Why Is the Roy-Borjas Model Unable to Predict International Migrant Selection on Education? Evidence from Urban and Rural Mexico ...
IWH-Treuhand-Mikrodatenbank Die IWH-Treuhand-Mikrodatenbank ist ein neuer...
Who Buffers Income Losses after Job Displacement? The Role of Alternative Income Sources, the Family, and the State ...
The CompNet Competitiveness Database The Competitiveness Research Network (CompNet)...
Bank Failures, Local Business Dynamics, and Government Policy
Small Business Economics,
Using MSA-level data over 1994–2014, we study the effect of bank failures on local business dynamics, in the form of net business formation and net job creation. We find that at least one bank failure in the metropolitan statistical area (MSA) with the mean population prevents approximately 475 net businesses from forming in that area, compared with MSAs that experience no bank failures, ceteris paribus. The equivalent effect on net job creation is 16,433 net job losses. Our results are even stronger for small businesses, which are usually more dependent on bank-firm relationships. These effects point to significant welfare losses stemming from bank failures, highlighting an important role for government intervention. We show that the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) is effective in reducing the negative effects of bank failures on local business dynamics. This positive effect of TARP is quite uniform across small and large firms.
Explaining Wage Losses After Job Displacement: Employer Size and Lost Firm Wage Premiums
Journal of the European Economic Association,
This paper investigates whether wage losses after job displacement are driven by lost firm wage premiums or worker productivity depreciations. We estimate losses in wages and firm wage premiums, the latter being measured as firm effects from a two-way fixed-effects wage decomposition. Using new German administrative data on displacements from small and large employers, we find that wage losses are to a large extent explained by losses in firm wage premiums and that premium losses are largely permanent. We show that losses strongly increase with pre-displacement employer size. This provides an explanation for large and persistent wage losses reported in previous displacement studies typically focusing on large employers, only.
06.10.2021 • 24/2021
IWH-Insolvenztrend: Insolvenzzahlen bleiben niedrig, mehr Industriejobs von Insolvenz betroffen
Die Anzahl der Insolvenzen von Personen- und Kapitalgesellschaften verharrte im September in der Nähe der historischen Tiefststände. Die Zahl der betroffenen Jobs im Verarbeitenden Gewerbe stieg dagegen deutlich an. Das Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung Halle (IWH) liefert mit dem IWH-Insolvenztrend ein monatliches Update zum bundesweiten Insolvenzgeschehen.
Who Buffers Income Losses after Job Displacement? The Role of Alternative Income Sources, the Family, and the State
LABOUR: Review of Labour Economics and Industrial Relations,
Using survey data from the German Socio‐Economic Panel (SOEP), this paper analyses the extent to which alternative income sources, reactions within the household context, and redistribution by the state attenuate earnings losses after job displacement. Applying propensity score matching and fixed effects estimations, we find that income from self‐employment reduces the earnings gap only slightly and severance payments buffer losses in the short run. On the household level, we find little evidence for an added worker effect whereas redistribution by the state within the tax and transfer system mitigates income losses substantially.
Employment Protection and Firm-level Job Reallocation: Adjusting for Coverage
IWH-CompNet Discussion Papers,
This paper finds that employment protection legislation (EPL) had a significant impact on employment adjustment in Europe over 2001-2013, once we account for firm-size related exemptions to EPL. We construct a novel coverage-adjusted EPL indicator and find that EPL hinders employment growth at the firm level and increases the share of firms that remain in the same size class. This suggests that stricter EPL restrains job creation because firms fear the costs of shedding jobs during downturns. We do not find evidence that EPL has positive effects on employment by limiting job losses after adverse shocks. In addition to standard controls for the share of credit-constrained firms and the position in the business cycle, we also control for sizerelated corporate tax exemptions and find that these also significantly constrain job creation among incumbent firms.