Jana Ohls

Jana Ohls
Aktuelle Position

seit 2/14

Junior Research Affiliate

Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung Halle (IWH)

seit 2010


Deutsche Bundesbank (Bereich Finanzstabilität, Abteilung Makroprudenzielle Analysen)


  • Finanzstabilität
  • Risikoverbund von Staat
  • Finanzsystem

Jana Ohls ist seit Februar 2014 Junior Research Affiliate am IWH. Sie forscht zu den Themen Risikoverbund von Staat und Finanzsystem und systemische Risiken.

Jana Ohls arbeitet seit 2010 für die Deutsche Bundesbank in dem Bereich Finanzstabilität, Abteilung Makroprudenzielle Analysen. Sie hat Internationale Volkswirtschaftslehre in Tübingen und Buenos Aires studiert.

Ihr Kontakt

Jana Ohls
Jana Ohls
Mitglied - Abteilung Finanzmärkte
Nachricht senden



International Banking and Cross-border Effects of Regulation: Lessons from Germany

Jana Ohls Markus Pramor Lena Tonzer

in: International Journal of Central Banking, Supplement 1, March 2017


We analyze the inward and outward transmission of regulatory changes through German banks’ (international) loan portfolio. Overall, our results provide evidence for international spillovers of prudential instruments. These spillovers are, however, quite heterogeneous between types of banks and can only be observed for some instruments. For instance, domestic affiliates of foreign-owned global banks reduce their loan growth to the German economy in response to a tightening of sector-specific capital buffers, local reserve requirements, and loan-to-value ratios in their home country. Furthermore, from the point of view of foreign countries, tightening reserve requirements is effective in reducing lending inflows from German banks. Finally, we find that business and financial cycles matter for lending decisions.

Publikation lesen


Banks and Sovereign Risk: A Granular View

Claudia M. Buch Michael Koetter Jana Ohls

in: Journal of Financial Stability, 2016


We investigate the determinants of sovereign bond holdings of German banks and the implications of such holdings for bank risk. We use granular information on all German banks and all sovereign debt exposures in the years 2005–2013. As regards the determinants of sovereign bond holdings of banks, we find that these are larger for weakly capitalized banks, banks that are active on capital markets, and for large banks. Yet, only around two thirds of all German banks hold sovereign bonds. Macroeconomic fundamentals were significant drivers of sovereign bond holdings only after the collapse of Lehman Brothers. With the outbreak of the sovereign debt crisis, German banks reallocated their portfolios toward sovereigns with lower debt ratios and bonds with lower yields. With regard to the implications for bank risk, we find that low-risk government bonds decreased the risk of German banks, especially for savings and cooperative banks. Holdings of high-risk government bonds, in turn, increased the risk of commercial banks during the sovereign debt crisis.

Publikation lesen
Mitglied der Leibniz-Gemeinschaft LogoTotal-Equality-LogoWeltoffen Logo