SSRN Working Papers,
We examine the relationship between protracted CEO successions and stock returns. In protracted successions, an incumbent CEO announces his or her resignation without a known successor, so the incumbent CEO becomes a “lame duck.” We find that 31% of CEO successions from 2005 to 2014 in the S&P 1500 are protracted, during which the incumbent CEO is a lame duck for an average period of about 6 months. During the reign of lame duck CEOs, firms generate an annual four-factor alpha of 11% and exhibit significant positive earnings surprises. Investors’ under-reaction to no news on new CEO information and underestimation of the positive effects of the tournament among the CEO candidates drive our results.
Start-up Competitions as an Instrument of Entrepreneurship Policy: The German Experience
European Planning Studies,
The number of aspiring entrepreneurs in high-tech industries who successfully complete the transition from a nascent start-up project towards an operational new venture is comparatively low in Germany. Since the mid-1990s, policy-makers have initiated numerous start-up competitions (SUCs or business plan competitions) to facilitate this important step in the venture creation process. SUCs have two key objectives. They are aimed at increasing start-up activity by motivating potential entrepreneurs, while they should also help to increase the likelihood of subsequent entrepreneurial success through providing necessary entrepreneurial skills to prospective entrepreneurs. With our explorative study, we provide the first comprehensive empirical evidence from a cross-sectional survey of existing SUCs in Germany. Overall, 71 SUCs are identified which are analysed regarding their development, regional distribution, and main structural characteristics. Finally, we outline an agenda of future research questions concerning the effectiveness and efficiency of SUCs as an instrument of entrepreneurship policy.
Lower Firm-Specific Productivity Levels in East Germany and East European Industrial Branches: The Role of Managerial Factors
Germany Economic Performance: From Unification to Euroisation. Macmillan: Basingstoke,
During the socialist era, companies in East Germany became much weaker than firms in West Germany in terms of technology and competitiveness. In large part, this may be rooted in the different incentive structures of the two systems: whereas in the West, the criterion for companies’ success was their ability to remain in business and generate income in a contestable market environment, firms in the East were required to fulfil a plan to which they were subjected without having their opinions considered.
Can Export Activities of Firms Contribute to the Catching-Up Process of Transitional Economies?
Can the transitional and development economies ever catch up? The Materials from The International Scientific Conference Cracow,
In contrast to the majority of the former centrally planned economies, the East German economy has suffered from enormous losses in the transformation process. In the study the question is analyzed whether exports can contribute to the catching-up process in transitional economies. Here it must be explained why the firms emerging out of the privatization process in economies in transition are successful if the export sector consists of small and medium sized enterprises. That is the case with East German manufacturing industry. The study is based on individual company data from the surveys of the East Germany's and North Rhine Westphalia's manufacturing industry between 1995 and 2001 stemming from official statistics.