Eine kleine Minderheit von Produkten verursacht bei ihrer Herstellung einen Großteil des Gasverbrauchs der Industrie. Viele könnten relativ leicht durch Importe ersetzt werden, zeigt eine Analyse des Leibniz-Instituts für Wirtschaftsforschung Halle (IWH) für das Jahresgutachten der Wirtschaftsweisen. Ein Industriezweig ist besonders betroffen.
Die Zahl der Insolvenzen von Personen- und Kapitalgesellschaften war im Oktober im Vergleich zum Vormonat leicht rückläufig, zeigt die aktuelle Analyse des Leibniz-Instituts für Wirtschaftsforschung Halle (IWH). Für die kommenden Monate ist jedoch wieder mit steigenden Insolvenzzahlen zu rechnen.
Die Zahl der Insolvenzen von Personen- und Kapitalgesellschaften liegt im September 34% über dem Vorjahreswert, zeigt die aktuelle Analyse des Leibniz-Instituts für Wirtschaftsforschung Halle (IWH). Für den Herbst ist mit weiter zunehmenden Insolvenzzahlen zu rechnen.
The energy crisis is pushing the German economy into recession. This also affects the economy in East Germany. According to the Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH), East German production will expand at a slightly stronger rate of 1.5% than in Germany as a whole. For the coming year, the decline in East Germany is expected to be less pronounced than in the west at 0.1% (Germany: ‒0.4%). For 2024, the economists forecast a growth of 1.7% (Germany: 1.9%).
in: Review of Corporate Finance Studies, forthcoming
How do firms invest when financial constraints are relaxed? We document that firms affected by a large positive credit supply shock predominantly increase borrowing for transaction-based purposes. These treated firms have larger asset and employment growth rates; however, growth entirely stems from the increased takeover activity. Announcement returns indicate a low quality of the credit-supply-induced takeover activity. These results offer the possibility that credit-driven growth can simply reflect redistribution, rather than net gains in assets or employment.
in: Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, forthcoming
We study how banks use “regulatory adjustments” to inflate their regulatory capital ratios and whether this depends on forbearance on the part of national authorities. Using the 2011 EBA capital exercise as a quasi-natural experiment, we find that banks substantially inflated their levels of regulatory capital via a reduction in regulatory adjustments — without a commensurate increase in book equity and without a reduction in bank risk. We document substantial heterogeneity in regulatory capital inflation across countries, suggesting that national authorities forbear their domestic banks to meet supranational requirements, with a focus on short-term economic considerations.
in: Journal of International Economics, forthcoming
Capital inflow surges destabilize the economy through a maturity shortening mechanism. The underlying reason is that firms have incentives to redeem their debt on demand to accommodate the potential liquidity needs of global investors, which makes international borrowing endogenously fragile. Based on a theoretical model and empirical evidence at both the firm and macro levels, our main findings are twofold. First, a significant association exists between surges and shortened corporate debt maturity, especially for firms with foreign bank relationships and higher redeployability. Second, the probability of a crisis following surges with a flattened yield curve is significantly higher than that following surges without one. Our study suggests that debt maturity is the key to understand the financial instability consequences of capital inflow bonanzas.
in: Journal of International Economics, forthcoming
This study provides firm-level evidence on the effect of capital account liberalization on total factor productivity (TFP) growth. We find that a one standard deviation increase in the capital account openness indicator constructed by Fernández et al. (2016) is significantly associated with a 0.18 standard deviation increase in firms’ TFP growth rates. The productivity-enhancing effects are stronger for sectors with higher external finance dependence and capital-skill complementarity, and are persistent five years after liberalization. Moreover, we show that potential transmission mechanisms include improved financing conditions, greater skilled labor utilization, and technology upgrades. Finally, we document heterogeneous effects across firm size and tradability, and threshold effects with respect to the country's institutional quality.
