Wirtschaftspolitische Blätter,
Der Ölpreis ist seit der Mitte des Jahres 2014 deutlich gesunken. Die konjunkturellen Effekte von Ölpreisänderungen hängen davon ab, ob nachfrageseitige oder angebotsseitige Ursachen die Preisänderung auslösen. Im vorliegenden Beitrag wird der Ölpreisrückgang seit Mitte des Jahres 2014 in eine konjunkturelle und eine ölmarktspezifische Komponente zerlegt. Anschließend wird mit dem internationalen Konjunkturmodell des IWH analysiert, welchen Beitrag der Ölpreisrückgang zur konjunkturellen Entwicklung seit Mitte des Jahres 2014 geleistet hat und welche Effekte bis zum Ende des Jahres 2016 noch zu erwarten sind. Es werden sowohl ölexportierende (Russland) als auch ölimportierende Länder (G7-Länder und Österreich) betrachtet. Das Bruttoinlandsprodukt wird im betrachteten Länderkreis in den USA und in Japan am stärksten stimuliert, während der Ölpreisfall in Russland das Bruttoinlandsprodukt deutlich dämpft.
Fiscal Policy and the Great Recession in the Euro Area
American Economic Review: Papers and Proceedings,
How much did fiscal policy contribute to euro area real GDP growth during the Great Recession? We estimate that discretionary fiscal measures have increased annualized quarterly real GDP growth during the crisis by up to 1.6 percentage points. We obtain our result by using an extended version of the European Central Bank's New Area-Wide Model with a rich specification of the fiscal sector. A detailed modeling of the fiscal sector and the incorporation of as many as eight fiscal time series appear pivotal for our result.