The Effects of Antitrust Laws on Horizontal Mergers: International Evidence
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,
This study examines how antitrust law adoptions affect horizontal merger and acquisition (M&A) outcomes. Using the staggered introduction of competition laws in 20 countries, we find antitrust regulation decreases acquirers’ five-day cumulative abnormal returns surrounding horizontal merger announcements. A decrease in deal value, target book assets, and industry peers' announcement returns are consistent with the market power hypothesis. Exploiting antitrust law adoptions addresses a downward bias to an estimated effect of antitrust enforcement (Baker (2003)). The potential bias from heterogeneous treatment effects does not nullify our results. Overall, antitrust policies seem to deter post-merger monopolistic gains, potentially improving customer welfare.
IWH Medium-Term Projection The IWH medium-term projection shows: If Germany wants to stick to both its current debt...
IWH Bankruptcy Research
IWH Bankruptcy Research The Bankruptcy Research Unit of the Halle Institute for...
The Rise of Populist Parties in Europe
The Rise of Populist Parties in Europe: The Dark Side of Globalisation and Technological Change? ...
ENTRANCES Energy Transitions from Coal and Carbon: Effects on Societies ...
Wage and Employment Effects of Insolvencies
Wage and employment effects of bankruptcies Although the consequences of...
IWH-Tarif-Check The IWH-Tarif-Check (IWH Wage Rate Check) analyses the real income...
Advances in Using Vector Autoregressions to Estimate Structural Magnitudes ...
Brown Bag Seminar
Brown Bag Seminar Financial Markets Department The seminar series "Brown...
The Value of Firm Networks: A Natural Experiment on Board Connections
SAFE Working Papers,
We present causal evidence on the effect of boardroom networks on firm value and compensation policies. We exploit a ban on interlocking directorates of Italian financial and insurance companies as exogenous variation and show that firms that lose centrality in the network experience negative abnormal returns around the announcement date. The key driver of our results is the role of boardroom connections in reducing asymmetric information. The complementarities with the input-output and cross-ownership networks are consistent with this channel. Using hand-collected data, we also show that network centrality has a positive effect on directors’ compensation, providing evidence of rent sharing.