Economic Failure and the Role of Plant Age and Size
Steffen Müller, Jens Stegmaier
Small Business Economics,
Nr. 3,
2015
Abstract
This paper introduces a large-scale administrative panel data set on corporate bankruptcy in Germany that allows for an econometric analysis of involuntary exits where previous studies mixed voluntary and involuntary exits. Approximately 83 % of all bankruptcies occur in plants with not more than 10 employees, and 61 % of all bankrupt plants are not older than 5 years. The descriptive statistics and regression analysis indicate substantial negative age dependence with respect to bankruptcy risk but confirm negative size dependence for mature plants only. Our results corroborate hypotheses stressing increasing capabilities and positional advantage, both predicting negative age dependence with respect to bankruptcy risk due to productivity improvements. The results are not consistent with the theories explaining age dependence via imprinting or structural inertia.
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Corporate Venture Capital, Value Creation, and Innovation
Thomas J. Chemmanur, Elena Loutskina, Xuan Tian
Review of Financial Studies,
Nr. 8,
2014
Abstract
We analyze how corporate venture capital (CVC) differs from independent venture capital (IVC) in nurturing innovation in entrepreneurial firms. We find that CVC-backed firms are more innovative, as measured by their patenting outcome, although they are younger, riskier, and less profitable than IVC-backed firms. Our baseline results continue to hold in a propensity score matching analysis of IPO firms and a difference-in-differences analysis of the universe of VC-backed entrepreneurial firms. We present evidence consistent with two possible underlying mechanisms: CVC's greater industry knowledge due to the technological fit between their parent firms and entrepreneurial firms and CVC's greater tolerance for failure.
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Is Subsidizing Companies in Difficulties an Optimal Policy? An Empirical Study on the Effectiveness of State Aid in the European Union
Nicole Nulsch
IWH Discussion Papers,
Nr. 9,
2014
Abstract
Even though state aid in order to rescue or restructure ailing companies is regularly granted by European governments, it is often controversially discussed. The aims for rescuing companies are manifold and vary from social, industrial and even political considerations. Well-known examples are Austrian Airlines (Austria) or MG Rover (Great Britain). Yet, this study aims to answer the question whether state aid is used effectively and whether the initial aim why aid has been paid has been reached, i.e. the survival of the company. By using data on rescued companies in the EU and applying a survival analysis, this paper investigates the survival rates of these companies up to 15 years after the aid has been paid. In addition, the results are compared to the survival rates of non-rescued companies which have also been in difficulties. The results suggest that despite the financial support, business failure is often only post-poned; best survival rates have firms with long-term restructuring, enterprises in Eastern Europe, smaller firms and mature companies. However, non-funded companies have an even higher ratio to go bankrupt.
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Sovereign Credit Risk, Banks' Government Support, and Bank Stock Returns around the World: Discussion of Correa, Lee, Sapriza, and Suarez
Reint E. Gropp
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking,
s1
2014
Abstract
In the years leading up to the 2008–09 financial crisis, many banks around the world greatly expanded their balance sheets to take advantage of cheap and abundantly available funding. Access to international funding markets, in particular, made it possible for banks to reach a size that in some cases was a large multiple of their home countries’ gross domestic product (GDP). In Iceland, for example, assets of the banking system reached up to 900% of GDP in 2007. Similarly, by the end of 2008, assets in UK and Swiss banks exceeded 500% of their countries’ GDPs, respectively. Banks may also have grown rapidly because they may have wanted to reach too-big-to-fail status in their country, implying even lower funding cost (Penas and Unal 2004).
The depth and severity of the 2008–09 financial crisis and the subsequent debt crisis in Europe, however, have cast doubts on the ability of governments to bail out banks when they experience severe difficulties, in particular, in financially fragile environments and faced with large budget imbalances. This has resulted in as what some observers have dubbed a “doom loop”: the combination of weak public finances and weak banks results in a vicious cycle, in which the funding cost of banks increases, as the ability of governments to bail out banks is called into question, in turn increasing the funding cost of these banks and making the likelihood that the government will actually have to step in even higher, which in turn increases funding cost to the government and so forth.
Against this background, the paper by Correa et al. (2014) explores the link between sovereign rating changes and bank stock returns. They show large negative reactions of stock returns in response to sovereign ratings downgrades for banks that are expected to receive government support in case of failure. They find the strongest effects in developed economies, where the credibility of government bail outs is higher ex ante, while the effects are smaller in developing and emerging economies. In my view, the paper makes a number of important contributions to the extant literature.
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Financial Factors in Macroeconometric Models
Sebastian Giesen
Volkswirtschaft, Ökonomie, Shaker Verlag GmbH, Aachen,
2013
Abstract
The important role of credit has long been identified as a key factor for economic development (see e.g. Wicksell (1898), Keynes (1931), Fisher (1933) and Minsky (1957, 1964)). Even before the financial crisis most researchers and policy makers agreed that financial frictions play an important role for business cycles and that financial turmoils can result in severe economic downturns (see e.g. Mishkin (1978), Bernanke (1981, 1983), Diamond (1984), Calomiris (1993) and Bernanke and Gertler (1995)). However, in practice researchers and policy makers mostly used simplified models for forecasting and simulation purposes. They often neglected the impact of financial frictions and emphasized other non financial market frictions when analyzing business cycle fluctuations (prominent exceptions include Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999) and Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno (2010)). This has been due to the fact that most economic downturns did not seem to be closely related to financial market failures (see Eichenbaum (2011)). The outbreak of the subprime crises ― which caused panic in financial markets and led to the default of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 ― then led to a reconsideration of such macroeconomic frameworks (see Caballero (2010) and Trichet (2011)). To address the economic debate from a new perspective, it is therefore necessary to integrate the relevant frictions which help to explain what we have experienced during recent years.
