Environmental Reputational Risk, Negative Media Attention and Financial Performance
Leonardo Becchetti, Rocco Ciciretti, Iftekhar Hasan, Gabriele La Licata
Financial Markets, Institutions and Instruments,
Nr. 4,
2022
Abstract
Tracing negative media attention, this paper investigates the effect of reputational risk on firm value. Decomposing reputational damage into environmental, social and corporate-governance dimensions, it reports that environmental reputational risk has the most significant negative effect on price earnings, i.e., firms exposed to environmental risk are likely to be priced at a discount or charged a higher risk premium when discounting future earnings.
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Corporate Governance Benefits of Mutual Fund Cooperation
Rex Wang Renjie, Patrick Verwijmeren, Shuo Xia
IWH Discussion Papers,
Nr. 21,
2022
Abstract
Mutual fund families increasingly hold bonds and stocks from the same firm. We study the implications of such dual holdings for corporate governance and firm decision-making. We present evidence that dual ownership allows financially distressed firms to increase investments and to refinance by issuing bonds with lower yields and fewer restrictive covenants. As such, dual ownership reduces shareholder-creditor conflicts, especially when families encourage cooperation among their managers. Overall, our results suggest that mutual fund families internalize the shareholder-creditor agency conflicts of their portfolio companies, highlighting the positive governance externalities of intra-family cooperation.
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Stock Liquidity and Corporate Labor Investment
Mong Shan Ee, Iftekhar Hasan, He Huang
Journal of Corporate Finance,
February
2022
Abstract
Labor is among the most crucial factors of production that maintain a firm's competitiveness. Given its economic importance, drivers of firms' labor investment policy have gained increasing attention in the financial economics literature. This study investigates the relation between stock liquidity and labor investment efficiency. We establish a causal relation between the two phenomena using an exogenous shock to liquidity: the 2001 decimalization of stock trading. We find that labor investment efficiency improves following an increase in stock liquidity, and the effect is prevalent in firms experiencing overinvestment in labor. Our findings further support the argument that stock liquidity improves the efficiency of labor investment by enhancing governance through shareholder exit threat.
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Do Banks Value Borrowers' Environmental Record? Evidence from Financial Contracts
I-Ju Chen, Iftekhar Hasan, Chih-Yung Lin, Tra Ngoc Vy Nguyen
Journal of Business Ethics,
December
2021
Abstract
Banks play a unique role in society. They not only maximize profits but also consider the interests of stakeholders. We investigate whether banks consider firms’ pollution records in their lending decisions. The evidence shows that banks offer significantly higher loan spreads, higher total borrowing costs, shorter loan maturities, and greater collateral to firms with higher levels of chemical pollution. The costly effects are stronger for borrowers with greater risk and weaker corporate governance. Further, the results show that banks with higher social responsibility account for their borrowers’ environmental performance and charge higher loan spreads to those with poor performance. These results support the idea that banks with higher social responsibility can promote the practice of business ethics in firms.
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Military Directors, Governance and Firm Behavior
Chen Cai, Iftekhar Hasan, Yinjie (Victor) Shen, Shuai Wang
Advances in Accounting,
December
2021
Abstract
We build a large dataset of board of directors with military experience and document a substantial and persistent presence of independent military directors serving on corporate boards. We find that firms with independent military directors are associated with better monitoring outcomes, including less excessive CEO compensation, greater forced CEO turnover–performance sensitivity, and less earnings management.
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Stock Liquidity, Empire Building, and Valuation
Sris Chatterjee, Iftekhar Hasan, Kose John, An Yan
Journal of Corporate Finance,
2021
Abstract
We conjecture that high stock liquidity negatively affects firm valuation by inducing inefficient investment. Using takeovers of public targets to study the empire-building motive, we find that a liquid firm is more likely than an illiquid firm to acquire a public firm. Such a takeover by a bidder with higher stock liquidity destroys bidder value to a larger degree. These patterns occur in both stock and cash acquisitions and hold after we use decimalization of tick size as a quasi-exogenous shock to stock liquidity. Finally, we show that financial constraints and corporate governance play important roles in the effects of stock liquidity on empire building in mergers and acquisitions.
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Agency Cost of CEO Perquisites in Bank Loan Contracts
Chia-Ying Chan, Iftekhar Hasan, Chih-Yung Lin
Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting,
May
2021
Abstract
This study investigates the association between CEO perquisites and bank loan spreads. We collect detailed data on CEO perquisites from the proxy statements of S&P 500 firms between 1993 and 2015 to study this issue. The empirical evidence supports the agency cost view that the lending banks demand significantly higher returns (spread), more collateral, and stricter covenants from firms with higher CEO perquisites. We further confirm that the effect of these perquisites remains after we control for various corporate governance and agency cost factors. We conclude that banks consider CEO perquisites as a type of agency cost when they make lending decisions.
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Labor in the Boardroom
Jörg Heining, Simon Jäger, Benjamin Schoefer
Quarterly Journal of Economics,
Nr. 2,
2021
Abstract
We estimate the wage effects of shared governance, or codetermination, in the form of a mandate of one-third of corporate board seats going to worker representatives. We study a reform in Germany that abruptly abolished this mandate for stock corporations incorporated after August 1994, while it locked the mandate for the slightly older cohorts. Our research design compares firm cohorts incorporated before the reform and after; in a robustness check we draw on the analogous difference in unaffected firm types (LLCs). We find no effects of board-level codetermination on wages and the wage structure, even in firms with particularly flexible wages. The degree of rent sharing and the labor share are also unaffected. We reject that disinvestment could have offset wage effects through the canonical hold-up channel, as shared governance, if anything, increases capital formation.
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Activism and Empire Building
Nickolay Gantchev, Merih Sevilir, Anil Shivdasani
Journal of Financial Economics,
Nr. 2,
2020
Abstract
Hedge fund activists target firms engaging in empire building and improve their future acquisition and divestiture strategy. Following intervention, activist targets make fewer acquisitions but obtain substantially higher returns by avoiding large and diversifying deals and refraining from acquisitions during merger waves. Activist targets also increase the pace of divestitures and achieve higher divestiture returns than matched non-targets. Activists curtail empire building through the removal of empire building chief executive officers (CEOs), compensation based incentives, and appointment of new board members. Our findings highlight an important channel through which activists improve efficiency and create shareholder value.
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Managerial Ability and Value Relevance of Earnings
Bill Francis, Iftekhar Hasan, Ibrahim Siraj, Qiang Wu
China Accounting and Finance Review,
Nr. 4,
2019
Abstract
We examine how management ability affects the extent to which capital markets rely on earnings to value equity. Using a measure of ability that captures a management team’s capacity for generating revenues with a given level of resources compared to other industry peers, we find a strong positive association between managerial ability and the value relevance of earnings. Additional tests show that our results are robust to controlling for earnings attributes and investment efficiency. We use propensity score matching and the 2SLS instrumental variable approach to deal with the issue of endogeneity. For further identification, we examine CEO turnover and find that newly hired CEOs with better managerial abilities than the replaced CEOs increase the value relevance of earnings. We identify weak corporate governance and product market power as the two important channels through which superior management practices play an important role in the corporate decision-making process that positively influence the value relevance of earnings. Overall, our findings suggest that better managers make accounting information significantly more relevant in the market valuation of equity.
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