The economy is a complex system because market participants do not act independently but adjust their behavior to other agents and to the outcome which emerges from their joint actions (Arthur, 2014). Dependencies among participants can impede policy makers capabilities to influence or steer the course of the economy. Kambhu et al. (2007) argue that to influence developments in financial markets, for instance to prevent crises from spreading, there are only “coarse or indirect options” available for policy makers. Similar to crises which propagate through a complex system, interventions might result in unintended side effects which can also disseminate through the system. Thus, in a complex system, unintended consequences of policy efforts may well be the rule. Policy makers try to ward off or mitigate negative consequences for the economy and society during periods of crisis. For instance, during the Covid crisis large scale support programs for firms in Western economies were set up to avoid bankruptcies. Similarly, during the sovereign debt crisis in the Eurozone, the European Central Bank (ECB) set up large scale asset purchase programs as well as additionally longer-term refinancing operations (LTRO) which provided immediate support to financial market participants’ liquidity positions and thereby prevented a melt-down of the financial system. During these periods, immediate and abundant liquidity supply is of utmost importance. Meanwhile, crisis measures, due to their massive scale and non-specific target group, may entail unknown or unintended side effects for instance on competition among market participants, firms’ investment behavior, or changes in lending strategies and risk taking behavior of banks. Likewise, new regulatory frameworks such as the introduction of new markets can have consequences previously not thought of. For policy makers it is important to know direct effects of policy interventions but also to be aware of the possibility and impact of indirect or unexpected side effects in order to evaluate measures taken and to learn for future design of regulation or intervention.

We assess the cleansing effects of the 2008–2009 financial crisis. U.S. regions with higher levels of supervisory forbearance on distressed banks see less restructuring in the real sector: fewer establishments, firms, and jobs are lost when more distressed banks remain in business. In these regions, the banking sector has been less healthy for several years after the crisis. Regions with less forbearance experience higher productivity growth after the crisis with more firm entries, job creation, and employment, wages, patents, and output growth. Forbearance is greater for state-chartered banks and in regions with weaker banking competition and more independent banks.

Syndicated loan data provided by DealScan is an essential input in banking research. This data is rich enough to answer urging questions on bank lending, e.g., in the presence of financial shocks or climate change. However, many data options raise the question of how to choose the estimation sample. We employ a standard regression framework analyzing bank lending during the financial crisis of 2007/08 to study how conventional but varying usages of DealScan affect the estimates. The key finding is that the direction of coefficients remains relatively robust. However, statistical significance depends on the data and sampling choice and we provide guidelines for applied research.

Studies find that during the 2007–2009 global financial crisis, loan spreads rose and corporate lending tightened, especially for foreign borrowers (a flight-home effect). We find that banks in countries with explicit deposit insurance (DI) made smaller reductions in total lending and foreign lending, experienced smaller increases in loan spreads, and had quicker post-crisis recoveries. These effects are more pronounced for banks heavily relying on deposit funding. Evidence also reveals that more generous or credible DI design is associated with a stronger stabilization effect on bank lending during the crisis, confirmed by the difference-in-differences analysis based on expansion of DI coverage during the crisis. The stabilization effect is robust to the use of country-specific crisis measures and control of temporary government guarantees.

Die russische Wirtschaft ist durch die westlichen Sanktionen nach dem Einmarsch in die Ukraine schwer getroffen. Die Wirtschaft schrumpft um über 8%, die Inflation hat sich auf knapp 20% erhöht. Die meisten internationalen Firmen haben sich aus Russland zurückgezogen. Viele reiche Russen haben keinen Zugang mehr zu ihren Vermögenswerten im Ausland, Kapitalverkehrskontrollen verhindern, dass Russen und russische Firmen Fremdwährung kaufen können, und sowohl die russischen Banken als auch die russische Zentralbank haben fast keine Möglichkeiten mehr, mit ausländischen Banken Transaktionen durchzuführen. Gleichzeitig hat Putin das Gegenteil von dem erreicht, was er laut eigener Aussage wollte: eine Schwächung der NATO, der Europäischen Union und des Westens im Allgemeinen. Schweden und Finnland haben um die Aufnahme in die NATO gebeten und damit die gemeinsame Grenze der NATO mit Russland um über 800 km verlängert. Die Chancen, dass die Ukraine in die EU aufgenommen wird, haben sich deutlich erhöht, und der Westen ist mit wenigen Ausnahmen (Ungarn, Türkei) geeinter denn je.

Prognosemodelle für die zukünftige wirtschaftliche Entwicklung verwenden häufig marktbasierte Indikatoren wie Spreads von Unternehmensanleihen, die den Risikoaufschlag gegenüber einem Referenzzins angeben. Anleihespreads bilden jedoch nur die Entwicklung von Risiken für Unternehmen ab, die regelmäßig Anleihen emittieren – im Durchschnitt größere, sichere Firmen. Neuartige Daten zu Bankkrediten, die im Sekundärmarkt gehandelt werden, erlauben auch die Konstruktion von Kreditspreads. Kreditmarktdaten umfassen ein breiteres Spektrum an Firmen, inklusive kleinerer Firmen, die stärker von Finanzmarktfriktionen betroffen sind. Tests zeigen, dass Kreditspreads tatsächlich mehr Informationen über wirtschaftliche Entwicklungen beinhalten als Anleihespreads und daher das Potenzial haben, Prognosemodelle zu verbessern.

We identify the effect of climate change-related regulatory risks on credit real-location. Our evidence suggests that effects depend borrower's region. Following an increase in salience of regulatory risks, banks reallocate credit to US firms that could be negatively impacted by regulatory interventions. Conversely, in Europe, banks lend more to firms that could benefit from environmental regulation. The effect is moderated by banks' own loan portfolio composition. Banks with a portfolio tilted towards firms that could be negatively a affected by environmental policies increasingly support these firms. Overall, our results indicate that financial implications of regulation associated with climate change appear to be the main drivers of banks' behavior.

Unconventional monetary policy measures like asset purchase programs aim to reduce certain securities' yield and alter financial institutions' investment behavior. These measures increase the institutions' market value of securities and add to their equity positions. We show that the extent of this recapitalization effect crucially depends on the securities' accounting and valuation methods, country-level regulation, and maturity structure. We argue that future research needs to consider these factors when quantifying banks' recapitalization effects and consequent changes in banks' lending decisions to the real sector.

How does social capital affect trust? Evidence from a Chinese peer-to-peer lending platform shows regional social capital affects the trustee’s trustworthiness and the trustor’s trust propensity. Ceteris paribus, borrowers from higher social capital regions receive larger bid from individual lenders, have higher funding success, larger loan size, and lower default rates, especially for low-quality borrowers. Lenders from higher social capital regions take higher risks and have higher default rates, especially for inexperienced lenders. Cross-regional transactions are most (least) likely to be realized between parties from high (low) social capital regions.