Creditor-control Rights and the Nonsynchronicity of Global CDS Markets
Iftekhar Hasan, Miriam Marra, Eliza Wu, Gaiyan Zhang
Review of Corporate Finance Studies,
forthcoming
Abstract
We analyze how creditor rights affect the nonsynchronicity of global corporate credit default swap spreads (CDS-NS). CDS-NS is negatively related to the country-level creditor-control rights, especially to the “restrictions on reorganization” component, where creditor-shareholder conflicts are high. The effect is concentrated in firms with high investment intensity, asset growth, information opacity, and risk. Pro-creditor bankruptcy reforms led to a decline in CDS-NS, indicating lower firm-specific idiosyncratic information being priced in credit markets. A strategic-disclosure incentive among debtors avoiding creditor intervention seems more dominant than the disciplining effect, suggesting how strengthening creditor rights affects power rebalancing between creditors and shareholders.
Read article
Compensation Regulation in Banking: Executive Director Behavior and Bank Performance after the EU Bonus Cap
Stefano Colonnello, Michael Koetter, Konstantin Wagner
Journal of Accounting and Economics,
forthcoming
Abstract
The regulation that caps executives’ variable compensation, as part of the Capital Requirements Directive IV of 2013, likely affected executive turnover, compensation design, and risk-taking in EU banking. The current study identifies significantly higher average turnover rates but also finds that they are driven by CEOs at poorly performing banks. Banks indemnified their executives by off-setting the bonus cap with higher fixed compensation. Although our evidence is only suggestive, we do not find any reduction in risk-taking at the bank level, one purported aim of the regulation.
Read article
Supranational Rules, National Discretion: Increasing versus Inflating Regulatory Bank Capital?
Reint E. Gropp, Thomas Mosk, Steven Ongena, Ines Simac, Carlo Wix
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,
forthcoming
Abstract
We study how banks use “regulatory adjustments” to inflate their regulatory capital ratios and whether this depends on forbearance on the part of national authorities. Using the 2011 EBA capital exercise as a quasi-natural experiment, we find that banks substantially inflated their levels of regulatory capital via a reduction in regulatory adjustments — without a commensurate increase in book equity and without a reduction in bank risk. We document substantial heterogeneity in regulatory capital inflation across countries, suggesting that national authorities forbear their domestic banks to meet supranational requirements, with a focus on short-term economic considerations.
Read article
To Securitize or To Price Credit Risk?
Danny McGowan, Huyen Nguyen
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,
forthcoming
Abstract
Do lenders securitize or price loans in response to credit risk? Exploiting exogenous variation in regional credit risk due to foreclosure law differences along US state borders, we find that lenders securitize mortgages that are eligible for sale to the Government Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs) rather than price regional credit risk. For non-GSE-eligible mortgages with no GSE buyback provision, lenders increase interest rates as they are unable to shift credit risk to loan purchasers. The results inform the debate surrounding the GSEs' buyback provisions, the constant interest rate policy, and show that underpricing regional credit risk increases the GSEs' debt holdings.
Read article
Hollywood, Wall Street, and Mistrusting Individual Investors
Guido Lenz, Maximilian Mayer
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization,
June
2023
Abstract
Individual investors reduce their trading activity in financial markets after the release of negatively biased Hollywood movies related to financial markets. These movies regularly depict financial markets and professionals active in them as marked by greed and corruption (Lichter et al. 1997). This decline in trading activity at the extensive margin comes together with depressed investor sentiment marked by higher likelihoods and volumes of selling than of buying transactions by those investors still active. Their avoidance of investing in and tendency to trade out of stocks related to companies in the financial industry, as well as their shift from actively managed mutual funds to passive vehicles (ETFs), provide evidence for the deterioration of investors’ trust in the financial industry and its managers. This channel is in line with existing literature on subjective beliefs in investment decisions and the impact of biased media coverage, such as the negative depiction of financial markets, shareholders, and managers in Hollywood movies.
Read article
Gender Pay Gap in American CFOs: Theory and Evidence
Bill Francis, Iftekhar Hasan, Gayane Hovakimian, Zenu Sharma
Journal of Corporate Finance,
June
2023
Abstract
Studies document persistent unexplained gender-based wage gap in labor markets. At the executive level, where skill and education are similar, career interruptions and differences in risk preferences primarily explain the extant gender-based pay gap. This study focuses on CFO compensation contracts of Execucomp firms (1992–2020) and finds no gender-based pay gap. This paper offers several explanations for this phenomenon, such as novel evidence on the risk preferences of females with financial expertise and changes in the social and regulatory climate.
Read article
23.05.2023 • 14/2023
Analysis of earnings calls: Blathering managers harm their company
If a senior executive refuses to give information to professional investors, the company's stock market value drops afterwards. This is shown in a study by the Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH) after evaluating
1.2 million answers from tele-phone conferences.
Fabian Wöbbeking
Read press release
Short-Selling Threats and Bank Risk-Taking: Evidence from the Financial Crisis
Dien Giau Bui, Iftekhar Hasan, Chih-Yung Lin, Hong Thoa Nguyen
Journal of Banking and Finance,
May
2023
Abstract
The focus of this paper is whether the Securities and Exchange Commission's Regulation SHO strengthens or weakens the effect of short-selling threats on banks’ risk-taking. The evidence shows that pilot banks with looser constraints on short-selling increased their risk-taking during the financial crisis of 2007–2009. The reason is that short-selling threats improved the information environment and mitigated the agency problems of banks during the pilot program that led to greater risk-taking by pilot banks. Additionally, this effect is mainly driven by pilot banks with poor corporate governance, or high information asymmetry. Overall, our paper provides novel evidence that the disciplinary role of short-sellers had a positive effect on bank risk-taking during the financial crisis.
Read article
Natural Disasters and Bank Stability: Evidence from the U.S. Financial System
Felix Noth, Ulrich Schüwer
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management,
May
2023
Abstract
We show that weather-related natural disasters in the United States significantly weaken the financial stability of banks with business activities in affected regions. This is reflected in higher probabilities of default, lower z-scores, higher non-performing assets ratios, higher foreclosure ratios, lower returns on assets and lower equity ratios of affected banks in the years following a natural disaster. The effects are economically relevant and highlight the financial vulnerability of banks and their borrowers despite insurances and public aid programs.
Read article
14.03.2023 • 7/2023
Gas storages full – economic outlook less gloomy
The severe slump in the German economy expected last fall has not materialised because gas supply stabilises. However, due to high inflation, higher real interest rates and declining real incomes, the economy is likely to remain weak. In its spring forecast, the Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH) expects production to grow by just 0.4% in 2023, and inflation to remain high at 5.8%.
Oliver Holtemöller
Read press release