Bonusbeschränkung bei Banken: Das Ziel der Risikoverringerung wird nicht erreicht
Konstantin Wagner
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
Nr. 2,
2019
Abstract
Im Jahr 2014 trat die Regulierung zur Deckelung der variablen Vergütung von Bankvorständen in der Europäischen Union (EU) in Kraft. Ziel dieser Regulierung ist es, die Anreize zur übermäßigen Risikoübernahme zu vermindern. Dieser Beitrag untersucht, ob die Regulierung ihr erklärtes Ziel erreichen konnte und ob sie zudem mit unbeabsichtigten Konsequenzen einherging. Der Vergleich der Vergütungsniveaus vor und nach Einführung der Deckelung zeigt: Banken haben ihre Vorstände für den Verlust variabler Vergütung mit einer permanenten Erhöhung fixer Vergütungsbestandteile entschädigt. Gleichzeitig nahm die risikogewichtete Rentabilität betroffener Institute ab, was auf ein höheres Eigenrisiko zurückzuführen ist. Abgesichert durch hohe Fixgehälter gehen Banker offenbar höhere Risiken ein. Der befürchtete Exodus talentierter Banker aus Europa blieb aus.
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Firm-level Employment, Labour Market Reforms, and Bank Distress
Ralph Setzer, Moritz Stieglitz
Abstract
We explore the interaction between labour market reforms and financial frictions. Our study combines a new cross-country reform database on labour market reforms with matched firm-bank data for nine euro area countries over the period 1999 to 2013. While we find that labour market reforms are overall effective in increasing employment, restricted access to bank credit can undo up to half of long-term employment gains at the firm-level. Entrepreneurs without sufficient access to credit cannot reap the full benefits of more flexible employment regulation.
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Do Asset Purchase Programmes Shape Industry Dynamics? Evidence from the ECB's SMP on Plant Entries and Exits
Manfred Antoni, Talina Sondershaus
IWH Discussion Papers,
Nr. 12,
2019
Abstract
Asset purchase programmes (APPs) may insulate banks from having to terminate relationships with unproductive customers. Using administrative plant and bank data, we test whether APPs impinge on industry dynamics in terms of plant entry and exit. Plants in Germany connected to banks with access to an APP are approximately 20% less likely to exit. In particular, unproductive plants connected to weak banks with APP access are less likely to close. Aggregate entry and exit rates in regional markets with high APP exposures are also lower. Thus, APPs seem to subdue Schumpeterian cleansing mechanisms, which may hamper factor reallocation and aggregate productivity growth.
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Banks' Funding Stress, Lending Supply, and Consumption Expenditure
H. Evren Damar, Reint E. Gropp, Adi Mordel
Abstract
We employ a unique identification strategy linking survey data on household consumption expenditure to bank-level data to estimate the effects of bank funding stress on consumer credit and consumption expenditures. We show that households whose banks were more exposed to funding shocks report lower levels of nonmortgage liabilities. This, however, only translates into lower levels of consumption for low income households. Hence, adverse credit supply shocks are associated with significant heterogeneous effects.
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The Economic Impact of Changes in Local Bank Presence
Iftekhar Hasan, Krzysztof Jackowicz, Oskar Kowalewski, Łukasz Kozłowski
Regional Studies,
Nr. 5,
2019
Abstract
This study analyzes the economic consequences of changes in the local bank presence. Using a unique data set of banks, firms and counties in Poland over the period 2009–14, it is shown that changes strengthening the relationship banking model are associated with local labour market improvements and easier small and medium-sized enterprise access to bank debt. However, only the appearance of new, more aggressive owners of large commercial banks stimulates new firm creation.
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Lock‐in Effects in Relationship Lending: Evidence from DIP Loans
Iftekhar Hasan, Gabriel G. Ramírez, Gaiyan Zhang
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking,
Nr. 4,
2019
Abstract
Do prior lending relationships result in pass‐through savings (lower interest rates) for borrowers, or do they lock in higher costs for borrowers? Theoretical models suggest that when borrowers experience greater information asymmetry, higher switching costs, and limited access to capital markets, they become locked into higher costs from their existing lenders. Firms in Chapter 11 seeking debtor‐in‐possession (DIP) financing often fit this profile. We investigate the presence of lock‐in effects using a sample of 348 DIP loans. We account for endogeneity using the instrument variable (IV) approach and the Heckman selection model and find consistent evidence that prior lending relationship is associated with higher interest costs and the effect is more severe for stronger existing relationships. Our study provides direct evidence that prior lending relationships do create a lock‐in effect under certain circumstances, such as DIP financing.
