Natural Disasters and Bank Stability: Evidence from the U.S. Financial System
Felix Noth, Ulrich Schüwer
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management,
May
2023
Abstract
We show that weather-related natural disasters in the United States significantly weaken the financial stability of banks with business activities in affected regions. This is reflected in higher probabilities of default, lower z-scores, higher non-performing assets ratios, higher foreclosure ratios, lower returns on assets and lower equity ratios of affected banks in the years following a natural disaster. The effects are economically relevant and highlight the financial vulnerability of banks and their borrowers despite insurances and public aid programs.
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30.11.2022 • 28/2022
Stricter rules for banks can relieve real estate markets
Exuberant price levels in the German real estate market could further exacerbate an economic crisis. Fiscal instruments exert too little influence to contain this danger, shows a study by the Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH).
Michael Koetter
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Social Capital, Trusting, and Trustworthiness: Evidence from Peer-to-Peer Lending
Iftekhar Hasan, Qing He, Haitian Lu
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,
No. 4,
2022
Abstract
How does social capital affect trust? Evidence from a Chinese peer-to-peer lending platform shows regional social capital affects the trustee’s trustworthiness and the trustor’s trust propensity. Ceteris paribus, borrowers from higher social capital regions receive larger bid from individual lenders, have higher funding success, larger loan size, and lower default rates, especially for low-quality borrowers. Lenders from higher social capital regions take higher risks and have higher default rates, especially for inexperienced lenders. Cross-regional transactions are most (least) likely to be realized between parties from high (low) social capital regions.
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Capital Requirements, Market Structure, and Heterogeneous Banks
Carola Müller
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 15,
2022
Abstract
Bank regulators interfere with the efficient allocation of resources for the sake of financial stability. Based on this trade-off, I compare how different capital requirements affect default probabilities and the allocation of market shares across heterogeneous banks. In the model, banks‘ productivity determines their optimal strategy in oligopolistic markets. Higher productivity gives banks higher profit margins that lower their default risk. Hence, capital requirements indirectly aiming at high-productivity banks are less effective. They also bear a distortionary cost: Because incumbents increase interest rates, new entrants with low productivity are attracted and thus average productivity in the banking market decreases.
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Gender, Credit, and Firm Outcomes
Manthos D. Delis, Iftekhar Hasan, Maria Iosifidi, Steven Ongena
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,
No. 1,
2022
Abstract
Small and micro enterprises are usually majority-owned by entrepreneurs. Using a unique sample of loan applications from such firms, we study the role of owners’ gender in bank credit decisions and post-credit-decision firm outcomes. We find that, ceteris paribus, female entrepreneurs are more prudent loan applicants than are males, since they are less likely to apply for credit or to default after loan origination. The relatively more aggressive behavior of male applicants pays off, however, in terms of higher average firm performance after loan origination.
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Firm Subsidies, Financial Intermediation, and Bank Risk
Aleksandr Kazakov, Michael Koetter, Mirko Titze, Lena Tonzer
Abstract
We study whether government subsidies can stimulate bank funding of marginal investment projects and the associated effect on financial stability. We do so by exploiting granular project-level information for the largest regional economic development programme in Germany since 1997: the Improvement of Regional Economic Structures programme (GRW). By combining the universe of subsidised firms to virtually all German local banks over the period 1998-2019, we test whether this large-scale transfer programme destabilised regional credit markets. Because GRW subsidies to firms are destabilised at the EU level, we can use it as an exogenous shock to identify bank responses. On average, firm subsidies do not affect bank lending, but reduce banks’ distance to default. Average effects conflate important bank-level heterogeneity though. Conditional on various bank traits, we show that well capitalised banks with more industry experience expand lending when being exposed to subsidised firms without exhibiting more risky financial profiles. Our results thus indicate that stable banks can act as an important facilitator of regional economic development policies. Against the backdrop of pervasive transfer payments to mitigate Covid-19 losses and in light of far-reaching transformation policies required to green the economy, our study bears important implications as to whether and which banks to incorporate into the design of transfer Programmes.
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06.07.2020 • 13/2020
IWH issues warning of a new banking crisis
The coronavirus recession could mean the end for dozens of banks across Germany – even if Germany survives the economic crisis relatively unscathed. An analysis by the Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH) shows that many savings banks and cooperative banks are particularly at risk. Loans worth hundreds of billions of euros are on the balance sheets of the financial institutions concerned. IWH President Gropp warns of a potentially high additional burden for the already weakened real economy.
Reint E. Gropp
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The Corona Recession and Bank Stress in Germany
Reint E. Gropp, Michael Koetter, William McShane
IWH Online,
No. 4,
2020
Abstract
We conduct stress tests for a large sample of German banks across different recoveries from the Corona recession. We find that, depending on how quickly the economy recovers, between 6% to 28% of banks could become distressed from defaulting corporate borrowers alone. Many of these banks are likely to require regulatory intervention or may even fail. Even in our most optimistic scenario, bank capital ratios decline by nearly 24%. The sum of total loans held by distressed banks could plausibly range from 127 to 624 billion Euros and it may take years before the full extent of this stress is observable. Hence, the current recession could result in an acute contraction in lending to the real economy, thereby worsening the current recession , decelerating the recovery, or perhaps even causing a “double dip” recession. Additionally, we show that the corporate portfolio of savings and cooperative banks is more than five times as exposed to small firms as that of commercial banks and Landesbanken. The preliminary evidence indicates small firms are particularly exposed to the current crisis, which implies that cooperative and savings banks are at especially high risk of becoming distressed. Given that the financial difficulties may seriously impair the recovery from the Covid-19 crisis, the pressure to bail out large parts of the banking system will be strong. Recent research suggests that the long run benefits of largely resisting these pressures may be high and could result in a more efficient economy.
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Too connected to fail? Wie die Vernetzung der Banken staatliche
Rettungsmaßnahmen vorhersagen kann
Friederike Altgelt, Michael Koetter
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 4,
2017
Abstract
Seit der globalen Finanzkrise 2007/2008 liegt aufgrund ihrer Schlüsselrolle für ein funktionierendes Finanzsystem ein besonderer Fokus auf den so genannten systemrelevanten Finanzinstitutionen (systemically important financial institutions, SIFIs). Neben der Größe von Finanzinstitutionen ist auch das Ausmaß ihrer Vernetzung im internationalen Finanzsystem entscheidend für die Klassifikation als systemrelevant. Obwohl die Vernetzung von Banken untereinander in der Regel schwer zu messen ist, kann sie aus der Entwicklung von Prämien von Kreditausfallversicherungen (den so genannten Credit Default Swap (CDS) Spreads) und Aktienrenditen abgeleitet werden. Dieser Beitrag untersucht, inwieweit sich mit Hilfe der sich daraus ergebenden Co-Crash-Probability vor der Finanzkrise vorhersagen lässt, welche Finanzinstitutionen während der Krise Teil von staatlichen Rettungsprogrammen (bailout programmes) wurden.
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