in: Journal of the European Economic Association, forthcoming
This paper derives a European Herfindahl–Hirschman concentration index from 15 micro-aggregated country datasets. In the last decade, European concentration rose due to a reallocation of economic activity toward large and concentrated industries. Over the same period, productivity gains from an increasing allocative efficiency of the European market accounted for 50% of European productivity growth while markups stayed constant. Using country-industry variation, we show that changes in concentration are positively associated with changes in productivity and allocative efficiency. This holds across most sectors and countries and supports the notion that rising concentration in Europe reflects a more efficient market environment rather than weak competition and rising market power.
in: Defence and Peace Economics, forthcoming
We investigate the long-term relationship between conflict-related migration and individual socioeconomic inequality. Looking at the post-conflict environment of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), a former Yugoslav state most heavily impacted by the wars of the early 1990s, the paper focuses on differences in educational performance and income between four groups: migrants, internally displaced persons, former external migrants, and those who did not move. The analysis leverages a municipality-representative survey (n ≈ 6,000) that captured self-reported education and income outcomes as well as migration histories. We find that individuals with greater exposure to conflict had systematically worse educational performance and lower earnings two decades after the war. Former external migrants now living in BiH have better educational and economic outcomes than those who did not migrate, but these advantages are smaller for external migrants who were forced to move. We recommend that policies intended to address migration-related discrepancies should be targeted on the basis of individual and family experiences caused by conflict.
in: Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, forthcoming
Do lenders securitize or price loans in response to credit risk? Exploiting exogenous variation in regional credit risk due to foreclosure law differences along US state borders, we find that lenders securitize mortgages that are eligible for sale to the Government Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs) rather than price regional credit risk. For non-GSE-eligible mortgages with no GSE buyback provision, lenders increase interest rates as they are unable to shift credit risk to loan purchasers. The results inform the debate surrounding the GSEs' buyback provisions, the constant interest rate policy, and show that underpricing regional credit risk increases the GSEs' debt holdings.
in: Financial Markets, Institutions and Instruments, forthcoming
Abstract Tracing negative media attention, this paper investigates the effect of reputational risk on firm value. Decomposing reputational damage into environmental, social and corporate-governance dimensions, it reports that environmental reputational risk has the most significant negative effect on price earnings, i.e., firms exposed to environmental risk are likely to be priced at a discount or charged a higher risk premium when discounting future earnings.
in: Review of Economic Studies, forthcoming
We present a test of Coasean theories of efficient separations. We study a cohort of jobs from the introduction through the repeal of a large age- and region-specific unemployment benefit extension in Austria. In the treatment group, 18.5% fewer jobs survive the program period. According to the Coasean view, the destroyed marginal jobs had low joint surplus. Hence, after the repeal, the treatment survivors should be more resilient than the ineligible control group survivors. Strikingly, the two groups instead exhibit identical post-repeal separation behavior. We provide, and find suggestive evidence consistent with, an alternative model in which wage rigidity drives the inefficient separation dynamics.
in: IMF Economic Review, forthcoming
We analyze whether financial integration leads to converging or diverging business cycles using a dynamic spatial model. Our model allows for contemporaneous spillovers of shocks to GDP growth between countries that are financially integrated and delivers a scalar measure of the spillover intensity at each point in time. For a financial network of ten European countries from 1996 to 2017, we find that the spillover effects are positive on average and much larger during periods of financial stress, pointing towards stronger business cycle synchronization. Dismantling GDP growth into value added growth of ten major industries, we observe that spillover intensities vary significantly. The findings are robust to a variety of alternative model specifications.
in: Review of Corporate Finance Studies, forthcoming
How do firms invest when financial constraints are relaxed? We document that firms affected by a large positive credit supply shock predominantly increase borrowing for transaction-based purposes. These treated firms have larger asset and employment growth rates; however, growth entirely stems from the increased takeover activity. Announcement returns indicate a low quality of the credit-supply-induced takeover activity. These results offer the possibility that credit-driven growth can simply reflect redistribution, rather than net gains in assets or employment.
in: Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, forthcoming
We study how banks use “regulatory adjustments” to inflate their regulatory capital ratios and whether this depends on forbearance on the part of national authorities. Using the 2011 EBA capital exercise as a quasi-natural experiment, we find that banks substantially inflated their levels of regulatory capital via a reduction in regulatory adjustments — without a commensurate increase in book equity and without a reduction in bank risk. We document substantial heterogeneity in regulatory capital inflation across countries, suggesting that national authorities forbear their domestic banks to meet supranational requirements, with a focus on short-term economic considerations.