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Gute Absicht – böses Ende: Die US-Wohnungspolitik als Brandbeschleuniger der Weltfinanzkrise
Reint E. Gropp, Vahid Saadi
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
Nr. 1,
2019
Abstract
Der Boom auf dem US-amerikanischen Eigenheimmarkt in den frühen 2000er Jahren führte zur schwersten Finanzkrise der vergangenen Jahrzehnte. Wissenschaftler haben unterschiedliche Faktoren dokumentiert, die zum rasanten Anstieg der Immobilienpreise beigetragen haben. Kaum beleuchtet wurde bisher die Rolle der US-Wohnungspolitik, insbesondere die Förderung des privaten Wohneigentums durch den Community Reinvestment Act (CRA). Der vorliegende Beitrag untersucht die Geschichte dieses Bundesgesetzes und seine Auswirkungen auf den Markt für Hypotheken und Wohneigentum seit den späten 1990er Jahren. Infolge des CRA wurden seit 1998 deutlich mehr Hypotheken aufgenommen. Der Anstieg der Immobilienpreise in der Boomphase beruhte zum Teil auf diesem politisch induzierten Anstieg der Hypothekenvergabe. Der CRA ermöglichte es auch Kreditnehmern mit geringerer Kreditwürdigkeit, eine Hypothek aufzunehmen – in der Folge kam es zu vermehrten Zahlungsausfällen. Der CRA hat also zum Boom-Bust-Zyklus auf dem amerikanischen Immobilienmarkt beigetragen. Er kann als Beispiel einer wohlmeinenden Politik gelten, die unbeabsichtigt wohlfahrtsmindernde Wirkungen zeitigt.
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Enforcement of Banking Regulation and the Cost of Borrowing
Yota D. Deli, Manthos D. Delis, Iftekhar Hasan, Liuling Liu
Journal of Banking and Finance,
April
2019
Abstract
We show that borrowing firms benefit substantially from important enforcement actions issued on U.S. banks for safety and soundness reasons. Using hand-collected data on such actions from the main three U.S. regulators and syndicated loan deals over the years 1997–2014, we find that enforcement actions decrease the total cost of borrowing by approximately 22 basis points (or $4.6 million interest for the average loan). We attribute our finding to a competition-reputation effect that works over and above the lower risk of punished banks post-enforcement and survives in a number of sensitivity tests. We also find that this effect persists for approximately four years post-enforcement.
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The Income Elasticity of Mortgage Loan Demand
Manthos D. Delis, Iftekhar Hasan, Chris Tsoumas
Financial Markets, Institutions and Instruments,
Special Issue: 2016 Portsmouth – Fordham Conferenc
2019
Abstract
One explanation for the emergence of the housing market bubble and the subprime crisis is that increases in individuals’ income led to higher increases in the amount of mortgage loans demanded, especially for the middle class. This hypothesis translates to an increase in the income elasticity of mortgage loan demand before 2007. Using applicant‐level data, we test this hypothesis and find that the income elasticity of mortgage loan demand in fact declines in the years before 2007, especially for the mid‐ and lower‐middle income groups. Our finding implies that increases in house prices were not matched by increases in loan applicants’ income.
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What Drives Banks‘ Geographic Expansion? The Role of Locally Non-diversifiable Risk
Reint E. Gropp, Felix Noth, Ulrich Schüwer
IWH Discussion Papers,
Nr. 6,
2019
Abstract
We show that banks that are facing relatively high locally non-diversifiable risks in their home region expand more across states than banks that do not face such risks following branching deregulation in the 1990s and 2000s. These banks with high locally non-diversifiable risks also benefit relatively more from deregulation in terms of higher bank stability. Further, these banks expand more into counties where risks are relatively high and positively correlated with risks in their home region, suggesting that they do not only diversify but also build on their expertise in local risks when they expand into new regions.
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