Financial Incentives and Loan Officer Behavior: Multitasking and Allocation of Effort under an Incomplete Contract
Patrick Behr, Alejandro H. Drexler, Reint E. Gropp, Andre Guettler
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,
Nr. 4,
2020
Abstract
We investigate the implications of providing loan officers with a nonlinear compensation structure that rewards loan volume and penalizes poor performance. Using a unique data set provided by a large international commercial bank, we examine the main activities that loan officers perform: loan prospecting, screening, and monitoring. We find that when loan officers are at risk of losing their bonuses, they increase prospecting and monitoring. We further show that loan officers adjust their behavior more toward the end of the month when bonus payments are approaching. These effects are more pronounced for loan officers with longer tenures at the bank.
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Credit Allocation when Borrowers are Economically Linked: An Empirical Analysis of Bank Loans to Corporate Customers
Iftekhar Hasan, Kristina Minnick, Kartik Raman
Journal of Corporate Finance,
June
2020
Abstract
Using detailed loan level data, we examine bank lending to corporate customers relying on principal suppliers. Customers experience larger loan spreads, higher intensity of covenants and greater likelihood of requiring collateral when they depend more on the principal supplier for inputs. The positive association between the customer’s loan spread and its dependence on the principal supplier is less pronounced when the bank has a prior loan outstanding with the principal supplier, and when the bank has higher market share in the industry. Longer relationships between the customer and its principal supplier, and between the bank and the principal supplier, mitigate lending constraints. The evidence is consistent with corporate suppliers serving as an informational bridge between the lender and the customer.
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Banks’ Funding Stress, Lending Supply and Consumption Expenditure
H. Evren Damar, Reint E. Gropp, Adi Mordel
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking,
Nr. 4,
2020
Abstract
We employ a unique identification strategy linking survey data on household consumption expenditure to bank‐level data to estimate the effects of bank funding stress on consumer credit and consumption expenditures. We show that households whose banks were more exposed to funding shocks report lower levels of nonmortgage liabilities. This, however, only translates into lower levels of consumption for low‐income households. Hence, adverse credit supply shocks are associated with significant heterogeneous effects.
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Democracy and Credit
Manthos D. Delis, Iftekhar Hasan, Steven Ongena
Journal of Financial Economics,
Nr. 2,
2020
Abstract
Does democratization reduce the cost of credit? Using global syndicated loan data from 1984 to 2014, we find that democratization has a sizable negative effect on loan spreads: a 1-point increase in the zero-to-ten Polity IV index of democracy shaves at least 19 basis points off spreads, but likely more. Reversals to autocracy hike spreads more strongly. Our findings are robust to the comprehensive inclusion of relevant controls, to the instrumentation with regional waves of democratization, and to a battery of other sensitivity tests. We thus highlight the lower cost of loans as one relevant mechanism through which democratization can affect economic development.
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Stress Tests and Small Business Lending
Kristle R. Cortés, Yuliya Demyanyk, Lei Li, Elena Loutskina, Philip E. Strahan
Journal of Financial Economics,
Nr. 1,
2020
Abstract
Post-crisis stress tests have altered banks’ credit supply to small business. Banks most affected by stress tests reallocate credit away from riskier markets and toward safer ones. They also raise interest rates on small loans. Quantities fall most in high-risk markets where stress-tested banks own no branches, and prices rise mainly where they do. The results suggest that banks price the stress-test induced increase in capital requirements where they have local knowledge, and exit where they do not. Stress tests do not, however, reduce aggregate credit. Small banks seem to increase their share in geographies formerly reliant on stress-tested lenders.
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12.03.2020 • 4/2020
Konjunktur aktuell: Wirtschaft im Bann der Corona-Epidemie
Die Corona-Epidemie blockiert die konjunkturelle Erholung in Deutschland. Aus dem Ausland fällt Nachfrage aus, im Inland wird Konsum, soweit er Infektionsrisiken mit sich bringt, unterlassen, und Investitionen werden aufgeschoben. Unter der Annahme, dass die Epidemie in den fortgeschrittenen Volkswirtschaften noch zeitnah eingedämmt werden kann, beträgt der Produktionszuwachs im Jahr 2020 nach der Frühjahrsprognose des Leibniz-Instituts für Wirtschaftsforschung Halle (IWH) 0,6%. Dabei dürfte die Expansion in Ostdeutschland mit 0,9% höher ausfallen als in Westdeutschland. Sollte die Ausbreitung der Krankheit nicht drastisch reduziert werden können, ist mit einer Rezession in Deutschland zu rechnen.
Oliver Holtemöller
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18.02.2020 • 3/2020
Presseeinladung zur IWH-Konferenz „Europas Finanzmarkt: Zwangsehe oder lose Bekanntschaft?“ am 26. Februar 2020
Ein Jahrzehnt nach der weltweiten Finanzkrise steht das Finanzsystem noch immer vor enormen Herausforderungen. Wie diese in Europa gemeistert werden können, ist Thema einer hochkarätig besetzten Tagung am Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung Halle (IWH). Zur Eröffnung spricht Claudia Buch, Vizepräsidentin der Deutschen Bundesbank.
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Managerial Biases and Debt Contract Design: The Case of Syndicated Loans
Tim R. Adam, Valentin Burg, Tobias Scheinert, Daniel Streitz
Management Science,
Nr. 1,
2020
Abstract
We examine whether managerial overconfidence impacts the use of performance-pricing provisions in loan contracts (performance-sensitive debt [PSD]). Managers with biased views may issue PSD because they consider this form of debt to be mispriced. Our evidence shows that overconfident managers are more likely to issue rate-increasing PSD than regular debt. They choose PSD with steeper performance-pricing schedules than those chosen by rational managers. We reject the possibility that overconfident managers have (persistent) positive private information and use PSD for signaling. Finally, firms seem to benefit less from using PSD ex post if they are managed by overconfident rather than rational managers.
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Employee Treatment and Contracting with Bank Lenders: An Instrumental Approach for Stakeholder Management
Bill Francis, Iftekhar Hasan, Liuling Liu, Haizhi Wang
Journal of Business Ethics,
2019
Abstract
Adopting an instrumental approach for stakeholder management, we focus on two primary stakeholder groups (employees and creditors) to investigate the relationship between employee treatment and loan contracts with banks. We find strong evidence that fair employee treatment reduces loan price and limits the use of financial covenants. In addition, we document that relationship bank lenders price both the levels and changes in the quality of employee treatment, whereas first-time bank lenders only care about the levels of fair employee treatment. Taking a contingency perspective, we find that industry competition and firm asset intangibility moderate the relationship between good human resource management and bank loan costs. The cost reduction effect of fair employee treatment is stronger for firms operating in a more competitive industry and having higher levels of intangible assets.
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What Drives Discretion in Bank Lending? Some Evidence and a Link to Private Information
Gene Ambrocio, Iftekhar Hasan
Journal of Banking and Finance,
2019
Abstract
We assess the extent to which discretion, unexplained variations in the terms of a loan contract, has varied across time and lending institutions and show that part of this discretion is due to private information that lenders have on their borrowers. We find that discretion is lower for secured loans and loans granted by a larger group of lenders, and is larger when the lenders are larger and more profitable. Over time, discretion is also lower around recessions although the private information content is higher. The results suggest that bank discretionary and private information acquisition behavior may be important features of the credit cycle.
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