We document and dissect a new stylized fact about firm growth: the shift from labor to intermediate inputs. This shift occurs in input quantities, cost and output shares, and output elasticities. We establish this fact using German firm-level data and replicate it in administrative firm data from 11 additional countries. We also document these patterns in micro-aggregated industry data for 20 European countries (and, with respect to industry cost shares, for the US). We rationalize this novel regularity within a parsimonious model featuring (i) an elasticity of substitution between intermediates and labor that exceeds unity, and (ii) an increasing shadow price of labor relative to intermediates, due to monopsony power over labor or labor adjustment costs. The shift from labor to intermediates accounts for one half to one third of the decline in the labor share in growing firms (the remainder is due to wage markdowns and markups) and rationalizes most of the labor share decline in growing industries.

We document and dissect a new stylized fact about firm growth: the shift from labor to intermediate inputs. This shift occurs in input quantities, cost and output shares, and output elasticities. We establish this fact using German firm-level data and replicate it in administrative firm data from 11 additional countries. We also document these patterns in micro-aggregated industry data for 20 European countries (and, with respect to industry cost shares, for the US). We rationalize this novel regularity within a parsimonious model featuring (i) an elasticity of substitution between intermediates and labor that exceeds unity, and (ii) an increasing shadow price of labor relative to intermediates, due to monopsony power over labor or labor adjustment costs. The shift from labor to intermediates accounts for one half to one third of the decline in the labor share in growing firms (the remainder is due to wage markdowns and markups) and rationalizes most of the labor share decline in growing industries.

Der deutsche Konjunkturmotor stottert weiter vor sich hin. Obwohl das Bruttoinlandsprodukt (BIP) im dritten Quartal 2024 um 0,2% zunahm, liegt es immer noch unter dem Niveau vom ersten Quartal 2024, da das zweite Quartal nach neuesten Zahlen weitaus schwächer ausgefallen ist als zuvor gemeldet (vgl. Abbildung 1). Der leichte Zuwachs im dritten Quartal dürfte dabei vor allem auf gestiegene staatliche und private Konsumausgaben zurückzuführen sein. In den Unternehmen ist die Stimmung weiterhin trüb und die wirtschaftspolitische Unsicherheit dürfte weiterhin hoch bleiben. Zudem belasten nach wie vor gestiegene Energie- und Lohnkosten die Investitionsbereitschaft der Unternehmen. Alles in allem dürfte das Bruttoinlandsprodukt (BIP) laut IWH-Flash-Indikator im vierten Quartal 2024 stagnieren. Für den Jahresbeginn 2025 deuten allerdings die Frühindikatoren auf eine Belebung der wirtschaftlichen Aktivitäten und einen Anstieg des BIP um 0,4% hin. Diese reflektieren jedoch noch nicht die jüngsten politischen Ereignisse in den USA und in Deutschland.

We use project-level information for the largest regional economic development program in German history to study how government subsidies to firms affect credit markets. We identify credit market responses by considering both, bank lending and firm borrowing during 1998-2019. We find that subsidies lead to larger lending volumes without crowding out credit to non-subsidized firms. Banks that are more exposed to subsidized firms exhibit moderately higher credit risk though. Firm subsidies support lending especially when credit constraints are elevated during the years of the financial crisis.