Die deutsche Konjunktur hat zum Ende des Jahres 2024 einen weiteren Rückschlag erhalten. Das Bruttoinlandsprodukt (BIP) sank im vierten Quartal 2024 um 0,2%. Es ist damit seit Mitte 2022 auf einem leicht sinkenden Trend (vgl. Abbildung 1). Wenngleich staatliche und private Konsumausgaben zugelegt haben dürften, konnten diese die deutlich gesunkenen Exporte nicht kompensieren. Damit ging auch die Wirtschaftsleistung im Jahr 2024 insgesamt um 0,2% zurück.

In den Unternehmen hat sich die Lage zuletzt anscheinend stabilisiert, die Erwartungen verschlechtern sich jedoch weiter. Die Risiken, die von der US-Wirtschaftspolitik ausgehen, dürften die Investitionsbereitschaft der Unternehmen bremsen. Das senkt nicht nur gegenwärtig die Chancen auf eine konjunkturelle Erholung, sondern wirkt auch mittelfristig hemmend auf das Produktionspotenzial. Alles in allem wird wohl das Bruttoinlandsprodukt (BIP) laut IWH-Flash-Indikator im ersten Quartal 2025 nur wenig um 0,2% und im zweiten Quartal um 0,3% zulegen.

This study employs bilateral data on external assets to examine the impact of climate policies on the reallocation of international capital. We find that the stringency of climate policy in the destination country is significantly and positively associated with an increase in the allocation of portfolio equity and banking investment to that country. However, it does not show significant effects on the allocation of foreign direct investment and portfolio debt. Our findings are not driven by valuation effects, and we present evidence that suggests diversification, suasion, and uncertainty mitigation as possible underlying mechanisms.

Bank lobbying has a bitter taste in most forums, ringing the bell of preferential treatment of big banks from governments and regulators. Using corporate loan facilities and hand-matched information on bank lobbying from 1999 to 2017, we show that lobbying banks increase their borrowers' overall performance. This positive effect is stronger for opaque and credit-constrained borrowers, when the lobbying lender possesses valuable information on the borrower, and for borrowers with strong corporate governance. Our findings are consistent with the theory positing that lobbying can provide access to valuable lender-borrower information, resulting in improved efficiency in large firms' corporate financing.

This paper studies the economic and political effects of a large trade shock in agriculture—the grain invasion from the Americas—in Prussia during the first globalisation (1870–913). We show that this shock led to a decline in the employment rate and overall income. However, we do not observe declining per capita income and political polarisation, which we explain by a strong migration response. Our results suggest that the negative and persistent effects of trade shocks we see today are not a universal feature of globalisation, but depend on labour mobility. For our analysis, we digitise data from Prussian industrial and agricultural censuses on the county level and combine them with national trade data at the product level. We exploit the cross-regional variation in cultivated crops within Prussia and instrument with Italian and United States trade data to isolate exogenous variation.

This paper analyzes if lenders resolve managerial agency problems in loan contracts using sweep covenants. Sweeps require a (partial) prepayment when triggered and are included in many contracts. Exploiting exogenous reductions in analyst coverage due to brokerage house mergers and closures, we find that increased borrower opacity significantly increases sweep use. The effect is strongest for borrowers with higher levels of managerial entrenchment and if lenders hold both debt and equity in the firm. Overall, our results suggest that lenders implement sweep covenants to mitigate managerial agency problems by limiting contingencies of wealth expropriation.