in: Journal of International Economics, forthcoming
Capital inflow surges destabilize the economy through a maturity shortening mechanism. The underlying reason is that firms have incentives to redeem their debt on demand to accommodate the potential liquidity needs of global investors, which makes international borrowing endogenously fragile. Based on a theoretical model and empirical evidence at both the firm and macro levels, our main findings are twofold. First, a significant association exists between surges and shortened corporate debt maturity, especially for firms with foreign bank relationships and higher redeployability. Second, the probability of a crisis following surges with a flattened yield curve is significantly higher than that following surges without one. Our study suggests that debt maturity is the key to understand the financial instability consequences of capital inflow bonanzas.
in: Journal of International Economics, forthcoming
This study provides firm-level evidence on the effect of capital account liberalization on total factor productivity (TFP) growth. We find that a one standard deviation increase in the capital account openness indicator constructed by Fernández et al. (2016) is significantly associated with a 0.18 standard deviation increase in firms’ TFP growth rates. The productivity-enhancing effects are stronger for sectors with higher external finance dependence and capital-skill complementarity, and are persistent five years after liberalization. Moreover, we show that potential transmission mechanisms include improved financing conditions, greater skilled labor utilization, and technology upgrades. Finally, we document heterogeneous effects across firm size and tradability, and threshold effects with respect to the country's institutional quality.
in: Journal of the European Economic Association, forthcoming
This paper derives a European Herfindahl–Hirschman concentration index from 15 micro-aggregated country datasets. In the last decade, European concentration rose due to a reallocation of economic activity toward large and concentrated industries. Over the same period, productivity gains from an increasing allocative efficiency of the European market accounted for 50% of European productivity growth while markups stayed constant. Using country-industry variation, we show that changes in concentration are positively associated with changes in productivity and allocative efficiency. This holds across most sectors and countries and supports the notion that rising concentration in Europe reflects a more efficient market environment rather than weak competition and rising market power.
in: Defence and Peace Economics, forthcoming
We investigate the long-term relationship between conflict-related migration and individual socioeconomic inequality. Looking at the post-conflict environment of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), a former Yugoslav state most heavily impacted by the wars of the early 1990s, the paper focuses on differences in educational performance and income between four groups: migrants, internally displaced persons, former external migrants, and those who did not move. The analysis leverages a municipality-representative survey (n ≈ 6,000) that captured self-reported education and income outcomes as well as migration histories. We find that individuals with greater exposure to conflict had systematically worse educational performance and lower earnings two decades after the war. Former external migrants now living in BiH have better educational and economic outcomes than those who did not migrate, but these advantages are smaller for external migrants who were forced to move. We recommend that policies intended to address migration-related discrepancies should be targeted on the basis of individual and family experiences caused by conflict.
in: Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, forthcoming
Do lenders securitize or price loans in response to credit risk? Exploiting exogenous variation in regional credit risk due to foreclosure law differences along US state borders, we find that lenders securitize mortgages that are eligible for sale to the Government Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs) rather than price regional credit risk. For non-GSE-eligible mortgages with no GSE buyback provision, lenders increase interest rates as they are unable to shift credit risk to loan purchasers. The results inform the debate surrounding the GSEs' buyback provisions, the constant interest rate policy, and show that underpricing regional credit risk increases the GSEs' debt holdings.
in: Financial Markets, Institutions and Instruments, forthcoming
Abstract Tracing negative media attention, this paper investigates the effect of reputational risk on firm value. Decomposing reputational damage into environmental, social and corporate-governance dimensions, it reports that environmental reputational risk has the most significant negative effect on price earnings, i.e., firms exposed to environmental risk are likely to be priced at a discount or charged a higher risk premium when discounting future earnings.
