23.05.2023 • 14/2023
Analyse von Finanzmarkt-Gesprächen: Schwafelnde Manager schaden dem Unternehmen
Verweigert eine Top-Führungskraft gegenüber Profi-Investoren die Auskunft, sinkt danach der Börsenwert des Unternehmens. Das zeigt eine Studie des Leibniz-Instituts für Wirtschaftsforschung Halle (IWH) nach Auswertung von 1,2 Millionen Antworten aus Telefonkonferenzen.
Die Mathematik der Bauchentscheidungen Zuerst Kosten und Nutzen sorgfältig abwägen und dann rational...
The Impact of Public Guarantees on Bank Risk-taking: Evidence from a Natural Experiment
Review of Finance,
In 2001, government guarantees for savings banks in Germany were removed following a lawsuit. We use this natural experiment to examine the effect of government guarantees on bank risk-taking. The results suggest that banks whose government guarantee was removed reduced credit risk by cutting off the riskiest borrowers from credit. Using a difference-in-differences approach we show that none of these effects are present in a control group of German banks to whom the guarantee was not applicable. Furthermore, savings banks adjusted their liabilities away from risk-sensitive debt instruments after the removal of the guarantee, while we do not observe this for the control group. We also document that yield spreads of savings banks’ bonds increased significantly right after the announcement of the decision to remove guarantees, while the yield spread of a sample of bonds issued by the control group remained unchanged. The evidence implies that public guarantees may be associated with substantial moral hazard effects.
Deposit Insurance, Moral Hazard and Market Monitoring
Review of Finance,
The paper analyses the relationship between deposit insurance, debt-holder monitoring, and risk taking. In a stylised banking model we show that deposit insurance may reduce moral hazard, if deposit insurance credibly leaves out non-deposit creditors. Testing the model using EU bank level data yields evidence consistent with the model, suggesting that explicit deposit insurance may serve as a commitment device to limit the safety net and permit monitoring by uninsured subordinated debt holders. We further find that credible limits to the safety net reduce risk taking of smaller banks with low charter values and sizeable subordinated debt shares only. However, we also find that the introduction of explicit deposit insurance tends to increase the share of insured deposits in banks' liabilities.