International Side-payments to Improve Global Public Good Provision when Transfers are Refinanced through a Tax on Local and Global Externalities
Martin Altemeyer-Bartscher, A. Markandya, Dirk T. G. Rübbelke
International Economic Journal,
Nr. 1,
2014
Abstract
This paper discusses a tax-transfer scheme that aims to address the under-provision problem associated with the private supply of international public goods and to bring about Pareto optimal allocations internationally. In particular, we consider the example of the global public good ‘climate stabilization’, both in an analytical and a numerical simulation model. The proposed scheme levies Pigouvian taxes globally, while international side-payments are employed in order to provide incentives to individual countries for not taking a free-ride from the international Pigouvian tax scheme. The side-payments, in turn, are financed via environmental taxes. As a distinctive feature, we take into account ancillary benefits that may be associated with local public characteristics of climate policy. We determine the positive impact that ancillary effects may exert on the scope for financing side-payments via environmental taxation. A particular attractive feature of ancillary benefits is that they arise shortly after the implementation of climate policies and therefore yield an almost immediate payback of investments in abatement efforts. Especially in times of high public debt levels, long periods of amortization would tend to reduce political support for investments in climate policy.
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The Impact of Institutional and Social Characteristics on Foreign Direct Investment: Evidence from Japan
Stefan Eichler, Alexander Karmann, N. Lucke
Annals of Financial Economics,
Nr. 2,
2013
Abstract
We examine the determinants of Japanese foreign direct investment (FDI) focusing on institutional and social factors. Using panel data on 59 countries from 1995 to 2008, we find that host countries with free and open markets and greater cultural distance from Japan attract Japanese FDI. Good institutions, such as a well-developed legal framework and an effective government, are important in promoting Japanese FDI to emerging economies, whereas fewer regulatory restrictions, lower tax burden, and more religious diversity attract Japanese FDI to developed countries. We find that corruption stimulates Japanese FDI to developed countries, which is contrary to most previous research.
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Taxes, Banks and Financial Stability
Reint E. Gropp
SAFE White Paper Series 6,
August
2013
Abstract
In response to the financial crisis of 2008/2009, numerous new taxes on financial institutions have been discussed or implemented around the world. This paper discusses the connection between the incidence of the taxes, their incentive effects, and policy makers’ objectives. Combining basic insights from banking theory with standard models of tax incidence shows that the incidence of such taxes will disproportionately fall on small and medium size enterprises. The arguments presented suggest it is unlikely that the taxes will have a beneficial impact on financial stability or raise significant amounts of revenue without increasing the cost of capital to bank dependent firms significantly.
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Vertical Grants and Local Public Efficiency
Ivo Bischoff, Peter Bönisch, Peter Haug, Annette Illy
Abstract
This paper analyses the impact of vertical grants on local public sector efficiency. First, we develop a theoretical model in which the bureaucrat sets the tax price while voters choose the quantity of public services. In this model, grants reduce efficiency if voters do not misinterpret the amount of vertical grants the local bureaucrats receive. If voters suffer from fiscal illusion, i.e. overestimate the amount of grants, our model yields an ambiguous effect of grants on efficiency. Second, we use the model to launch a note of caution concerning the inference that can be drawn from the existing cross-sectional studies in this field: Taking into account vertical financial equalization systems that reduce differences in fiscal capacity, empirical studies based on cross-sectional data may yield a positive relationship between grants and efficiency even when the underlying causal effect is negative. Third, we perform an empirical analysis for the German state of Saxony-Anhalt, which has implemented such a fiscal equalization system. We find a positive relationship between grants and efficiency. Our analysis shows that a careful reassessment of existing empirical evidence with regard to this issue seems necessary.
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Grant Dependence, Regulation and the Effects of Formula-based Grant Systems on German Local Governments: A Data Report for Saxony-Anhalt
Peter Haug
IWH Discussion Papers,
Nr. 2,
2013
Abstract
Recent empirical studies have found – seemingly − efficiency-enhancing effects of vertical grants on local public service provision. The main purpose of this paper is to prepare an elaborate theoretical and empirical analysis of these contradictory results. Therefore, it investigates if certain fiscal and institutional conditions (fiscal stress, fiscal rank-preserving vertical grant systems, input- and output regulation), that might help to explain these empirical findings, are characteristic of at least some parts of the local government sector or certain regions. The German state of Saxony-Anhalt is chosen for case study purposes. The main results are: First, the local governments suffer from severe fiscal problems such as high grant dependency, low tax revenues and the prevalent inability to finance investments by own resources. Second, the output- and input-regulation density of certain mandatory municipal services (schools, childcare facilities, fire protection) is high. Finally, the most important vertical grant category for local governments, the formula-based grants (“Schlüsselzuweisungen”), can be described as mainly exogenous, unconditional block grants that in most cases preserve the relative fiscal position of the grant recipients.