in: Review of Economic Studies, forthcoming
We present a test of Coasean theories of efficient separations. We study a cohort of jobs from the introduction through the repeal of a large age- and region-specific unemployment benefit extension in Austria. In the treatment group, 18.5% fewer jobs survive the program period. According to the Coasean view, the destroyed marginal jobs had low joint surplus. Hence, after the repeal, the treatment survivors should be more resilient than the ineligible control group survivors. Strikingly, the two groups instead exhibit identical post-repeal separation behavior. We provide, and find suggestive evidence consistent with, an alternative model in which wage rigidity drives the inefficient separation dynamics.
in: IMF Economic Review, forthcoming
We analyze whether financial integration leads to converging or diverging business cycles using a dynamic spatial model. Our model allows for contemporaneous spillovers of shocks to GDP growth between countries that are financially integrated and delivers a scalar measure of the spillover intensity at each point in time. For a financial network of ten European countries from 1996 to 2017, we find that the spillover effects are positive on average and much larger during periods of financial stress, pointing towards stronger business cycle synchronization. Dismantling GDP growth into value added growth of ten major industries, we observe that spillover intensities vary significantly. The findings are robust to a variety of alternative model specifications.
in: Review of Corporate Finance Studies, forthcoming
How do firms invest when financial constraints are relaxed? We document that firms affected by a large positive credit supply shock predominantly increase borrowing for transaction-based purposes. These treated firms have larger asset and employment growth rates; however, growth entirely stems from the increased takeover activity. Announcement returns indicate a low quality of the credit-supply-induced takeover activity. These results offer the possibility that credit-driven growth can simply reflect redistribution, rather than net gains in assets or employment.
in: Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, forthcoming
We study how banks use “regulatory adjustments” to inflate their regulatory capital ratios and whether this depends on forbearance on the part of national authorities. Using the 2011 EBA capital exercise as a quasi-natural experiment, we find that banks substantially inflated their levels of regulatory capital via a reduction in regulatory adjustments — without a commensurate increase in book equity and without a reduction in bank risk. We document substantial heterogeneity in regulatory capital inflation across countries, suggesting that national authorities forbear their domestic banks to meet supranational requirements, with a focus on short-term economic considerations.
in: Journal of International Economics, forthcoming
Capital inflow surges destabilize the economy through a maturity shortening mechanism. The underlying reason is that firms have incentives to redeem their debt on demand to accommodate the potential liquidity needs of global investors, which makes international borrowing endogenously fragile. Based on a theoretical model and empirical evidence at both the firm and macro levels, our main findings are twofold. First, a significant association exists between surges and shortened corporate debt maturity, especially for firms with foreign bank relationships and higher redeployability. Second, the probability of a crisis following surges with a flattened yield curve is significantly higher than that following surges without one. Our study suggests that debt maturity is the key to understand the financial instability consequences of capital inflow bonanzas.
in: Journal of International Economics, forthcoming
This study provides firm-level evidence on the effect of capital account liberalization on total factor productivity (TFP) growth. We find that a one standard deviation increase in the capital account openness indicator constructed by Fernández et al. (2016) is significantly associated with a 0.18 standard deviation increase in firms’ TFP growth rates. The productivity-enhancing effects are stronger for sectors with higher external finance dependence and capital-skill complementarity, and are persistent five years after liberalization. Moreover, we show that potential transmission mechanisms include improved financing conditions, greater skilled labor utilization, and technology upgrades. Finally, we document heterogeneous effects across firm size and tradability, and threshold effects with respect to the country's institutional quality.
in: Journal of the European Economic Association, forthcoming
This paper derives a European Herfindahl–Hirschman concentration index from 15 micro-aggregated country datasets. In the last decade, European concentration rose due to a reallocation of economic activity toward large and concentrated industries. Over the same period, productivity gains from an increasing allocative efficiency of the European market accounted for 50% of European productivity growth while markups stayed constant. Using country-industry variation, we show that changes in concentration are positively associated with changes in productivity and allocative efficiency. This holds across most sectors and countries and supports the notion that rising concentration in Europe reflects a more efficient market environment rather than weak competition and rising market power.
