We test whether organizational risk management matters to bondholders of U.S. bank holding companies (BHCs), and find that debt financing costs increase when the BHC has lower-quality risk management. Consistent with bailouts giving rise to moral hazard among bank creditors, we find that bondholders put less emphasis on risk management in large institutions for which bailouts are expected ex-ante. BHCs that maintained strong risk management before the financial crisis had lower debt costs during and after the crisis, compared to other banks. Overall, quality risk management can curtail risk exposures at BHCs and result in lower debt costs.

We study how banks use “regulatory adjustments” to inflate their regulatory capital ratios and whether this depends on forbearance on the part of national authorities. Using the 2011 EBA capital exercise as a quasi-natural experiment, we find that banks substantially inflated their levels of regulatory capital via a reduction in regulatory adjustments — without a commensurate increase in book equity and without a reduction in bank risk. We document substantial heterogeneity in regulatory capital inflation across countries, suggesting that national authorities forbear their domestic banks to meet supranational requirements, with a focus on short-term economic considerations.

We propose a macroeconomic model with a nonlinear Phillips curve that has a flat slope when inflationary pressures are subdued and steepens when inflationary pressures are elevated. The nonlinear Phillips curve in our model arises due to a quasi-kinked demand schedule for goods produced by firms. Our model can jointly account for the modest decline in inflation during the Great Recession and the surge in inflation during the post-COVID period. Because our model implies a stronger transmission of shocks when inflation is high, it generates conditional heteroskedasticity in inflation and inflation risk. Hence, our model can generate more sizeable inflation surges due to cost-push and demand shocks than a standard linearized model. Finally, our model implies that the central bank faces a more severe trade-off between inflation and output stabilization when inflation is elevated.

Does banking supervision affect borrowers’ transition to the carbon-neutral economy? We use a unique identification strategy that combines the French bank climate pilot exercise with borrowers’ carbon emissions to present two novel findings. First, climate stress tests actively facilitate borrowers’ transition to a low-carbon economy through a lending channel. Stress-tested banks increase loan volumes but simultaneously charge higher interest rates for brown borrowers. Second, additional lending is associated with some improvements in environmental performance. While borrowers commit more to reduce carbon emissions and are more likely to evaluate environmental effects of their projects, they neither reduce direct carbon emissions, nor terminate relationships with environmentally unfriendly suppliers. Our findings establish a causal link between bank climate stress tests and borrowers’ reductions in transition risk.