The Identification of Technology Regimes in Banking: Implications for the Market Power-Fragility Nexus
Michael Koetter, Tigran Poghosyan
Journal of Banking and Finance,
Nr. 8,
2009
Abstract
Neglecting the existence of different technologies in banking can contaminate efficiency, market power, and other performance measures. By simultaneously estimating (i) technology regimes conditional on exogenous factors, (ii) efficiency conditional on risk management, and (iii) Lerner indices of German banks, we identify three distinct technology regimes: Public & Retail, Small & Specialized, and Universal & Relationship. System estimation at the regional level reveals that greater bank market power increases bank profitability but also fosters corporate defaults. Corporate defaults, in turn, lead to higher probabilities of bank distress, which supports the market power-fragility hypothesis.
Artikel Lesen
Effects of Heterogeneity on Bank Efficiency Scores
J. W. B. Bos, Michael Koetter, James W. Kolari, Clemens J. M. Kool
European Journal of Operational Research,
Nr. 1,
2009
Abstract
Bank efficiency estimates often serve as a proxy of managerial skill since they quantify sub-optimal production choices. But such deviations can also be due to omitted systematic differences among banks. In this study, we examine the effects of heterogeneity on bank efficiency scores. We compare different specifications of a stochastic cost and alternative profit frontier model with a baseline specification. After conducting a specification test, we discuss heterogeneity effects on efficiency levels, ranks and the tails of the efficiency distribution. We find that heterogeneity controls influence both banks’ optimal costs and profits and their ability to be efficient. Differences in efficiency scores are important for more than only methodological reasons. First, different ways of accounting for heterogeneity result in estimates of foregone profits and additional costs that are significantly different from what we infer from our general specification. Second, banks are significantly re-ranked when their efficiency is estimated with a specification other than the preferred, general specification. Third, the general specification gives the most reliable estimates of the probability of distress, although differences to the other specifications are low.
Artikel Lesen
Cross-Border Bank Contagion in Europe
Reint E. Gropp, M. Lo Duca, Jukka M. Vesala
International Journal of Central Banking,
Nr. 1,
2009
Abstract
We analyze cross-border contagion among European banks in the period from January 1994 to January 2003. We use a multinomial logit model to estimate, in a given country, the number of banks that experience a large shock on the same day (“coexceedances”) as a function of common shocks and lagged coexceedances in other countries. Large shocks are measured by the bottom 95th percentile of the distribution of the daily percentage change in distance to default of banks.We find evidence of significant cross-border contagion among large European banks, which is consistent with a tiered cross-border interbank structure. The results also suggest that contagion increased after the introduction of the euro.
Artikel Lesen
Monetary Policy and Financial (In)stability: An Integrated Micro–Macro Approach
Ferre De Graeve, Thomas Kick, Michael Koetter
Journal of Financial Stability,
Nr. 3,
2008
Abstract
Evidence on central banks’ twin objective, monetary and financial stability, is scarce. We suggest an integrated micro–macro approach with two core virtues. First, we measure financial stability directly at the bank level as the probability of distress. Second, we integrate a microeconomic hazard model for bank distress and a standard macroeconomic model. The advantage of this approach is to incorporate micro information, to allow for non-linearities and to permit general feedback effects between financial distress and the real economy. We base the analysis on German bank and macro data between 1995 and 2004. Our results confirm the existence of a trade-off between monetary and financial stability. An unexpected tightening of monetary policy increases the probability of distress. This effect disappears when neglecting microeffects and non-linearities, underlining their importance. Distress responses are largest for small cooperative banks, weak distress events, and at times when capitalization is low. An important policy implication is that the separation of financial supervision and monetary policy requires close collaboration among members in the European System of Central Banks and national bank supervisors.
Artikel Lesen
Accounting for Distress in Bank Mergers
Michael Koetter, J. W. B. Bos, Frank Heid, James W. Kolari, Clemens J. M. Kool, Daniel Porath
Journal of Banking and Finance,
Nr. 10,
2007
Abstract
Most bank merger studies do not control for hidden bailouts, which may lead to biased results. In this study we employ a unique data set of approximately 1000 mergers to analyze the determinants of bank mergers. We use undisclosed information on banks’ regulatory intervention history to distinguish between distressed and non-distressed mergers. Among merging banks, we find that improving financial profiles lower the likelihood of distressed mergers more than the likelihood of non-distressed mergers. The likelihood to acquire a bank is also reduced but less than the probability to be acquired. Both distressed and non-distressed mergers have worse CAMEL profiles than non-merging banks. Hence, non-distressed mergers may be motivated by the desire to forestall serious future financial distress and prevent regulatory intervention.
