This paper assesses the progress made towards the creation of the European Banking Union (EBU) and the evolution of the banking industry in the European Union since the financial crisis of 2007. We review major regulatory changes pertaining to the three pillars of the EBU and the effects of new legislation on both banks and the real economy. Whereas farreaching reforms pertaining to the EBU pillars of supervision and resolution regimes have been implemented, the absence of a European Deposit Scheme remains a crucial deficiency. We discuss how European banks coped with recent challenges, such as the Covid-19 pandemic, a high inflation environment, and digitalization needs, followed by an outlook on selected major challenges lying ahead of this incomplete EBU, notably the transition towards a green economy.

We examine the effect of sovereign credit impairments on the pricing of syndicated loans following rating downgrades in the borrowing firms' countries of domicile. We find that the sovereign ceiling policies used by credit rating agencies create a disproportionately adverse impact on the bounded firms' borrowing costs relative to other domestic firms following their sovereign's rating downgrade. Rating-based regulatory frictions partially explain our results. On the supply-side, loans carry a higher spread when granted from low-capital banks, non-bank lenders, and banks with high market power. We further document an operating demand-side channel, contingent on borrowers' size, financial constraints, and global diversification. Our results can be attributed to the relative bargaining power between lenders and borrowers: relationship borrowers and non-bank dependent borrowers with alternative financing sources are much less affected.

We study the firm-level and aggregate effects of government-imposed employment targets. We develop a dynamic general equilibrium model with heterogeneous firms and endogenous productivity growth in which penalties for below-target hiring generate a polarization mechanism: low-productivity firms exit, while others expand employment beyond efficient levels, and firms invest in productivity to avoid future penalties. We test and confirm the model’s firm level predictions using unique contractual data on more than 18,000 employment commitments from the East German privatization, exploiting quasi-random variation in the assignment of privatizers to firms. Quantitatively, employment targets reduce unemployment in the short run, but these gains reverse over time as distorted labor allocations and weakened investment incentives slow aggregate productivity growth and reduce welfare. We also evaluate how alternative designs for employment-protection (e.g., the choice between mandates and subsidies, the structure of targets) impact misallocation and the resulting short- and long-run outcomes.

Die vorliegende Expertise verfolgte das Ziel, Datenbedarfe für die Evaluierung der Kapitel-1-Maßnahmen des InvKG abzuleiten. Die Evaluierung und die daraus entstehenden Datenbedarfe müssen sich in ein theoretisches Modell der ökonomischen Literatur zur Wirkung von Politikmaßnahmen einordnen lassen. Bei den Kapitel-1-Maßnahmen handelt es sich im weitesten Sinne um Investitionen in wirtschaftsnahe Infrastrukturen. Charakteristisch für Infrastrukturen ist, dass sie durch mittlere Zeiträume der Planung und Errichtung auf der einen sowie lange Nutzungszeiträume auf der anderen Seite gekennzeichnet sind. Hinzu kommt, dass die Phasen der Planung/Errichtung und der Nutzung Aspekte von Marktmängeln berühren. In der Praxis unterliegt dieser Bereich daher einer umfassenden staatlichen Regulierung.

Relying on confidential supervisory data related to the 2016 EU-wide stress test, this paper presents novel empirical evidence that supervisory scrutiny associated to stress testing has a disciplining effect on bank risk. We find that banks that participated in the 2016 EU-wide stress test subsequently reduced their credit risk relative to banks that were not part of this exercise. Relying on new metrics for supervisory scrutiny that measure the quantity, potential impact, and duration of interactions between banks and supervisors during the stress test, we find that the disciplining effect is stronger for banks subject to more intrusive supervisory scrutiny during the exercise. We also find that a strong risk management culture is a prerequisite for the supervisory scrutiny to be effective. Finally, we show that a similar disciplining effect is not exerted neither by higher capital charges nor by more transparency and related market discipline induced by the stress test.