Size of Training Firms – The Role of Firms, Luck, and Ability in Young Workers’ Careers
Steffen Müller, Renate Neubäumer
International Journal of Manpower,
Nr. 5,
2018
Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to analyze how long-run unemployment of former apprentices depends on the size of their training firm and their ability.
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The Exchange Rate, Asymmetric Shocks and Asymmetric Distributions
Calin-Vlad Demian, Filippo di Mauro
International Economics,
August
2018
Abstract
The elasticity of exports to exchange rate fluctuations has been the subject of a large body of literature without a clear consensus emerging. Using a novel sector-level dataset based on firm level information, we show that exchange rate elasticities double in size when country and sector specific firm productivity distributions are considered in the empirical estimations. In addition, exports appear to be sensitive to appreciation episodes, but rather unaffected by depreciations. Finally, only rather large changes in the exchange rate appear to matter. The paper intends to contribute to the debate on the effectiveness and impacts of exchange rate movements, which features highly in the policy agenda.
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Growth through Heterogeneous Innovations
Ufuk Akcigit, William R. Kerr
Journal of Political Economy,
Nr. 4,
2018
Abstract
We build a tractable growth model in which multiproduct incumbents invest in internal innovations to improve their existing products, while new entrants and incumbents invest in external innovations to acquire new product lines. External and internal innovations generate heterogeneous innovation qualities, and firm size affects innovation incentives. We analyze how different types of innovation contribute to economic growth and the role of the firm size distribution. Our model aligns with many observed empirical regularities, and we quantify our framework with Census Bureau and patent data for US firms. Internal innovation scales moderately faster with firm size than external innovation.
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Urban Occupational Structures as Information Networks: The Effect on Network Density of Increasing Number of Occupations
Shade T. Shutters, José Lobo, Rachata Muneepeerakul, Deborah Strumsky, Charlotta Mellander, Matthias Brachert, Teresa Farinha, Luis M. A. Bettencourt
Plos One,
im Erscheinen
Abstract
Urban economies are composed of diverse activities, embodied in labor occupations, which depend on one another to produce goods and services. Yet little is known about how the nature and intensity of these interdependences change as cities increase in population size and economic complexity. Understanding the relationship between occupational interdependencies and the number of occupations defining an urban economy is relevant because interdependence within a networked system has implications for system resilience and for how easily can the structure of the network be modified. Here, we represent the interdependencies among occupations in a city as a non-spatial information network, where the strengths of interdependence between pairs of occupations determine the strengths of the links in the network. Using those quantified link strengths we calculate a single metric of interdependence–or connectedness–which is equivalent to the density of a city’s weighted occupational network. We then examine urban systems in six industrialized countries, analyzing how the density of urban occupational networks changes with network size, measured as the number of unique occupations present in an urban workforce. We find that in all six countries, density, or economic interdependence, increases superlinearly with the number of distinct occupations. Because connections among occupations represent flows of information, we provide evidence that connectivity scales superlinearly with network size in information networks.
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Private Benefits of Control and Bank Loan Contracts
Chih-Yung Lin, Wei-Che Tsai, Iftekhar Hasan, Le Quoc Tuan
Journal of Corporate Finance,
2018
Abstract
This paper investigates whether or not private benefits of control by managers and large shareholders influence the financing cost of firms. Evidence shows that lending banks demand a significantly higher loan spread, higher fees, shorter loan maturity, smaller loan size, stricter covenants, and greater collateral on firms with greater private benefits of control. Results are stronger for firms with weak corporate governance quality, supporting the agency cost viewpoint. Such evidence implies that banks consider higher private benefits of control as a type of agency problem when they make lending decisions.
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Explaining Wage Losses after Job Displacement: Employer Size and Lost Firm Rents
Daniel Fackler, Steffen Müller, Jens Stegmaier
Abstract
Why does job displacement, e.g., following import competition, technological change, or economic downturns, result in permanent wage losses? The job displacement literature is silent on whether wage losses after job displacement are driven by lost firm wage premiums or worker productivity depreciations. We therefore estimate losses in wages and firm wage premiums. Premiums are measured as firm effects from a two-way fixed-effects approach, as described in Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis (1999). Using German administrative data, we find that wage losses are, on average, fully explained by losses in firm wage premiums and that premium losses are largely permanent. We show that losses in wages and premiums are minor for workers displaced from small plants and strongly increase with pre-displacement firm size, which provides an explanation for the large and persistent wage losses that have been found in previous studies mostly focusing on displacement from large employers.
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Direct and Indirect Risk-taking Incentives of Inside Debt
Stefano Colonnello, Giuliano Curatola, Ngoc Giang Hoang
Journal of Corporate Finance,
August
2017
Abstract
We develop a model of compensation structure and asset risk choice, where a risk-averse manager is compensated with salary, equity and inside debt. We seek to understand the joint implications of this compensation package for managerial risk-taking incentives and credit spreads. We show that the size and seniority of inside debt not only are crucial for the relation between inside debt and credit spreads but also play an important role in shaping the relation between equity compensation and credit spreads. Using a sample of U.S. public firms with traded credit default swap contracts, we provide evidence supportive of the model's predictions.
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Drivers of Systemic Risk: Do National and European Perspectives Differ?
Claudia M. Buch, Thomas Krause, Lena Tonzer
Abstract
In Europe, the financial stability mandate generally rests at the national level. But there is an important exception. Since the establishment of the Banking Union in 2014, the European Central Bank (ECB) can impose stricter regulations than the national regulator. The precondition is that the ECB identifies systemic risks which are not adequately addressed by the macroprudential regulator at the national level. In this paper, we ask whether the drivers of systemic risk differ when applying a national versus a European perspective. We use market data for 80 listed euro-area banks to measure each bank’s contribution to systemic risk (SRISK) at the national and the euro-area level. Our research delivers three main findings. First, on average, systemic risk increased during the financial crisis. The difference between systemic risk at the national and the euro-area level is not very large, but there is considerable heterogeneity across countries and banks. Second, an exploration of the drivers of systemic risk shows that a bank’s contribution to systemic risk is positively related to its size and profitability. It decreases in a bank’s share of loans to total assets. Third, the qualitative determinants of systemic risk are similar at the national and euro-area level, whereas the quantitative importance of some determinants differs.
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05.01.2017 • 3/2017
Sekretariat des Forschungsnetzwerks CompNet künftig am IWH beheimatet
Das Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung Halle (IWH) hat das Sekretariat des Competitiveness Research Network CompNet übernommen, einem internationalen Netzwerk führender Wissenschaftler und Wissenschaftlerinnen sowie Fachleute, die erstklassige Forschung und Politikberatung auf den Gebieten der Wettbewerbsfähigkeit und Produktivität betreiben.
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Urban Agglomeration and CEO Compensation
Bill Francis, Iftekhar Hasan, Kose John, Maya Waisman
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,
Nr. 6,
2016
Abstract
We examine the relation between the agglomeration of firms around big cities and chief executive officer (CEO) compensation. We find a positive relation among the metropolitan size of a firm’s headquarters, the total and equity portion of its CEO’s pay, and the quality of CEO educational attainment. We also find that CEOs gradually increase their human capital in major metropolitan areas and are rewarded for this upon relocation to smaller cities. Taken together, the results suggest that urban agglomeration reflects local network spillovers and faster learning of skilled individuals, for which firms are willing to pay a premium and which are therefore important factors in CEO compensation.
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