in: Defence and Peace Economics, forthcoming
We investigate the long-term relationship between conflict-related migration and individual socioeconomic inequality. Looking at the post-conflict environment of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), a former Yugoslav state most heavily impacted by the wars of the early 1990s, the paper focuses on differences in educational performance and income between four groups: migrants, internally displaced persons, former external migrants, and those who did not move. The analysis leverages a municipality-representative survey (n ≈ 6,000) that captured self-reported education and income outcomes as well as migration histories. We find that individuals with greater exposure to conflict had systematically worse educational performance and lower earnings two decades after the war. Former external migrants now living in BiH have better educational and economic outcomes than those who did not migrate, but these advantages are smaller for external migrants who were forced to move. We recommend that policies intended to address migration-related discrepancies should be targeted on the basis of individual and family experiences caused by conflict.
in: Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, forthcoming
Do lenders securitize or price loans in response to credit risk? Exploiting exogenous variation in regional credit risk due to foreclosure law differences along US state borders, we find that lenders securitize mortgages that are eligible for sale to the Government Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs) rather than price regional credit risk. For non-GSE-eligible mortgages with no GSE buyback provision, lenders increase interest rates as they are unable to shift credit risk to loan purchasers. The results inform the debate surrounding the GSEs' buyback provisions, the constant interest rate policy, and show that underpricing regional credit risk increases the GSEs' debt holdings.
in: Financial Markets, Institutions and Instruments, forthcoming
Abstract Tracing negative media attention, this paper investigates the effect of reputational risk on firm value. Decomposing reputational damage into environmental, social and corporate-governance dimensions, it reports that environmental reputational risk has the most significant negative effect on price earnings, i.e., firms exposed to environmental risk are likely to be priced at a discount or charged a higher risk premium when discounting future earnings.
in: Review of Economic Studies, forthcoming
We present a test of Coasean theories of efficient separations. We study a cohort of jobs from the introduction through the repeal of a large age- and region-specific unemployment benefit extension in Austria. In the treatment group, 18.5% fewer jobs survive the program period. According to the Coasean view, the destroyed marginal jobs had low joint surplus. Hence, after the repeal, the treatment survivors should be more resilient than the ineligible control group survivors. Strikingly, the two groups instead exhibit identical post-repeal separation behavior. We provide, and find suggestive evidence consistent with, an alternative model in which wage rigidity drives the inefficient separation dynamics.
in: IMF Economic Review, forthcoming
We analyze whether financial integration leads to converging or diverging business cycles using a dynamic spatial model. Our model allows for contemporaneous spillovers of shocks to GDP growth between countries that are financially integrated and delivers a scalar measure of the spillover intensity at each point in time. For a financial network of ten European countries from 1996 to 2017, we find that the spillover effects are positive on average and much larger during periods of financial stress, pointing towards stronger business cycle synchronization. Dismantling GDP growth into value added growth of ten major industries, we observe that spillover intensities vary significantly. The findings are robust to a variety of alternative model specifications.
in: Review of Corporate Finance Studies, forthcoming
How do firms invest when financial constraints are relaxed? We document that firms affected by a large positive credit supply shock predominantly increase borrowing for transaction-based purposes. These treated firms have larger asset and employment growth rates; however, growth entirely stems from the increased takeover activity. Announcement returns indicate a low quality of the credit-supply-induced takeover activity. These results offer the possibility that credit-driven growth can simply reflect redistribution, rather than net gains in assets or employment.
in: Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, forthcoming
We study how banks use “regulatory adjustments” to inflate their regulatory capital ratios and whether this depends on forbearance on the part of national authorities. Using the 2011 EBA capital exercise as a quasi-natural experiment, we find that banks substantially inflated their levels of regulatory capital via a reduction in regulatory adjustments — without a commensurate increase in book equity and without a reduction in bank risk. We document substantial heterogeneity in regulatory capital inflation across countries, suggesting that national authorities forbear their domestic banks to meet supranational requirements, with a focus on short-term economic considerations.
