Compensation Regulation in Banking: Executive Director Behavior and Bank Performance after the EU Bonus Cap
Stefano Colonnello, Michael Koetter, Konstantin Wagner
Journal of Accounting and Economics,
The regulation that caps executives’ variable compensation, as part of the Capital Requirements Directive IV of 2013, likely affected executive turnover, compensation design, and risk-taking in EU banking. The current study identifies significantly higher average turnover rates but also finds that they are driven by CEOs at poorly performing banks. Banks indemnified their executives by off-setting the bonus cap with higher fixed compensation. Although our evidence is only suggestive, we do not find any reduction in risk-taking at the bank level, one purported aim of the regulation.
14.02.2023 • 4/2023
IWH-Studie zu Europas Top-Bankern: Riskante Geschäfte trotz Boni-Obergrenze
Vor zehn Jahren beschloss das EU-Parlament, die flexible Vergütung von Bankmanagern zu deckeln. Doch die Obergrenze für Boni verfehlt ihr Ziel: Manager systemrelevanter europäischer Banken gehen unverändert hohe Risiken ein, zeigt eine Studie des Leibniz-Instituts für Wirtschaftsforschung Halle (IWH).
Banking Market Deregulation and Mortality Inequality
Iftekhar Hasan, Thomas Krause, Stefano Manfredonia, Felix Noth
Bank of Finland Research Discussion Papers,
This paper shows that local banking market conditions affect mortality rates in the United States. Exploiting the staggered relaxation of branching restrictions in the 1990s across states, we find that banking deregulation decreases local mortality rates. This effect is driven by a decrease in the mortality rate of black residents, implying a decrease in the black-white mortality gap. We further analyze the role of mortgage markets as a transmitter between banking deregulation and mortality and show that households' easier access to finance explains mortality dynamics. We do not find any evidence that our results can be explained by improved labor outcomes.
Completing the European Banking Union: Capital Cost Consequences for Credit Providers and Corporate Borrowers
Michael Koetter, Thomas Krause, Eleonora Sfrappini, Lena Tonzer
European Economic Review,
The bank recovery and resolution directive (BRRD) regulates the bail-in hierarchy to resolve distressed banks in the European Union (EU). Using the staggered BRRD implementation across 15 member states, we identify banks’ capital cost responses and subsequent pass-through to borrowers towards surprise elements due to national transposition details. Average bank capital costs increase heterogeneously across countries with strongest funding cost hikes observed for banks located in GIIPS and non-EMU countries. Only banks in core E(M)U countries that exhibit higher funding costs increase credit spreads for corporate borrowers and contract credit supply. Tighter credit conditions are only passed on to more levered and less profitable firms. On balance, the national implementation of BRRD appears to have strengthened financial system resilience without a pervasive hike in borrowing costs.
The Cleansing Effect of Banking Crises
Reint E. Gropp, Steven Ongena, Jörg Rocholl, Vahid Saadi
We assess the cleansing effects of the 2008–2009 financial crisis. U.S. regions with higher levels of supervisory forbearance on distressed banks see less restructuring in the real sector: fewer establishments, firms, and jobs are lost when more distressed banks remain in business. In these regions, the banking sector has been less healthy for several years after the crisis. Regions with less forbearance experience higher productivity growth after the crisis with more firm entries, job creation, and employment, wages, patents, and output growth. Forbearance is greater for state-chartered banks and in regions with weaker banking competition and more independent banks.
A Note on the Use of Syndicated Loan Data
Isabella Müller, Felix Noth, Lena Tonzer
IWH Discussion Papers,
Syndicated loan data provided by DealScan has become an essential input in banking research over recent years. This data is rich enough to answer urging questions on bank lending, e.g., in the presence of financial shocks or climate change. However, many data options raise the question of how to choose the estimation sample. We employ a standard regression framework analyzing bank lending during the financial crisis to study how conventional but varying usages of DealScan affect the estimates. The key finding is that the direction of coefficients remains relatively robust. However, statistical significance seems to depend on the data and sampling choice.
Capital Requirements, Market Structure, and Heterogeneous Banks
IWH Discussion Papers,
Bank regulators interfere with the efficient allocation of resources for the sake of financial stability. Based on this trade-off, I compare how different capital requirements affect default probabilities and the allocation of market shares across heterogeneous banks. In the model, banks‘ productivity determines their optimal strategy in oligopolistic markets. Higher productivity gives banks higher profit margins that lower their default risk. Hence, capital requirements indirectly aiming at high-productivity banks are less effective. They also bear a distortionary cost: Because incumbents increase interest rates, new entrants with low productivity are attracted and thus average productivity in the banking market decreases.
Drei Forschungscluster ...
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