In this thesis, I analyze different ways to incorporate relevant frictions and financial variables in macroeconometric models. I discuss the potential consequences for standard statistical inference and macroeconomic policy. I cover three different aspects in this work. Each aspect presents an idea in a self-contained unit. The following paragraphs present more detail on the main topics covered.
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Industrial Associations as a Channel of Business-Government Interactions in an Imperfect Institutional Environment: The Russian Case
A. Yakovlev, A. Govorun
IWH Discussion Papers,
Nr. 16,
2011
Abstract
International lessons from emerging economies suggest that business associations may provide an effective channel of communication between the government and the private sector. This function of business associations may become still more important in transition economies, where old mechanisms for coordinating enterprise activities have been destroyed, while the new ones have not been established yet. In this context, Russian experience is a matter of interest, because for a long time, Russia was regarded as a striking example of state failures and market failures. Consequently, the key point of our study was a description of the role and place of business associations in the presentday
Russian economy and their interaction with member companies and bodies of state
administration. Relying on the survey data of 957 manufacturing firms conducted in
2009, we found that business associations are more frequently joined by larger companies, firms located in regional capital cities, and firms active in investment and innovation. By contrast, business associations tend to be less frequently joined by business groups’ subsidiaries and firms that were non-responsive about their respective ownership structures. Our regression analysis has also confirmed that business associations are a component of what Frye (2002) calls an “elite exchange”– although only on regional and local levels. These “exchanges” imply that members of business associations, on the one hand, more actively assist regional and local authorities in social development of their regions, and on the other hand more often receive support from authorities. However, this effect is insignificant in terms of support from the federal government. In general, our results allow us to believe that at present, business associations (especially the
industry-wide and “leading” ones) consolidate the most active, advanced companies and act as collective representatives of their interests. For this reason, business associations can be regarded as interface units between the authorities and businesses and as a possible instrument for promotion of economic development.
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Path Dependence and QWERTY's Lock-in: Toward a Veblenian Interpretation
John B. Hall, Iciar Dominguez Lacasa, Jutta Günther
Journal of Economic Issues,
Nr. 2,
2011
Abstract
In “Clio and the Economics of QWERTY,“ Paul David challenges an overarching, mainstream assumption that market forces should indeed lead toward efficient and optimal outcomes that include technology selection. David seeks to explain the endurance of technologies that his use of historiography judges inefficient and suboptimal. We challenge David's research, arguing that failure to consider the original institutional economics (OIE) tradition limits his grasp of complex processes to reduced notions of “path dependence“ based upon a “lock-in.“ This inquiry offers an alternative account of QWERTY and technology selection based upon Veblenian thinking, further supported by Paul Dale Bush's emphasis upon the ceremonial.
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Incubation Time, Incubator Age, and Firm Survival after Graduation
Michael Schwartz
International Journal of Entrepreneurship and Innovation Management,
2012
Abstract
On the basis of a sample of 149 graduate firms from five German business incubators, this article contributes to incubator/incubation literature by investigating the effects of the age of the incubators and the firms´ incubation time in securing long-term survival of the firms after leaving the incubator facilities. The empirical findings from Cox proportional hazards regression and parametric accelerated failure time models reveal a statistically significant negative impact for both variables incubator age and incubation time on post-graduation firm survival. One important implication that follows from the empirical results for policy makers and managers of those initiatives is that, when incubator managers become increasingly involved in various regional development activities, this may reduce the effectiveness of incubator support. Also, our finding speaks in favour of a strict limitation of incubation times and reinforces arguments of the supporters of maximum tenancy.
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Size and Focus of a Venture Capitalist's Portfolio
Paolo Fulghieri, Merih Sevilir
Review of Financial Studies,
Nr. 11,
2009
Abstract
We take a portfolio approach to analyze the investment strategy of a venture capitalist (VC) and show that portfolio size and scope affect both the entrepreneurs' and the VC's incentives to exert effort. A small portfolio improves entrepreneurial incentives because it allows the VC to concentrate the limited human capital on a smaller number of startups, adding more value. A large and focused portfolio is beneficial because it allows the VC to reallocate the limited resources and human capital in the case of startup failure and allows the VC to extract greater rents from the entrepreneurs. We show that the VC finds it optimal to limit portfolio size when startups have higher payoff potential - that is, when providing strong entrepreneurial incentives is most valuable. The VC expands portfolio size only when startup fundamentals are more moderate and when he can form a sufficiently focused portfolio. Finally, we show that the VC may find it optimal to engage in portfolio management by divesting some of the startups early since this strategy allows him to extract a greater surplus.
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