Professor Dr. Steffen Müller

Professor Dr. Steffen Müller
Aktuelle Position

seit 10/14

Leiter der Abteilung Strukturwandel und Produktivität

Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung Halle (IWH)

seit 10/14

Universitätsprofessor für Wirtschaftswissenschaften: Produktivität und Innovation

Otto-von-Guericke-Universität, Magdeburg


  • betriebliche Produktivität
  • empirische Arbeitsmarktökonomik
  • betriebliche Gründungs- und Schließungsdynamik

Seit 2014 ist Steffen Müller Universitätsprofessor für Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Produktivität und Innovation an der Otto-von-Guericke-Universität Magdeburg und Leiter der Abteilung Strukturwandel und Produktivität am IWH. Er ist CESifo Fellow und Mitglied im Bevölkerungsökonomischen Ausschuss, im Bildungsökonomischen Ausschuss und im Ausschuss für Sozialpolitik des Vereins für Socialpolitik.

Steffen Müller hat Volkswirtschaftslehre an der Universität Leipzig studiert. Er wechselte im Jahr 2005 an die Friedrich-Alexander-Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg, wo er 2009 bei Professor Regina T. Riphahn promovierte (Dissertation: Mandatory works councils in Germany: their effects on productivity and profits). Er habilitierte sich 2014 ebendort und erhielt die Lehrbefugnis für Volkswirtschaftslehre und Ökonometrie. Während dieser Zeit forschte Steffen Müller auch an der University of California in Berkeley und in Davis.

Ihr Kontakt

Professor Dr. Steffen Müller
Professor Dr. Steffen Müller
Leiter - Abteilung Strukturwandel und Produktivität
Nachricht senden +49 345 7753-708



Size of Training Firms and Cumulated Long-run Unemployment Exposure – The Role of Firms, Luck, and Ability in Young Workers’ Careers

Steffen Müller Renate Neubäumer

in: International Journal of Manpower, im Erscheinen

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Why Is there Resistance to Works Councils In Germany? An Economic Perspective

Steffen Müller Jens Stegmaier

in: Economic and Industrial Democracy, im Erscheinen


Recent empirical research generally finds evidence of positive economic effects for works councils, for example with regard to productivity and – with some limitations – to profits. This makes it necessary to explain why employers’ associations have reservations about works councils. On the basis of an in-depth literature analysis, this article shows that beyond the generally positive findings, there are important heterogeneities in the impact of works councils. The authors argue that those groups of employers that tend to benefit little from employee participation in terms of productivity and profits may well be important enough to shape the agenda of their employers’ organization and have even gained in importance within their organizations in recent years. The authors also discuss the role of deviations from profit-maximizing behavior like risk aversion, short-term profit-maximization and other non-pecuniary motives, as possible reasons for employer resistance.

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Industrial Relations: Worker Codetermination and Collective Wage Bargaining

Steffen Müller Claus Schnabel

in: Jahrbücher für Nationalökonomie und Statistik, Nr. 1, 2019


Trade unions and employers’ associations, collective bargaining, and employee representation at the workplace are the cornerstones of industrial relations systems in many developed countries. Germany stands out as a country with powerful works councils and a high coverage rate of collective bargaining agreements, supported by encompassing interest groups of employees and employers and by the state. The German case and the perceived stability of its industrial relations regime have attracted considerable attention among researchers and politicians, which also has to do with the country’s high productivity, comparably few strikes, and relatively minor employment problems. However, in recent years industrial relations in many countries including Germany have come under pressure and the fact that there is no obvious and clearly superior alternative to the current regime of industrial and labour relations may not be sufficient to guarantee the survival of the present system.

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Do Asset Purchase Programmes Shape Industry Dynamics? Evidence from the ECB's SMP on Plant Entries and Exits

Manfred Antoni Michael Koetter Steffen Müller Talina Sondershaus

in: IWH-Diskussionspapiere, Nr. 12, 2019


Asset purchase programmes (APPs) may insulate banks from having to terminate relationships with unproductive customers. Using administrative plant and bank data, we test whether APPs impinge on industry dynamics in terms of plant entry and exit. Plants in Germany connected to banks with access to an APP are approximately 20% less likely to exit. In particular, unproductive plants connected to weak banks with APP access are less likely to close. Aggregate entry and exit rates in regional markets with high APP exposures are also lower. Thus, APPs seem to subdue Schumpeterian cleansing mechanisms, which may hamper factor reallocation and aggregate productivity growth.

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Firm Wage Premia, Industrial Relations, and Rent Sharing in Germany

Boris Hirsch Steffen Müller

in: IWH-Diskussionspapiere, Nr. 2, 2018


This paper investigates the influence of industrial relations on firm wage premia in Germany. OLS regressions for the firm effects from a two-way fixed effects decomposition of workers’ wages by Card, Heining, and Kline (2013) document that average premia are larger in firms bound by collective agreements and in firms with a works council, holding constant firm performance. RIF regressions show that premia are less dispersed among covered firms but more dispersed among firms with a works council. Hence, deunionisation is the only among the suspects investigated that contributes to explaining the marked rise in the premia dispersion over time.

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Explaining Wage Losses after Job Displacement: Employer Size and Lost Firm Rents

Daniel Fackler Steffen Müller Jens Stegmaier

in: IWH-Diskussionspapiere, Nr. 32, 2017


Why does job displacement, e.g., following import competition, technological change, or economic downturns, result in permanent wage losses? The job displacement literature is silent on whether wage losses after job displacement are driven by lost firm wage premiums or worker productivity depreciations. We therefore estimate losses in wages and firm wage premiums. Premiums are measured as firm effects from a two-way fixed-effects approach, as described in Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis (1999). Using German administrative data, we find that wage losses are, on average, fully explained by losses in firm wage premiums and that premium losses are largely permanent. We show that losses in wages and premiums are minor for workers displaced from small plants and strongly increase with pre-displacement firm size, which provides an explanation for the large and persistent wage losses that have been found in previous studies mostly focusing on displacement from large employers.

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