Artikel Lesen
Does Qualification Drive Innovation? A Microeconometric Analysis Using Linked-employer-employee Data
Bianca Brandenburg, Jutta Günther, Lutz Schneider
IWH Discussion Papers,
Nr. 10,
2007
Abstract
Degree-level science and engineering skills as well as management and leadership skills are often referred to as a source of innovative activities within companies. Broken down by sectoral innovation patterns, this article examines the role of formal education and actual occupation for product innovation performance in manufacturing firms within a probit model. It uses unique micro data for Germany (LIAB) that contain detailed information about innovative activities and the qualification of employees. We find significant differences of the human capital endowment between sectors differentiated according to the Pavitt classification. Sectors with a high share of highly skilled employees engage in product innovation above average (specialized suppliers and science based industries). According to our hitherto estimation results, within these sectors the share of highly skilled employees does not, however, substantially increase the probability to be an innovative firm.
Artikel Lesen
Schätzunsicherheit oder Korrelation, Welche Risikokomponente sollten Unternehmen bei der Bewertung von Kreditportfoliorisiken wann berücksichtigen?
Henry Dannenberg
IWH Discussion Papers,
Nr. 5,
2007
Abstract
Die Bewertung der Ausfallwahrscheinlichkeiten von Ratingklassen, basierend auf historischen Daten, ist mit Schätzunsicherheit verbunden. Zur Bewertung dieser Unsicherheit werden in der Literatur Konfidenzintervalle diskutiert. Diesen liegen allerdings Annahmen bezüglich der Abhängigkeiten zwischen einzelnen Forderungen zugrunde, die im Widerspruch zu den Annahmen der gängigen Kreditportfoliomodelle stehen. Im vorliegenden Beitrag wird anhand von Simulationsstudien gezeigt, dass eine Berücksichtigung von Schätzunsicherheit in kleinen Portfolios gerechtfertigt sein kann, auch wenn dafür Abhängigkeiten vernachlässigt werden müssen. Die Modellierung der Schätzunsicherheit beruht hier auf der Idee der Konfidenzintervalle und der ihnen zugrundeliegenden Verteilungen. Die Ergebnisse der Arbeit sind vor allem für die Modellierung von Forderungsportfolios in Unternehmen von Interesse.
Artikel Lesen
Bank Lending, Bank Capital Regulation and Efficiency of Corporate Foreign Investment
Diemo Dietrich, Achim Hauck
IWH Discussion Papers,
Nr. 4,
2007
Abstract
In this paper we study interdependencies between corporate foreign investment and the capital structure of banks. By committing to invest predominantly at home, firms can reduce the credit default risk of their lending banks. Therefore, banks can refinance loans to a larger extent through deposits thereby reducing firms’ effective financing costs. Firms thus have an incentive to allocate resources inefficiently as they then save on financing costs. We argue that imposing minimum capital adequacy for banks can eliminate this incentive by putting a lower bound on financing costs. However, the Basel II framework is shown to miss this potential.
Artikel Lesen
Cross-border Bank Contagion in Europe
Reint E. Gropp, M. Lo Duca, Jukka M. Vesala
ECB Working Paper, No. 662,
Nr. 662,
2006
Abstract
This paper analyses cross-border contagion in a sample of European banks from January 1994 to January 2003. We use a multinomial logit model to estimate the number of banks in a given country that experience a large shock on the same day (“coexceedances“) as a function of variables measuring common shocks and lagged coexceedances in other countries. Large shocks are measured by the bottom 95th percentile of the distribution of the daily percentage change in the distance to default of the bank. We find evidence in favour of significant cross-border contagion. We also find some evidence that since the introduction of the euro cross-border contagion may have increased. The results seem to be very robust to changes in the specification.
Artikel Lesen
Network Investment and the Threat of Regulation – Preventing Monopoly Exploitation or Infrastructure Construction?
Ulrich Blum, Christian Growitsch, Niels Krap
IWH Discussion Papers,
Nr. 7,
2006
Abstract
In summer 2005, the German telecommunication incumbent Deutsche Telekom announced its plans to build a new broadband fibre optics network. Deutsche Telekom decided as precondition for this new network not to be regulated with respect to pricing and third party access. To develop a regulator's strategy that allows investments and prevents monopolistic prices at the same time, we model an incumbent's decision problem under a threat of regulation in a game-theoretical context. The decision whether to invest or not depends on the probability of regulation and its assumed impact on investment returns. Depending on the incumbent's expectation on these parameters, he will decide if the investment is favourable, and which price to best set. This price is below a non-regulated profit maximising price, since the incumbent tries to circumvent regulation. Thus, we show that the mere threat of a regulator's intervention might prevent supernormal profits without actual price regulation. The regulator, on the other hand, can influence both investment decision and the incumbent's price via his signals on regulation probability and price. These signals an be considered optimal, if they simultaneously allow investment and minimize the incumbent's price.
Artikel Lesen