in: Journal of International Economics, forthcoming
Capital inflow surges destabilize the economy through a maturity shortening mechanism. The underlying reason is that firms have incentives to redeem their debt on demand to accommodate the potential liquidity needs of global investors, which makes international borrowing endogenously fragile. Based on a theoretical model and empirical evidence at both the firm and macro levels, our main findings are twofold. First, a significant association exists between surges and shortened corporate debt maturity, especially for firms with foreign bank relationships and higher redeployability. Second, the probability of a crisis following surges with a flattened yield curve is significantly higher than that following surges without one. Our study suggests that debt maturity is the key to understand the financial instability consequences of capital inflow bonanzas.
in: Journal of International Economics, forthcoming
This study provides firm-level evidence on the effect of capital account liberalization on total factor productivity (TFP) growth. We find that a one standard deviation increase in the capital account openness indicator constructed by Fernández et al. (2016) is significantly associated with a 0.18 standard deviation increase in firms’ TFP growth rates. The productivity-enhancing effects are stronger for sectors with higher external finance dependence and capital-skill complementarity, and are persistent five years after liberalization. Moreover, we show that potential transmission mechanisms include improved financing conditions, greater skilled labor utilization, and technology upgrades. Finally, we document heterogeneous effects across firm size and tradability, and threshold effects with respect to the country's institutional quality.
in: Journal of the European Economic Association, forthcoming
This paper derives a European Herfindahl–Hirschman concentration index from 15 micro-aggregated country datasets. In the last decade, European concentration rose due to a reallocation of economic activity toward large and concentrated industries. Over the same period, productivity gains from an increasing allocative efficiency of the European market accounted for 50% of European productivity growth while markups stayed constant. Using country-industry variation, we show that changes in concentration are positively associated with changes in productivity and allocative efficiency. This holds across most sectors and countries and supports the notion that rising concentration in Europe reflects a more efficient market environment rather than weak competition and rising market power.
in: Defence and Peace Economics, forthcoming
We investigate the long-term relationship between conflict-related migration and individual socioeconomic inequality. Looking at the post-conflict environment of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), a former Yugoslav state most heavily impacted by the wars of the early 1990s, the paper focuses on differences in educational performance and income between four groups: migrants, internally displaced persons, former external migrants, and those who did not move. The analysis leverages a municipality-representative survey (n ≈ 6,000) that captured self-reported education and income outcomes as well as migration histories. We find that individuals with greater exposure to conflict had systematically worse educational performance and lower earnings two decades after the war. Former external migrants now living in BiH have better educational and economic outcomes than those who did not migrate, but these advantages are smaller for external migrants who were forced to move. We recommend that policies intended to address migration-related discrepancies should be targeted on the basis of individual and family experiences caused by conflict.
in: Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, forthcoming
Do lenders securitize or price loans in response to credit risk? Exploiting exogenous variation in regional credit risk due to foreclosure law differences along US state borders, we find that lenders securitize mortgages that are eligible for sale to the Government Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs) rather than price regional credit risk. For non-GSE-eligible mortgages with no GSE buyback provision, lenders increase interest rates as they are unable to shift credit risk to loan purchasers. The results inform the debate surrounding the GSEs' buyback provisions, the constant interest rate policy, and show that underpricing regional credit risk increases the GSEs' debt holdings.
in: Financial Markets, Institutions and Instruments, forthcoming
Abstract Tracing negative media attention, this paper investigates the effect of reputational risk on firm value. Decomposing reputational damage into environmental, social and corporate-governance dimensions, it reports that environmental reputational risk has the most significant negative effect on price earnings, i.e., firms exposed to environmental risk are likely to be priced at a discount or charged a higher risk premium when discounting future earnings.
in: Review of Economic Studies, forthcoming
We present a test of Coasean theories of efficient separations. We study a cohort of jobs from the introduction through the repeal of a large age- and region-specific unemployment benefit extension in Austria. In the treatment group, 18.5% fewer jobs survive the program period. According to the Coasean view, the destroyed marginal jobs had low joint surplus. Hence, after the repeal, the treatment survivors should be more resilient than the ineligible control group survivors. Strikingly, the two groups instead exhibit identical post-repeal separation behavior. We provide, and find suggestive evidence consistent with, an alternative model in which wage rigidity drives the inefficient separation dynamics.
