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Endogenous Institution Formation in Public Good Games: The Effect of Economic Education
Martin Altemeyer-Bartscher, Dmitri Bershadskyy, Philipp Schreck, Florian Timme
IWH Discussion Papers,
Nr. 29,
2017
Abstract
In a public good experiment, the paper analyses to which extent individuals with economic education behave differently in a second-order dilemma. Second-order dilemmas may arise, when individuals endogenously build up costly institutions that help to overcome a public good problem (first-order dilemma). The specific institution used in the experiment is a communication platform allowing for group communication before the first-order public good game takes place. The experimental results confirm the finding of the literature that economists tend to free ride more intensively in public good games than non-economists. The difference is the strongest in the end-game phase, yielding in the conclusion that the magnitude of the end-game effect depends on the share of economists in the pool of participants. When it comes to the building-up of institutions, the individual efficiency gain of the institution and its inherent cost function constitute the driving forces for the contribution behaviour. Providing an investment friendly environment yields in economists contributing more to the institution than non-economists. Therefore, we make clear that first-order results of a simple public good game cannot be simply applied for second-order incentive problems.
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Wage Bargaining Regimes and Firms‘ Adjustments to the Great Recession
Filippo di Mauro, Maddalena Ronchi
IWH-CompNet Discussion Papers,
Nr. 1,
2017
Abstract
The paper aims at investigating to what extent wage negotiation set-ups have shaped up firms’ response to the Great Recession, taking a firm-level cross-country perspective. We contribute to the literature by building a new micro-distributed database which merges data related to wage bargaining institutions (Wage Dynamic Network, WDN) with data on firm productivity and other relevant firm characteristics (CompNet). We use the database to study how firms reacted to the Great Recession in terms of variation in profits, wages, and employment. The paper shows that, in line with the theoretical predictions, centralized bargaining systems – as opposed to decentralized/firm level based ones – were accompanied by stronger downward wage rigidity, as well as cuts in employment and profits.
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Wage Bargaining Regimes and Firms' Adjustments to the Great Recession
Filippo di Mauro, Maddalena Ronchi
ECB Working Paper,
Nr. 2051,
2017
Abstract
The paper aims at investigating to what extent wage negotiation setups have shaped up firms’ response to the Great Recession, taking a firm-level cross-country perspective. We contribute to the literature by building a new micro-distributed database which merges data related to wage bargaining institutions (Wage Dynamic Network, WDN) with data on firm productivity and other relevant firm characteristics (CompNet). We use the database to study how firms reacted to the Great Recession in terms of variation in profits, wages, and employment. The paper shows that, in line with the theoretical predictions, centralized bargaining systems – as opposed to decentralized/firm level based ones – were accompanied by stronger downward wage rigidity, as well as cuts in employment and profits.
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Governmental Learning as a Determinant of Economic Growth
Marina Grusevaja
IWH Discussion Papers,
Nr. 23,
2010
Abstract
Systemic economic transition is a process of determined radical institutional change, a process of building new institutions required by a market economy. Nowadays, the experience of transition countries with the implementation of new institutions could be reviewed as a method of economic development that despite similar singular steps has different effects on the domestic economic performance. The process of institutional change towards a market economy is determined by political will, thus the government plays an important role in carrying out the economic reforms. Among the variety of outcomes and effects the attention is drawn especially to economic growth that diverges significantly in different post-transition countries. The paper attempts to shed light upon the problem on the basis of institutional economics, of economics of innovation and partially of political economy of growth using an evolutionary, process-oriented perspective. In this context the issue central to the promotion of economic growth is the successful implementation of new institutions through governmental activities. The paper shows that under the conditions of bounded rationality and radical uncertainty economic growth is determined, inter alia, by the capacity for governmental learning.
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Competition Policy in Central Eastern Europe in the Light of EU Accession
Jens Hölscher
Journal of Common Market Studies,
Nr. 2,
2004
Abstract
This study reviews the progress made in EU accession candidates on competition policy. The analysis shows that institution-building and legislation are well under way and that anti-trust practice is not too lax. Due to the diversity among the accession countries under review, the study finds that the strictly rule-based frame work of the EU might not be the most favourable solution for some candidates: firstly, the small and open economies of most candidates make it particularly difficult to define the ‘relevant market’ in competition cases. Secondly, the traditionally intense vertical integration of production in accession states calls for a reassessment of ‘vertical restraints’. The policy implications of this study suggest that the EU competition task force should take a proactive, case-by-case approach vis-à-vis its new members.
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Competition Policy in Central East Europe in light of EU Accession
Johannes Stephan
Journal of Common Market Studies,
2004
Abstract
This study reviews the progress made in EU accession candidates on competition policy. The analysis shows that institution-building and legislation are well under way and that anti-trust practice is not too lax. Due to the diversity among the accession countries under review, the study finds that the strictly rule-based frame work of the EU might not be the most favourable solution for some candidates: firstly, the small and open economies of most candidates make it particularly difficult to define the ‘relevant market’ in competition cases. Secondly, the traditionally intense vertical integration of production in accession states calls for a reassessment of ‘vertical restraints’. The policy implications of this study suggest that the EU competition task force should take a proactive, case-by-case approach vis-à-vis its new members.
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