Central Bank Transparency and Cross-border Banking
Stefan Eichler, Helge Littke, Lena Tonzer
Abstract
We analyze the effect of central bank transparency on cross-border bank activities. Based on a panel gravity model for cross-border bank claims for 21 home and 47 destination countries from 1998 to 2010, we find strong empirical evidence that a rise in central bank transparency in the destination country, on average, increases cross-border claims. Using interaction models, we find that the positive effect of central bank transparency on cross-border claims is only significant if the central bank is politically independent. Central bank transparency and credibility are thus considered complements by banks investing abroad.
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Risikobewertung von Staatsanleihen im Euroraum während der Staatsschuldenkrise von Ansteckungseffekten getrieben
Manuel Buchholz, Lena Tonzer
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
Nr. 1,
2015
Abstract
Die europäische Staatsschuldenkrise hat in vielen Ländern zu Zinsaufschlägen auf Staatsanleihen geführt. Dies war vor allem in den Jahren 2010 und 2011 in Ländern wie Griechenland, Italien oder Spanien zu beobachten. Zur gleichen Zeit blieben die Kreditrisiken deutscher oder französischer Staatsanleihen auf einem moderaten Niveau. Trotz der unterschiedlichen Entwicklung in den Niveaus findet man ein hohes Maß an Gleichbewegung von Kreditrisiken in den Ländern des Euroraums. Dieser Beitrag untersucht, inwieweit dies durch strukturelle Ähnlichkeiten, internationale Verflechtungen und globale Marktentwicklungen erklärt werden kann.
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Sovereign Default Risk and Decentralization: Evidence for Emerging Markets
Stefan Eichler, M. Hofmann
European Journal of Political Economy,
Nr. 32,
2013
Abstract
We study the impact of decentralization on sovereign default risk. Theory predicts that decentralization deteriorates fiscal discipline since subnational governments undertax/overspend, anticipating that, in the case of overindebtedness, the federal government will bail them out. We analyze whether investors account for this common pool problem by attaching higher sovereign yield spreads to more decentralized countries. Using panel data on up to 30 emerging markets in the period 1993–2008 we confirm this hypothesis. Higher levels of fiscal and political decentralization increase sovereign default risk. Moreover, higher levels of intergovernmental transfers and a larger number of veto players aggravate the common pool problem.
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Financial Constraints of Private Firms and Bank Lending Behavior
Patrick Behr, L. Norden, Felix Noth
Journal of Banking and Finance,
Nr. 9,
2013
Abstract
We investigate whether and how financial constraints of private firms depend on bank lending behavior. Bank lending behavior, especially its scale, scope and timing, is largely driven by bank business models which differ between privately owned and state-owned banks. Using a unique dataset on private small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) we find that an increase in relative borrowings from local state-owned banks significantly reduces firms’ financial constraints, while there is no such effect for privately owned banks. Improved credit availability and private information production are the main channels that explain our result. We also show that the lending behavior of local state-owned banks can be sustainable because it is less cyclical and neither leads to more risk taking nor underperformance.
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Sovereign Credit Risk Co-movements in the Eurozone: Simple Interdependence or Contagion?
Manuel Buchholz, Lena Tonzer
UniCredit & Universities Foundation, Working Paper Series No. 47,
Nr. 47,
2013
publiziert in: International Finance
Abstract
We investigate credit risk co-movements and contagion in sovereign debt markets of 17 industrialized countries for the period 2008-2012. We use dynamic conditional correlations of sovereign CDS spreads to detect contagion. This approach allows separating the channels through which contagion occurs from the determinants of simple interdependence. The results show that, first, sovereign credit risk comoves considerably, in particular among eurozone countries and during the sovereign debt crisis. Second, contagion cannot be attributed to one moment in time but varies across time and countries. Third, similarities in economic fundamentals, cross-country linkages in banking, and common market sentiment constitute the main channels of contagion.
