The Distribution of National Income in Germany, 1992-2019
Stefan Bach, Charlotte Bartels, Theresa Neef
IWH Discussion Papers,
Nr. 25,
2024
Abstract
This paper analyzes the distribution and composition of pre-tax national income in Germany since 1992, combining personal income tax returns, household survey data, and national accounts. Inequality rose from the 1990s to the late 2000s due to falling labor incomes among the bottom 50% and rising incomes in the top 10%. This trend reversed after 2007 as labor incomes across the bottom 90% increased. The top 1% income share, dominated by business income, remained relatively stable between 1992 and 2019. A large share of Germany’s top 1% earners are non-corporate business owners in labor-intensive professions. At least half of the business owners in P99-99.9 and a quarter in the top 0.1% operate firms in professional services – a pattern mirroring the United States. From 1992 to 2019, Germany’s top 0.1% income concentration exceeded France’s and matched U.S. levels until the late 2000s.
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Worker Beliefs about Outside Options
Simon Jäger, Christopher Roth, Nina Roussille, Benjamin Schoefer
Quarterly Journal of Economics,
Nr. 3,
2024
Abstract
Standard labor market models assume that workers hold accurate beliefs about the external wage distribution, and hence their outside options with other employers. We test this assumption by comparing German workers’ beliefs about outside options with objective benchmarks. First, we find that workers wrongly anchor their beliefs about outside options on their current wage: workers that would experience a 10% wage change if switching to their outside option only expect a 1% change. Second, workers in low-paying firms underestimate wages elsewhere. Third, in response to information about the wages of similar workers, respondents correct their beliefs about their outside options and change their job search and wage negotiation intentions. Finally, we analyze the consequences of anchoring in a simple equilibrium model. In the model, anchored beliefs keep overly pessimistic workers stuck in low-wage jobs, which gives rise to monopsony power and labor market segmentation.
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Rent-Sharing und Energiekosten: In welchem Umfang geben Industrieunternehmen Gewinne und Verluste an ihre Beschäftigten weiter?
Matthias Mertens, Steffen Müller, Georg Neuschäffer
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
Nr. 2,
2024
Abstract
Diese Studie untersucht, wie die betrieblichen Erträge zwischen deutschen Industrieunternehmen und ihren Beschäftigten aufgeteilt werden. Dafür werden Energiepreisänderungen auf Unternehmensebene und die daraus resultierenden Veränderungen im Unternehmensertrag betrachtet. Wir finden heraus, dass höhere Energiepreise die Löhne drücken und dass ein Rückgang bei den Erträgen um 10% zu einem Rückgang der Löhne um 2% führt. Dieser Zusammenhang ist asymmetrisch, was bedeutet, dass die Löhne nicht von Senkungen der Energiepreise profitieren, aber durch Energiepreiserhöhungen sinken. Kleine Unternehmen geben Schwankungen im Ertrag stärker an die Beschäftigten weiter als Großunternehmen.
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Early Child Care, Maternal Labor Supply, and Gender Equality: A Randomized Controlled Trial?
Henning Hermes, Marina Krauß, Philipp Lergetporer, Frauke Peter, Simon Wiederhold
IWH Discussion Papers,
Nr. 14,
2024
Abstract
We provide experimental evidence that enabling access to universal early child care increases maternal labor supply and promotes gender equality among families with lower socioeconomic status (SES). Our intervention offers information and customized help with child care applications, leading to a boost in child care enrollment among lower-SES families. 18 months after the intervention, we find substantial increases in maternal full-time employment (+160%), maternal earnings (+22%), and household income (+10%). Intriguingly, the positive employment effects are not only driven by extended hours at child care centers, but also by an increase in care hours by fathers. Gender equality also benefits more broadly from better access to child care: The treatment improves a gender equality index that combines information on intra-household division of working hours, care hours, and earnings by 40% of a standard deviation, with significant increases in each dimension. For higher-SES families, we consistently observe negligible, insignificant treatment effects.
