Institutions and Corporate Reputation: Evidence from Public Debt Markets
Xian Gu, Iftekhar Hasan, Haitian Lu
Journal of Business Ethics,
Using data from China’s public debt markets, we study the value of corporate reputation and how it interacts with legal and cultural forces to assure accountability. Exploring lawsuits that change corporate reputation, we find that firms involved in lawsuits experience a decrease in bond values and a tightening of borrowing terms. Using the heterogeneities in legal and social capital environments across Chinese provinces, we find the effects are more pronounced for private firms, firms headquartered in provinces with low legal protections, and firms headquartered in provinces with high social capital. The results show that lawsuits that allege misconduct are associated with reputational penalties and that such penalties serve as substitutes for legal protections and as complements to cultural forces to provide ex post accountability and motivate ex ante trust.
Do Role Models Matter in Large Classes? New Evidence on Gender Match Effects in Higher Education
Simon Wiederhold, Stephan Maurer, Guido Schwerdt
CESifo Working Paper,
We study whether female students benefit from being taught by female professors, and whether such gender match effects differ by class size. We use administrative records of a German public university, covering all programs and courses between 2006 and 2018. We find that gender match effects on student performance are sizable in smaller classes, but do not exist in larger classes. This difference suggests that direct and frequent interactions between students and professors are important for the emergence of gender match effects. Instead, the mere fact that one's professor is female is not sufficient to increase performance of female students.
Physical Climate Change and the Sovereign Risk of Emerging Economies
Journal of Economic Structures,
I show that rising temperatures can detrimentally affect the sovereign creditworthiness of emerging economies. To this end, I collect long-term monthly temperature data of 54 emerging markets. I calculate a country’s temperature deviation from its historical average, which approximates present-day climate change trends. Running regressions from 1994m1 to 2018m12, I find that higher temperature anomalies lower sovereign bond performances (i.e., increase sovereign risk) significantly for countries that are warmer on average and have lower seasonality. The estimated magnitudes suggest that affected countries likely face significant increases in their sovereign borrowing costs if temperatures continue to rise due to climate change. However, results indicate that stronger institutions can make a country more resilient towards temperature shocks, which holds independent of a country’s climate.
Trust and Contracting with Foreign Banks: Evidence from China
Desheng Yin, Iftekhar Hasan, Liuling Liu, Haizhi Wang
Journal of Asian Economics,
We empirically investigate whether firms doing business in regions characterized as having high social trust receive preferential treatment on loan contractual terms by foreign banks. Tracing cross-border syndicated lending activities in China, we document that firms located in provinces with higher social trust scores obtain significantly low costs of bank loans and experience less stringent collateral requirement. To address the potential endogeneity issues, we adopt an instrumental variable approach and a two-sided matching model, and report consistent results. We also estimate a system of three equations through three-stage-least square estimator to accommodate the joint determination of price and non-price terms in loan contracts. In addition, we find that the effect of social trust on cost of bank loans is more prominent for firms located in provinces with relatively less developed formal institutions.
What Does Codetermination Do?
Simon Jäger, Shakked Noy, Benjamin Schoefer
The authors provide a comprehensive overview of codetermination, that is, worker representation in firms’ governance and management. The available micro evidence points to zero or small positive effects of codetermination on worker and firm outcomes and leaves room for moderate positive effects on productivity, wages, and job stability. The authors also present new country-level, general-equilibrium event studies of codetermination reforms between the 1960s and 2010s, finding no effects on aggregate economic outcomes or the quality of industrial relations. They offer three explanations for the institution’s limited impact. First, existing codetermination laws convey little authority to workers. Second, countries with codetermination laws have high baseline levels of informal worker voice. Third, codetermination laws may interact with other labor market institutions, such as union representation and collective bargaining. The article closes with a discussion of the implications for recent codetermination proposals in the United States.
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The Effect of Foreign Institutional Ownership on Corporate Tax Avoidance: International Evidence
Iftekhar Hasan, Incheol Kim, Haimeng Teng, Qiang Wu
Journal of International Accounting, Auditing and Taxation,
We find that foreign institutional investors (FIIs) reduce their investee firms’ tax avoidance. We provide evidence that the effect is driven by the institutional distance between FIIs’ home countries/regions and host countries/regions. Specifically, we find that the effect is driven by the influence of FIIs from countries/regions with high-quality institutions (i.e., common law, high government effectiveness, and high regulatory quality) on investee firms located in countries/regions with low-quality institutions. Furthermore, we show that the effect is concentrated on FIIs with little experience in the investee countries/regions or FIIs with stronger monitoring incentives. Finally, we find that FIIs are more likely to vote against management if the firm has a higher level of tax avoidance.