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The Role of Investment Banking for the German Economy: Final Report for Deutsche Bank AG, Frankfurt/Main
Michael Schröder, M. Borell, Reint E. Gropp, Z. Iliewa, L. Jaroszek, G. Lang, S. Schmidt, K. Trela
ZEW-Dokumentationen, Nr. 12-01,
Nr. 1,
2011
Abstract
The aim of this study is to assess the contributions of investment banking to the economy with a particular focus on the German economy. To this end we analyse both the economic benefits and the costs stemming from investment banking.
The study focuses on investment banks as this part of banking is particularly relevant for financing companies as well as the development and use of specific products to support the needs of private and professional clients. The assessment of benefits and costs of investment banking has been conducted from a European perspective. Nevertheless there is a focus on the German economy to allow a more detailed analysis of certain aspects as for example the use of derivatives by German companies, the success of M&As in Germany or the effect of securitization on loan supply and GDP in Germany. For comparison purposes other European countries and also the U.S. have been taken into account.
The last financial crisis has shown the negative impacts of banks on the financial system and the whole economy. In a study on the contribution of investment banks to systemic risk we quantify the negative side of the investment banking business.
In the last part of the study we assess how the effects of regulatory changes on investment banking. All important changes in banking and capital market regulation are taken into account such as Basel III, additional capital requirements for systemically important financial institutions, regulation of OTC derivatives and specific taxes.
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The Laffer curve revisited
Mathias Trabandt, Harald Uhlig
Journal of Monetary Economics,
Nr. 4,
2011
Abstract
Laffer curves for the US, the EU-14 and individual European countries are compared, using a neoclassical growth model featuring “constant Frisch elasticity” (CFE) preferences. New tax rate data is provided. The US can maximally increase tax revenues by 30% with labor taxes and 6% with capital taxes. We obtain 8% and 1% for the EU-14. There, 54% of a labor tax cut and 79% of a capital tax cut are self-financing. The consumption tax Laffer curve does not peak. Endogenous growth and human capital accumulation affect the results quantitatively. Household heterogeneity may not be important, while transition matters greatly.
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Endogenous Selection of Comparison Groups, Human Capital Formation, and Tax Policy
Oded Stark, Walter Hyll, Y. Wang
Economica,
Nr. 313,
2012
Abstract
We consider a setting in which the acquisition of human capital entails a change of location in social space that causes individuals to revise their comparison groups. Skill levels are viewed as occupational groups. Moving up the skill ladder by acquiring additional human capital, in itself rewarding, leads to a shift in the individual’s inclination to compare himself with a different, and on average better-paid, comparison group, in itself penalizing. We shed new light on the dynamics of human capital formation, and suggest novel policy interventions to encourage human capital formation in the aggregate and reduce inter-group income inequality.
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Regulation and Taxation: A Complementarity
Benjamin Schoefer
Journal of Comparative Economics,
Nr. 4,
2010
Abstract
I show how quantity regulation can lower elasticities and thereby increase optimal tax rates. Such regulation imposes regulatory incentives for particular choice quantities. Their strength varies between zero (laissez faire) and infinite (command economy). In the latter case, regulation effectively eliminates any intensive behavioral responses to taxes; a previously distortionary tax becomes a lump sum. For intermediate regulation (where some deviation is feasible), intensive behavioral responses are still weaker than under zero regulation, and so quantity regulation reduces elasticities, thereby facilitating subsequent taxation. I apply this mechanism to labor supply and present correlational evidence for this complementarity: hours worked in high-regulation countries are compressed, and these countries tax labor at higher rates.
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Environmental Protection and the Private Provision of International Public Goods
Martin Altemeyer-Bartscher, Dirk T. G. Rübbelke, E. Sheshinski
Economica,
2010
Abstract
International environmental protection like the combat of global warming exhibits properties of public goods. In the international arena, no coercive authority exists that can enforce measures to overcome free-rider incentives. Therefore decentralized negotiations between individual regions serve as an approach to pursue efficient international environmental protection. We propose a scheme which is based on the ideas of Coasean negotiations and Pigouvian taxes. The negotiating entities offer side-payments to counterparts in order to influence their taxation of polluting consumption. Side-payments, in turn, are self-financed by means of externality-correcting taxes. As we show, a Pareto-efficient outcome can be attained.
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