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Income Shocks, Political Support and Voting Behaviour
Richard Upward, Peter Wright
IWH Discussion Papers,
Nr. 1,
2024
Abstract
We provide new evidence on the effects of economic shocks on political support, voting behaviour and political opinions over the last 25 years. We exploit a sudden, large and long-lasting shock in the form of job loss and trace out its impact on individual political outcomes for up to 10 years after the event. The availability of detailed information on households before and after the job loss event allows us to reweight a comparison group to closely mimic the job losers in terms of their observable characteristics, pre-existing political support and voting behaviour. We find consistent, long-lasting but quantitatively small effects on support and votes for the incumbent party, and short-lived effects on political engagement. We find limited impact on the support for fringe or populist parties. In the context of Brexit, opposition to the EU was much higher amongst those who lost their jobs, but this was largely due to pre-existing differences which were not exacerbated by the job loss event itself.
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Alumni
IWH-Alumni Das IWH pflegt den Kontakt zu seinen ehemaligen Mitarbeiterinnen und Mitarbeitern weltweit. Wir beziehen unsere Alumni in unsere Arbeit ein und unterrichten diese…
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Committing to Grow: Employment Targets and Firm Dynamics
Ufuk Akcigit, Harun Alp, André Diegmann, Nicolas Serrano-Velarde
IWH Discussion Papers,
Nr. 17,
2023
Abstract
We examine effects of government-imposed employment targets on firm behavior. Theoretically, such policies create “polarization,“ causing low-productivity firms to exit the market while others temporarily distort their employment upward. Dynamically, firms are incentivized to improve productivity to meet targets. Using novel data from East German firms post-privatization, we find that firms with binding employment targets experienced 25% higher annual employment growth, a 1.1% higher annual exit probability, and 10% higher annual productivity growth over the target period. Structural estimates reveal substantial misallocation of labor across firms and that subsidizing productivity growth would yield twice the long term increases in employment.
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Retreat-Auftakt-Meeting
IWH Retreat: Auftakt-Meeting von Oliver Holtemöller, 19.04.2022 Liebe Kolleginnen und Kollegen, am 08. und 09. Juni 2022 findet unsere Klausurtagung am Schwielowsee bei Potsdam…
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05.04.2023 • 9/2023
Ostdeutsche Wirtschaft bisher gut durch Energiekrise gekommen – Implikationen der Gemeinschaftsdiagnose Frühjahr 2023 und amtlicher Länderdaten für die ostdeutsche Wirtschaft
Im Jahr 2022 hat die ostdeutsche Wirtschaft mit 3,0% deutlich stärker expandiert als die Wirtschaft in Westdeutschland (1,5%). Hintergrund ist eine robustere Entwicklung der Arbeitnehmer- und Rentnereinkommen. Auch für das Jahr 2023 prognostiziert das Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung Halle (IWH) deshalb mit 1% eine höhere Zuwachsrate des Bruttoinlandsprodukts in Ostdeutschland als in Deutschland insgesamt (0,3%). Die Arbeitslosenquote dürfte mit 6,8% im Jahr 2023 und 6,7% im Jahr darauf in etwa stagnieren.
Oliver Holtemöller
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Paying Outsourced Labor: Direct Evidence from Linked Temp Agency-Worker-Client Data
Andres Drenik, Simon Jäger, Pascuel Plotkin, Benjamin Schoefer
Review of Economics and Statistics,
Nr. 1,
2023
Abstract
We estimate how much firms differentiate pay premia between regular and outsourced workers in temp agency work arrangements. We leverage unique Argentinian administrative data that feature links between user firms (the workplaces where temp workers perform their labor) and temp agencies (their formal employers). We estimate that a high-wage user firm that pays a regular worker a 10% premium pays a temp worker on average only a 4.9% premium, compared to what these workers would earn in a low-wage user firm in their respective work arrangements—the midpoint between the benchmarks for insiders (one) and the competitive spot-labor market (zero).
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