Firm Social Networks, Trust, and Security Issuances
European Journal of Finance,
We observe that public firms are more likely to issue seasoned stocks rather than bonds when theirs boards are more socially-connected. These connected issuers experience better announcement-period stock returns and attract more institutional investors. This social-connection effect is stronger for firms with severe information asymmetry, higher risk of being undersubscribed, and more visible to investors. Our conjecture is this social-network effect is driven by trust in issuing firms. Given stocks are more sensitive to trust, these trusted firms are more likely to issue stocks than bonds. Trustworthiness plays an important role in firms’ security issuances in capital markets.
Why are some Chinese Firms Failing in the US Capital Markets? A Machine Learning Approach
Pacific-Basin Finance Journal,
We study the market performance of Chinese companies listed in the U.S. stock exchanges using machine learning methods. Predicting the market performance of U.S. listed Chinese firms is a challenging task due to the scarcity of data and the large set of unknown predictors involved in the process. We examine the market performance from three different angles: the underpricing (or short-term market phenomena), the post-issuance stock underperformance (or long-term market phenomena), and the regulatory delistings (IPO failure risk). Using machine learning techniques that can better handle various data problems, we improve on the predictive power of traditional estimations, such as OLS and logit. Our predictive model highlights some novel findings: failed Chinese companies have chosen unreliable U.S. intermediaries when going public, and they tend to suffer from more severe owners-related agency problems.
Delay Determinants of European Banking Union Implementation
European Journal of Political Economy,
Most countries in the European Union (EU) delay the transposition of European Commission (EC) directives, which aim at reforming banking supervision, resolution, and deposit insurance. We compile a systematic overview of these delays to investigate if they result from strategic considerations of governments conditional on the state of their financial, regulatory, and political systems. Transposition delays pertaining to the three Banking Union directives differ considerably across the 28 EU members. Bivariate regression analyses suggest that existing national bank regulation and supervision drive delays the most. Political factors are less relevant. These results are qualitatively insensitive to alternative estimation methods and lag structures. Multivariate analyses highlight that well-stocked deposit insurance schemes speed-up the implementation of capital requirements, banking systems with many banks are slower in implementing new bank rescue and resolution rules, and countries with a more intensive sovereign-bank nexus delay the harmonization of EU deposit insurance more.
IWH-FDI-Mikrodatenbank Die IWH-FDI-Mikrodatenbank (FDI = Foreign Direct Investment)...
Reports des European Forecasting Network (EFN)
Reports des European Forecasting Network (EFN) Das European Forecasting Network...
Does Social Capital Matter in Corporate Decisions? Evidence from Corporate Tax Avoidance ...
Borrowers Under Water! Rare Disasters, Regional Banks, and Recovery Lending ...
National Politics and Bank Default Risk in the Eurozone
Journal of Financial Stability,
We study the impact of national politics on default risk of eurozone banks as measured by the stock market-based Distance to Default. We find that national electoral cycles, the power of the government as well as the government’s party ideological alignment significantly affect the stability of banks in the eurozone member countries. Moreover, we show that the impact of national politics on bank default risk is more pronounced for large as well as weakly capitalized banks.
Legal Insider Trading and Stock Market Liquidity
This paper assesses the impact of legal trades by corporate insiders on the liquidity of the firm’s stock. For this purpose, we analyze two liquidity measures and one information asymmetry measure. The analysis allows us to study as well the effect of a change in insider trading regulation, namely the implementation of the Market Abuse Directive (European Union Directive 2003/6/EC) on the Dutch stock market. The first set of results shows that, in accordance with theories of asymmetric information, the intensity of legal insider trading in a given company is positively related to the bid-ask spread and to the information asymmetry measure. We also find that the Market Abuse Directive did not reduce significantly this effect. Secondly, analyzing liquidity and information asymmetry around the days of legal insider trading, we find that small and large capitalization stocks see their bid-ask spread and the permanent price impact increase when insiders trade. For mid-cap stocks, only the permanent price impact increases. Finally, we could not detect a significant improvement of these results following the change in regulation.