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Islamic Finance in Europe
Pierluigi Caristi, Stéphane Couderc, Angela di Maria, Filippo di Mauro, Beljeet Kaur Grewal, Lauren Ho, Sergio Masciantonio, Steven Ongena, Sajjad Zaher
ECB Occasional Paper,
Nr. 146,
2013
Abstract
Islamic finance is based on ethical principles in line with Islamic religious law. Despite its low share of the global financial market, Islamic finance has been one of this sector's fastest growing components over the last decades and has gained further momentum in the wake of the financial crisis. The paper examines the development of and possible prospects for Islamic finance, with a special focus on Europe. It compares Islamic and conventional finance, particularly as concerns risks associated with the operations of respective institutions, as well as corporate governance. The paper also analyses empirical evidence comparing Islamic and conventional financial institutions with regard to their: (i) efficiency and profitability; and (ii) stability and resilience. Finally, the paper considers the conduct of monetary policy in an Islamic banking context. This is not uncomplicated given the fact that interest rates - normally a cornerstone of monetary policy - are prohibited under Islamic finance. Liquidity management issues are thus discussed here, with particular reference to the euro area.
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Payment Defaults and Interfirm Liquidity Provision
F. Boissay, Reint E. Gropp
Review of Finance,
Nr. 6,
2013
Abstract
Using a unique data set on French firms, we show that credit constrained firms that face liquidity shocks are more likely to default on their payments to suppliers. Credit constrained firms pass on a sizeable fraction of such shocks to their suppliers. This is consistent with the idea that firms provide liquidity insurance to each other and that this mechanism is able to alleviate credit constraints. We show that the chain of defaults stops when it reaches unconstrained firms. Liquidity appears to be allocated from firms with access to outside finance to credit constrained firms along supply chains.
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Efficiency in the UK Commercial Property Market: A Long-run Perspective
Steven Devaney, Oliver Holtemöller, R. Schulz
IWH Discussion Papers,
Nr. 15,
2012
Abstract
Informationally efficient prices are a necessary requirement for optimal resource allocation in the real estate market. Prices are informationally efficient if they reflect buildings’ benefit to marginal buyers, thereby taking account of all available information on future market development. Prices that do not reflect available information may lead to over- or undersupply if developers react to these inefficient prices. In this study, we examine the efficiency of the UK commercial property market and the interaction between prices, construction costs, and new supply. We collated a unique data set covering the years 1920 onwards, which we employ in our study. First, we assess if real estate prices were in accordance with present values, thereby testing for informational efficiency. By comparing prices and estimated present values, we can measure informational inefficiency. Second, we assess if developers reacted correctly to price signals. Development (or the lack thereof) should be triggered by deviations between present values and cost; if prices do not reflect present values, then they should have no impact on development decisions.
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Did TARP Distort Competition Among Sound Banks?
Michael Koetter, Felix Noth
Abstract
This study investigates if the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) distorted price competition in U.S. banking. Political indicators reveal bailout expectations after 2009, manifested as beliefs about the predicted probability of receiving equity support relative to failing during the TARP disbursement period. In addition, the TARP affected the competitive conduct of unsupported banks after the program stopped in the fourth quarter of 2009. Loan rates were higher, and the risk premium required by depositors was lower for banks with higher bailout expectations. The interest margins of unsupported banks increased in the immediate aftermath of the TARP disbursement but not after 2010. No effects emerged for loan or deposit growth, which suggests that protected banks did not increase their market shares at the expense of less protected banks.
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Bank Bailouts and Moral Hazard: Evidence from Germany
Lammertjan Dam, Michael Koetter
Review of Financial Studies,
Nr. 8,
2012
Abstract
We use a structural econometric model to provide empirical evidence that safety nets in the banking industry lead to additional risk taking. To identify the moral hazard effect of bailout expectations on bank risk, we exploit the fact that regional political factors explain bank bailouts but not bank risk. The sample includes all observed capital preservation measures and distressed exits in the German banking industry during 1995–2006. A change of bailout expectations by two standard deviations increases the probability of official distress from 6.6% to 9.4%, which is economically significant.
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