Cross-border Transmission of Emergency Liquidity
Journal of Banking & Finance,
We show that emergency liquidity provision by the Federal Reserve transmitted to non-U.S. banking markets. Based on manually collected holding company structures, we identify banks in Germany with access to U.S. facilities. Using detailed interest rate data reported to the German central bank, we compare lending and borrowing rates of banks with and without such access. U.S. liquidity shocks cause a significant decrease in the short-term funding costs of the average German bank with access. This reduction is mitigated for banks with more vulnerable balance sheets prior to the inception of emergency liquidity. We also find a significant pass-through in terms of lower corporate credit rates charged for banks with the lowest pre-crisis leverage, US-dollar funding needs, and liquidity buffers. Spillover effects from U.S. emergency liquidity provision are generally confined to short-term rates.
Borrowers Under Water! Rare Disasters, Regional Banks, and Recovery Lending ...
Crises and Rescues: Liquidity Transmission Through Global Banks
International Journal of Central Banking,
This paper shows that global banks transmit liquidity shocks via their network of foreign affiliates. We use the (unexpected) access of German banks' affiliates located in the United States to the Federal Reserve's Term Auction Facility. We condition on the parent banks' U.S. dollar funding needs in order to examine how affiliates located outside the United States adjusted their balance sheets when the U.S. affiliate of the same parent tapped into TAF liquidity. Our research has three main findings. First, affiliates tied to parents with higher U.S. dollar funding needs expanded their foreign assets during periods of active TAF borrowing. Second, the overall effects are driven by affiliates located in financial centers. Third, U.S.- dollar-denominated lending particularly increased in response to the TAF program.
Bank Market Power and Loan Contracts: Empirical Evidence
Using a sample of syndicated loan facilities granted to US corporate borrowers from 1987 to 2013, we directly gauge the lead banks’ market power, and test its effects on both price and non‐price terms in loan contracts. We find that bank market power is positively correlated with loan spreads, and the positive relation holds for both non‐relationship loans and relationship loans. In particular, we report that, for relationship loans, lending banks charge lower loan price for borrowing firms with lower switching cost. We further employ a framework accommodating the joint determination of loan contractual terms, and document that the lead banks’ market power is positively correlated with collateral and negatively correlated with loan maturity. In addition, we report a significant and negative relationship between banking power and the number of covenants in loan contracts, and the negative relationship is stronger for relationship loans.
Crises, rescues, and policy transmission through international banks
Bundesbank Discussion Paper 15/2011,
The World Financial Crisis has shaken the fundamentals of international banking
and triggered a downward spiral of asset prices. To prevent a further meltdown of
markets, governments have intervened massively through rescues measures aimed at recapitalizing banks and through liquidity support. We use a detailed, banklevel dataset for German banks to analyze how the lending and borrowing of their foreign affiliates has responded to domestic (German) and to US crisis support schemes. We analyze how these policy interventions have spilled over into
foreign markets. We identify loan supply shocks by exploiting that not all banks
have received policy support and that the timing of receiving support measures
has differed across banks. We find that banks covered by rescue measures of the
German government have increased their foreign activities after these policy
interventions, but they have not expanded relative to banks not receiving support.
Banks claiming liquidity support under the Term Auction Facility (TAF) program
have withdrawn from foreign markets outside the US, but they have expanded
relative to affiliates of other German banks.
Incubation Time, Incubator Age, and Firm Survival after Graduation
International Journal of Entrepreneurship and Innovation Management,
On the basis of a sample of 149 graduate firms from five German business incubators, this article contributes to incubator/incubation literature by investigating the effects of the age of the incubators and the firms´ incubation time in securing long-term survival of the firms after leaving the incubator facilities. The empirical findings from Cox proportional hazards regression and parametric accelerated failure time models reveal a statistically significant negative impact for both variables incubator age and incubation time on post-graduation firm survival. One important implication that follows from the empirical results for policy makers and managers of those initiatives is that, when incubator managers become increasingly involved in various regional development activities, this may reduce the effectiveness of incubator support. Also, our finding speaks in favour of a strict limitation of incubation times and reinforces arguments of the supporters of maximum tenancy.
Incubator Age and Incubation Time: Determinants of Firm Survival after Graduation?
On the basis of a sample of 149 graduate firms from five German technology oriented business incubators, this article contributes to incubator/incubation literature by investigating the effects of the age of the business incubators and the firms’ incubation time in securing long-term survival of the firms after leaving the incubator facilities. The empirical findings from Cox-proportional hazards regression and parametric accelerated failure time models reveal a statistically negative impact for both variables incubator age and incubation time on post-graduation firm survival. One possible explanation for these results is that, when incubator managers become increasingly involved in various regional development activities (e.g. coaching of regional network initiatives), this may reduce the effectiveness of incubator support and therefore the survival chances of firms.