Professor Dr. Andre Guettler

Professor Dr. Andre Guettler
Aktuelle Position

seit 6/16

Forschungsprofessor

Leibniz-Insitut für Wirtschaftsforschung Halle (IWH)

seit 4/13

Direktor des Instituts für Strategische Unternehmensführung und Finanzierung

Universität Ulm

Forschungsschwerpunkte

  • reale Effekte von Finanzmarktregulation
  • Kreditzugang für kleine und mittlere Unternehmen

Andre Guettler ist seit Juni 2016 Forschungsprofessor am IWH. Seine Forschung konzentriert sich auf Fragestellungen der Finanzintermediation und vor allem auf die realen Effekte von Finanzmarktregulation, Wettbewerb zwischen Banken, Zugang zu Krediten und Ratingagenturen.

Andre Guettler leitet das Institut für Strategische Unternehmensführung und Finanzierung an der Universität Ulm.

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Professor Dr. Andre Guettler
Professor Dr. Andre Guettler
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Publikationen

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Financial Incentives and Loan Officer Behavior: Multitasking and Allocation of Effort under an Incomplete Contract

P. Behr A. H. Drexler Reint E. Gropp Andre Guettler

in: Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, im Erscheinen

Abstract

In this paper we investigate the implications of providing loan officers with a compensation structure that rewards loan volume and penalizes poor performance versus a fixed wage unrelated to performance. We study detailed transaction information for more than 45,000 loans issued by 240 loan officers of a large commercial bank in Europe. We examine the three main activities that loan officers perform: monitoring, originating, and screening. We find that when the performance of their portfolio deteriorates, loan officers increase their effort to monitor existing borrowers, reduce loan origination, and approve a higher fraction of loan applications. These loans, however, are of above-average quality. Consistent with the theoretical literature on multitasking in incomplete contracts, we show that loan officers neglect activities that are not directly rewarded under the contract, but are in the interest of the bank. In addition, while the response by loan officers constitutes a rational response to a time allocation problem, their reaction to incentives appears myopic in other dimensions.

Publikation lesen

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The Case for a European Rating Agency: Evidence from the Eurozone Sovereign Debt Crisis

Marc Altdörfer Carlos A. De las Salas Vega Andre Guettler Gunter Löffler

in: Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, 2019

Abstract

Politicians frequently voice that European bond issuers would benefit from the presence of a Europe-based rating agency. We take Fitch as a prototype for such an agency. With its ownership structure and a headquarter in London, Fitch is more European than Moody’s and S&P; during the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis, it also issued more favorable ratings. Fitch’s rating actions, however, were largely ignored by the bond market. Our results thus cast doubt on the benefits of a European credit rating agency.

Publikation lesen

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Hidden Gems and Borrowers with Dirty Little Secrets: Investment in Soft Information, Borrower Self-selection and Competition

Reint E. Gropp Andre Guettler

in: Journal of Banking & Finance, Nr. 2, 2018

Abstract

This paper empirically examines the role of soft information in the competitive interaction between relationship and transaction banks. Soft information can be interpreted as a valuable signal about the quality of a firm that is observable to a relationship bank, but not to a transaction bank. We show that borrowers self-select to relationship banks depending on whether their observed soft information is positive or negative. Competition affects the investment in learning the soft information from firms by relationship banks and transaction banks asymmetrically. Relationship banks invest more; transaction banks invest less in soft information, exacerbating the selection effect.

Publikation lesen

Arbeitspapiere

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Public Bank Guarantees and Allocative Efficiency

Reint E. Gropp Andre Guettler Vahid Saadi

in: IWH-Diskussionspapiere, Nr. 7, 2015

Abstract

In the wake of the recent financial crisis, many governments extended public guarantees to banks. We take advantage of a natural experiment, in which long-standing public guarantees were removed for a set of German banks following a lawsuit, to identify the real effects of these guarantees on the allocation of credit (“allocative efficiency”). Using matched bank/firm data, we find that public guarantees reduce allocative efficiency. With guarantees in place, poorly performing firms invest more and maintain higher rates of sales growth. Moreover, firms produce less efficiently in the presence of public guarantees. Consistently, we show that guarantees reduce the likelihood that firms exit the market. These findings suggest that public guarantees hinder restructuring activities and prevent resources to flow to the most productive uses.

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