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Reports des European Forecasting Network (EFN)
Reports des European Forecasting Network (EFN) Das European Forecasting Network...
Das IWH auf der Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2019 "30 Jahre Mauerfall" - Demokratie und Marktwirtschaft
IWH-BROWN-BAG-PANEL "Ost-West-Produktivitätslücke: Ursachen und Folgen" ...
Neues Europa Die Wirtschaftskrise ist weitgehend überwunden, doch das Vertrauen in die EZB...
Does Social Capital Matter in Corporate Decisions? Evidence from Corporate Tax Avoidance ...
Fiscal Policy and Fiscal Fragility: Empirical Evidence from the OECD ...
Innovation, Reallocation, and Growth
American Economic Review,
We build a model of firm-level innovation, productivity growth, and reallocation featuring endogenous entry and exit. A new and central economic force is the selection between high- and low-type firms, which differ in terms of their innovative capacity. We estimate the parameters of the model using US Census microdata on firm-level output, R&D, and patenting. The model provides a good fit to the dynamics of firm entry and exit, output, and R&D. Taxing the continued operation of incumbents can lead to sizable gains (of the order of 1.4 percent improvement in welfare) by encouraging exit of less productive firms and freeing up skilled labor to be used for R&D by high-type incumbents. Subsidies to the R&D of incumbents do not achieve this objective because they encourage the survival and expansion of low-type firms.
Interactions Between Regulatory and Corporate Taxes: How Is Bank Leverage Affected?
Regulatory bank levies set incentives for banks to reduce leverage. At the same time, corporate income taxation makes funding through debt more attractive. In this paper, we explore how regulatory levies affect bank capital structure, depending on corporate income taxation. Based on bank balance sheet data from 2006 to 2014 for a panel of EU-banks, our analysis yields three main results: The introduction of bank levies leads to lower leverage as liabilities become more expensive. This effect is weaker the more elevated corporate income taxes are. In countries charging very high corporate income taxes, the incentives of bank levies to reduce leverage turn ineffective. Thus, bank levies can counteract the debt bias of taxation only partially.