Completing the European Banking Union: Capital Cost Consequences for Credit Providers and Corporate Borrowers
European Economic Review,
The bank recovery and resolution directive (BRRD) regulates the bail-in hierarchy to resolve distressed banks in the European Union (EU). Using the staggered BRRD implementation across 15 member states, we identify banks’ capital cost responses and subsequent pass-through to borrowers towards surprise elements due to national transposition details. Average bank capital costs increase heterogeneously across countries with strongest funding cost hikes observed for banks located in GIIPS and non-EMU countries. Only banks in core E(M)U countries that exhibit higher funding costs increase credit spreads for corporate borrowers and contract credit supply. Tighter credit conditions are only passed on to more levered and less profitable firms. On balance, the national implementation of BRRD appears to have strengthened financial system resilience without a pervasive hike in borrowing costs.
Evidenzbasierte Politikberatung (IWH-CEP)
Zentrum für evidenzbasierte Politikberatung (IWH-CEP) ...
Aktuelle Trends: Auf dem Weg zur europäischen Bankenunion: Verzögerte Umsetzung der Abwicklungsrichtlinie
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
In Reaktion auf die Erfahrungen aus der letzten Finanzmarktkrise veröffentlichte die Europäische Kommission im Mai 2014 die Richtlinie zur Sanierung und Abwicklung von Kreditinstituten (Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive, BRRD). Die Richtlinie legt Regeln zur Abwicklung und Restrukturierung von Banken einschließlich eines Bail-in-Mechanismus fest, der das Verlustrisiko beim Scheitern einer Bank vorrangig deren Anteilseignern und Gläubigern aufbürdet.
Are Bank Capital Requirements Optimally Set? Evidence from Researchers’ Views
Journal of Financial Stability,
We survey 149 leading academic researchers on bank capital regulation. The median (average) respondent prefers a 10% (15%) minimum non-risk-weighted equity-to-assets ratio, which is considerably higher than the current requirement. North Americans prefer a significantly higher equity-to-assets ratio than Europeans. We find substantial support for the new forms of regulation introduced in Basel III, such as liquidity requirements. Views are most dispersed regarding the use of hybrid assets and bail-inable debt in capital regulation. 70% of experts would support an additional market-based capital requirement. When investigating factors driving capital requirement preferences, we find that the typical expert believes a five percentage points increase in capital requirements would “probably decrease” both the likelihood and social cost of a crisis with “minimal to no change” to loan volumes and economic activity. The best predictor of capital requirement preference is how strongly an expert believes that higher capital requirements would increase the cost of bank lending.
11.08.2016 • 34/2016
Banken-Stresstest 2016: Deutsche und italienische Banken mit ähnlichen Ergebnissen
Europäische Bankenaufsicht (EBA) und Europäische Zentralbank (EZB) haben die Ergebnisse ihres Banken-Stresstests 2016 vorgelegt. Der Test zeigt, dass die meisten europäischen Banken unter den angenommenen Stressszenarien recht stabil bleiben würden. „Bedenklich stimmt allerdings, dass die italienischen Banken nicht schlechter abschneiden als die deutschen Großbanken“, kommentiert IWH-Präsident Reint E. Gropp. „Eine Aufstockung des Eigenkapitals der beiden deutschen Großbanken scheint angeraten zu sein. Außerdem hat der Stresstest leider zwei entscheidende Faktoren nicht berücksichtigt: Erstens wurde eine lang anhaltende Niedrigzinspolitik der EZB nicht simuliert. Und zweitens berücksichtigt der Test nicht die Möglichkeit, dass viele kleine Institute gleichzeitig in Schwierigkeiten geraten könnten, was wiederum im Kontext der schwindenden Zinsmargen immer wahrscheinlicher werden könnte“, sagt Gropp. Der Stresstest sollte auch nicht davon ablenken, dringend die Probleme der italienischen Banken zu lösen.
Sovereign Credit Risk, Banks' Government Support, and Bank Stock Returns around the World: Discussion of Correa, Lee, Sapriza, and Suarez
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking,
In the years leading up to the 2008–09 financial crisis, many banks around the world greatly expanded their balance sheets to take advantage of cheap and abundantly available funding. Access to international funding markets, in particular, made it possible for banks to reach a size that in some cases was a large multiple of their home countries’ gross domestic product (GDP). In Iceland, for example, assets of the banking system reached up to 900% of GDP in 2007. Similarly, by the end of 2008, assets in UK and Swiss banks exceeded 500% of their countries’ GDPs, respectively. Banks may also have grown rapidly because they may have wanted to reach too-big-to-fail status in their country, implying even lower funding cost (Penas and Unal 2004).
The depth and severity of the 2008–09 financial crisis and the subsequent debt crisis in Europe, however, have cast doubts on the ability of governments to bail out banks when they experience severe difficulties, in particular, in financially fragile environments and faced with large budget imbalances. This has resulted in as what some observers have dubbed a “doom loop”: the combination of weak public finances and weak banks results in a vicious cycle, in which the funding cost of banks increases, as the ability of governments to bail out banks is called into question, in turn increasing the funding cost of these banks and making the likelihood that the government will actually have to step in even higher, which in turn increases funding cost to the government and so forth.
Against this background, the paper by Correa et al. (2014) explores the link between sovereign rating changes and bank stock returns. They show large negative reactions of stock returns in response to sovereign ratings downgrades for banks that are expected to receive government support in case of failure. They find the strongest effects in developed economies, where the credibility of government bail outs is higher ex ante, while the effects are smaller in developing and emerging economies. In my view, the paper makes a number of important contributions to the extant literature.
The Ex Ante versus Ex Post Effect of Public Guarantees
D. Evanoff, C. Holthausen, G. Kaufman and M. Kremer (eds), The Role of Central Banks in Financial Stability: How has it Changed? World Scientific Studies in International Economics 30,
In October 2006, Dominion Bond Rating Service (DBRS) introduced new ratings for banks that account for the potential of government support. The rating changes are not a reflection of any changes in the respective banks’ credit fundamentals. We use this natural experiment to evaluate the consequences of bail out expectations for bank behavior using a difference in differences approach. The results suggest a striking difference between the effects of bail out probabilities during calm times (“ex ante”) versus during crisis times (“ex post”). During calm times, higher bail-out probabilities result in higher risk taking, consistent with the moral hazard view and much of the empirical literature. However, in crisis times, we find that banks with higher bail out probabilities tend to increase their risk taking less compared to banks that were ex ante unlikely to be bailed-out. Charter values are one part of the explanation: Supported banks may have a funding advantage relative to non-supported banks during the crisis. However, we cannot rule out that other factors also may be playing a role, including tighter supervision of supported banks in crisis times.
Sovereign Default Risk and Decentralization: Evidence for Emerging Markets
European Journal of Political Economy,
We study the impact of decentralization on sovereign default risk. Theory predicts that decentralization deteriorates fiscal discipline since subnational governments undertax/overspend, anticipating that, in the case of overindebtedness, the federal government will bail them out. We analyze whether investors account for this common pool problem by attaching higher sovereign yield spreads to more decentralized countries. Using panel data on up to 30 emerging markets in the period 1993–2008 we confirm this hypothesis. Higher levels of fiscal and political decentralization increase sovereign default risk. Moreover, higher levels of intergovernmental transfers and a larger number of veto players aggravate the common pool problem.