in: IMF Economic Review, forthcoming
We analyze whether financial integration leads to converging or diverging business cycles using a dynamic spatial model. Our model allows for contemporaneous spillovers of shocks to GDP growth between countries that are financially integrated and delivers a scalar measure of the spillover intensity at each point in time. For a financial network of ten European countries from 1996 to 2017, we find that the spillover effects are positive on average and much larger during periods of financial stress, pointing towards stronger business cycle synchronization. Dismantling GDP growth into value added growth of ten major industries, we observe that spillover intensities vary significantly. The findings are robust to a variety of alternative model specifications.
Despite a decline in the second half of the year, gross domestic product is expected to expand by 1.4% this year. For the coming year, the institutes expect a contraction by 0.4%, followed by an increase of 1.9% in 2024. Sources: Destatis; Calculations by the institutes; from 3. quarter 2022: institutes' forecast. Data as of September 27, 2022.
1/3: Up to 600 000 jobs would indirectly be threatened by a hard Brexit, about 100 000 of those in Germany. Source: Brautzsch, Hans-Ulrich, Holtemöller, Oliver: Potential International Employment Effects of a Hard Brexit. IWH Discussion Papers, Nr. 4, 2019. Halle (Saale) 2019.
2/3: Effects on employment rates would be particularly high in Malta and Ireland. Source: Brautzsch, Hans-Ulrich, Holtemöller, Oliver: Potential International Employment Effects of a Hard Brexit. IWH Discussion Papers, Nr. 4, 2019. Halle (Saale) 2019.
3/3: In Germany, a hard Brexit would particularly affect the car industry and, as a result, the districts of Wolfsburg (Volkswagen headquarters) and Dingolfing-Landau (BMW). Source: Brautzsch, Hans-Ulrich, Holtemöller, Oliver: Potential International Employment Effects of a Hard Brexit. IWH-Diskussionspapiere, Nr. 4, 2019. Halle (Saale) 2019.
This figure shows the different pillars that form the basis of the new regulatory framework in Europe. The Single Rulebook applies to all 28 member states. The three pillars of the European Banking Union are obligatory for Euro Area countries and voluntary for the remaining EU member states. Source: Koetter, Michael; Krause, Thomas; Tonzer, Lena (2017): Delay determinants of European Banking Union implementation. IWH Discussion Papers 24/2017, Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH).
The graph shows the percentage share of firms that have been classified as zombies in a given year and country. Zombie firms are firms, that for at least two consecutive years have negative returns, negative investment, and debt servicing capacity (EBITDA/ financial debt) below 5 %. Source: Koetter, Michael; Setzer, Ralph; Storz, Manuela; Westphal, Andreas (2017): Do we want these two to tango? On zombie firms and stressed banks in Europe. IWH Discussion Papers 13/2017, Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH).
EU: European Commission, Economic Forecast, November 2017; IMF: World Economic Outlook, October 2017, ECB: December 2017 staff macroeconomic projections. OECD: Economic Outlook, November 2017; Consensus: Consensus Economics, Consensus Forecasts, December 2017. Source: EFN-European Forecasting Network (2017): EFN Report: Economic Outlook for the Euro Area in 2018 and 2019.
This figure (a) shows headline inflation rates in the Euro area and in ten member countries of the European Monetary Union (EMU). The possible inflation drivers may all have contributed to the low inflation rate in recent years. The series of survey- and market-based inflation expectations were obtained from Consensus Economics, Thomson Reuters and own calculations. For the remaining data sources it is referred to the data and estimation section. Source: Dany-Knedlik, Geraldine; Holtemöller, Oliver (2017): Inflation dynamics during the financial crisis in Europe: Cross-sectional identification of long-run inflation expectations. IWH Discussion Papers 10/2017, Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH).
This figure (b) shows unemployment rates in the Euro area and in ten member countries of the European Monetary Union (EMU). The possible inflation drivers may all have contributed to the low inflation rate in recent years. The series of survey- and market-based inflation expectations were obtained from Consensus Economics, Thomson Reuters and own calculations. For the remaining data sources it is referred to the data and estimation section. Source: Dany-Knedlik, Geraldine; Holtemöller, Oliver (2017): Inflation dynamics during the financial crisis in Europe: Cross-sectional identification of long-run inflation expectations. IWH Discussion Papers 10/2017, Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH).
