Pre-announcement and Timing: The Effects of a Government Expenditure Shock
European Economic Review,
An econometric strategy to identify a pre-announced fiscal policy shock is proposed. I show that the reduced form innovations can be recovered by estimating a Vector-moving-average model using the Kalman filter. The structural effects are identified exploiting the shock's pre-announced nature, which leads to potentially different signs of the responses of some endogenous variables during the announcement and after the realization of the shock. I illustrate my strategy by identifying a pre-announced shock to government consumption expenditures. I find that the response of private consumption is significantly negative on impact, rises and becomes significantly positive two quarters after the realization of the policy shock.
Fiscal Policy and the Great Recession in the Euro Area
American Economic Review: Papers and Proceedings,
How much did fiscal policy contribute to euro area real GDP growth during the Great Recession? We estimate that discretionary fiscal measures have increased annualized quarterly real GDP growth during the crisis by up to 1.6 percentage points. We obtain our result by using an extended version of the European Central Bank's New Area-Wide Model with a rich specification of the fiscal sector. A detailed modeling of the fiscal sector and the incorporation of as many as eight fiscal time series appear pivotal for our result.
Effects of Fiscal Stimulus in Structural Models
American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics,
The paper subjects seven structural DSGE models, all used heavily by policymaking institutions, to discretionary fiscal stimulus shocks using seven different fiscal instruments, and compares the results to those of two prominent academic DSGE models. There is considerable agreement across models on both the absolute and relative sizes of different types of fiscal multipliers. The size of many multipliers is large, particularly for spending and targeted transfers. Fiscal policy is most effective if it has moderate persistence and if monetary policy is accommodative. Permanently higher spending or deficits imply significantly lower initial multipliers.
Crises, rescues, and policy transmission through international banks
Bundesbank Discussion Paper 15/2011,
The World Financial Crisis has shaken the fundamentals of international banking
and triggered a downward spiral of asset prices. To prevent a further meltdown of
markets, governments have intervened massively through rescues measures aimed at recapitalizing banks and through liquidity support. We use a detailed, banklevel dataset for German banks to analyze how the lending and borrowing of their foreign affiliates has responded to domestic (German) and to US crisis support schemes. We analyze how these policy interventions have spilled over into
foreign markets. We identify loan supply shocks by exploiting that not all banks
have received policy support and that the timing of receiving support measures
has differed across banks. We find that banks covered by rescue measures of the
German government have increased their foreign activities after these policy
interventions, but they have not expanded relative to banks not receiving support.
Banks claiming liquidity support under the Term Auction Facility (TAF) program
have withdrawn from foreign markets outside the US, but they have expanded
relative to affiliates of other German banks.
What Might Central Banks Lose or Gain in Case of Euro Adoption – A GARCH-Analysis of Money Market Rates for Sweden, Denmark and the UK
This study deals with the question whether the central banks of Sweden, Denmark and the UK can really influence short-term money markets and thus, would lose this influence in case of Euro adoption. We use a GARCH-M-GED model with daily money market rates. The model reveals the co-movement between the Euribor and the shortterm interest rates in these three countries. A high degree of co-movement might be seen as an argument for a weak impact of the central bank on its money markets. But this argument might only hold for tranquil times. Our approach reveals, in addition, whether there is a specific reaction of the money markets in turbulent times. Our finding is that the policy of the European Central Bank (ECB) has indeed a significant impact on the three money market rates, and there is no specific benefit for these countries to stay outside the Euro area. However, the GARCH-M-GED model further reveals risk divergence and unstable volatilities of risk in the case of adverse monetary shocks to the economy for Sweden and Denmark, compared to the Euro area. We conclude that the danger of adverse monetary developments cannot be addressed by a common monetary
policy for these both countries, and this can be seen as an argument to stay outside the Euro area.