This figure shows the payments of the bank levy (in million euros) by German banks for the years 2011-2015, broken down by banking group. During the years 2011-2014, banks had to contribute to the national restructuring fund as specified in the Restructuring Fund Act. In 2015, banks contributions were for the first time calculated as specified in the Banking Resolution and Restructuring Directive. Source of Figure: Deutscher Bundestag Drucksache 18/5993, BB8/5993he 18 5 December 2015. Source: Buch, Claudia; Tonzer, Lena; Weigert, Benjamin (2017): Assessing the effects of regulatory bank levies. VOX CEPR's Policy Portal: Research-based policy analysis and commentary from leading economists.
This figure shows the development of aggregated foreign funding for Brazilian banks between January 2007 and December 2010. The vertical line is set at September 2008, the month when the collapse of Lehman Brothers triggered a freeze in global interbank markets. Foreign funding is aggregated from the bank-level data in the baseline sample. The variable is reported in real 2013 US$ millions. Source: Noth, Felix; Ossandon Busch, Matias (2017): Banking globalization, local lending, and labor market effects: Micro-level evidence from Brazil. IWH Discussion Papers 7/2017, Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH).
The unemployment rate of EU nationals in most countries is slightly higher than that of domestic nationals; these rates are almost perfectly correlated for all member states. As the figure displays, the unemployment rate of citizens from non-EU member states is significantly higher than that of domestic nationals in almost all countries; the dispersion of the rates is also significantly greater. Source: Altemeyer-Bartscher, Martin; Holtemöller, Oliver; Lindner, Axel; Schmalzbauer, Andreas; Zeddies, Götz (2016): On the Distribution of Refugees in the EU. In: Intereconomics, Volume 51, July/August 2016, Number 4, pp. 220-228.
In fact, there is a positive correlation between the number of applications for asylum in recent years and the difference in the unemployment rates of domestic nationals and of citizens from non-EU member states (as shown in the figure at hand). This indicates that the marginal costs of integrating refugees do indeed increase as the number of refugees grows. Source: Altemeyer-Bartscher, Martin; Holtemöller, Oliver; Lindner, Axel; Schmalzbauer, Andreas; Zeddies, Götz (2016): On the Distribution of Refugees in the EU. In: Intereconomics, Volume 51, July/August 2016, Number 4, pp. 220-228.
Large differences between nationals and foreigners from non-EU countries can also be observed when it comes to the employment rate. In most countries, the employment rate is considerably lower for non-EU citizens than for domestic nationals; this is the case especially for women, but it applies to men as well. While the employment rate of male non-EU foreigners increases at least somewhat with the employment rate of male domestic nationals, the employment rate of female non-EU foreigners is largely disconnected from the domestic rate (see figure above). Source: Altemeyer-Bartscher, Martin; Holtemöller, Oliver; Lindner, Axel; Schmalzbauer, Andreas; Zeddies, Götz (2016): On the Distribution of Refugees in the EU. In: Intereconomics, Volume 51, July/August 2016, Number 4, pp. 220-228.
The figure demonstrates that the average number of responses differs between the three treatment groups "Original Meaning", "No Meaning" and "Alternative Meaning". It shows the average work performance of workers fulfilling the same task with the same reward but with different information about the usefulness or meaning of their work done before. Since some workers did not respond at first and only participated in the experiment as latecomers after they were sent further invitations, these were considered as a special group. Therefore, two different groups were created "Immediate" and "Pooled" and were considered separately. In essence, the additional "Pooled" group consists of latecomers grouped together with the employees that immediately participated in the experiment. Source: Chadi, Adrian; Jeworrek, Sabrina; Mertins, Vanessa (2016): When the Meaning of Work Has Disappeared: Experimental Evidence on Employees’ Performance and Emotions. Management Science 63(6): 1696-1707.
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