Do Banks Value Borrowers' Environmental Record? Evidence from Financial Contracts
I-Ju Chen, Iftekhar Hasan, Chih-Yung Lin, Tra Ngoc Vy Nguyen
Journal of Business Ethics,
forthcoming
Abstract
Banks play a unique role in society. They not only maximize profits but also consider the interests of stakeholders. We investigate whether banks consider firms’ pollution records in their lending decisions. The evidence shows that banks offer significantly higher loan spreads, higher total borrowing costs, shorter loan maturities, and greater collateral to firms with higher levels of chemical pollution. The costly effects are stronger for borrowers with greater risk and weaker corporate governance. Further, the results show that banks with higher social responsibility account for their borrowers’ environmental performance and charge higher loan spreads to those with poor performance. These results support the idea that banks with higher social responsibility can promote the practice of business ethics in firms.
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BigTech Credit and Monetary Policy Transmission: Micro-level Evidence from China
Yiping Huang, Xiang Li, Han Qiu, Changhua Yu
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 18,
2022
Abstract
This paper studies monetary policy transmission through BigTech and traditional banks. By comparing business loans made by a BigTech bank with those made by traditional banks, it finds that BigTech loans tend to be smaller, and the BigTech bank grants credit to more new borrowers compared with conventional banks in response to expansionary monetary policy. The BigTech bank‘s advantages in information, monitoring, and risk management are the potential mechanisms. The analysis also finds that BigTech and traditional bank credits to firms that have already borrowed from these banks respond similarly to changes in monetary policy. Overall, BigTech credit amplifies monetary policy transmission mainly through the extensive margin. In addition, monetary policy has a stronger impact on the real economy through BigTech lending than traditional bank loans.
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Social Capital, Trusting, and Trustworthiness: Evidence from Peer-to-Peer Lending
Iftekhar Hasan, Qing He, Haitian Lu
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,
No. 4,
2022
Abstract
How does social capital affect trust? Evidence from a Chinese peer-to-peer lending platform shows regional social capital affects the trustee’s trustworthiness and the trustor’s trust propensity. Ceteris paribus, borrowers from higher social capital regions receive larger bid from individual lenders, have higher funding success, larger loan size, and lower default rates, especially for low-quality borrowers. Lenders from higher social capital regions take higher risks and have higher default rates, especially for inexperienced lenders. Cross-regional transactions are most (least) likely to be realized between parties from high (low) social capital regions.
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Climate Change-Related Regulatory Risks and Bank Lending
Isabella Müller, Eleonora Sfrappini
ECB Working Paper,
No. 2670,
2022
Abstract
We identify the effect of climate change-related regulatory risks on credit real-location. Our evidence suggests that effects depend borrower's region. Following an increase in salience of regulatory risks, banks reallocate credit to US firms that could be negatively impacted by regulatory interventions. Conversely, in Europe, banks lend more to firms that could benefit from environmental regulation. The effect is moderated by banks' own loan portfolio composition. Banks with a portfolio tilted towards firms that could be negatively a affected by environmental policies increasingly support these firms. Overall, our results indicate that financial implications of regulation associated with climate change appear to be the main drivers of banks' behavior.
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Understanding Post-Covid Inflation Dynamics
Martín Harding, Jesper Lindé, Mathias Trabandt
Working Paper,
2022
Abstract
We propose a macroeconomic model with a nonlinear Phillips curve that has a flat slope when inflationary pressures are subdued and steepens when inflationary pressures are elevated. The nonlinear Phillips curve in our model arises due to a quasi-kinked demand schedule for goods produced by firms. Our model can jointly account for the modest decline in inflation during the Great Recession and the surge in inflation during the Post-Covid period. Because our model implies a stronger transmission of shocks when inflation is high, it generates conditional heteroscedasticity in inflation and inflation risk. Hence, our model can generate more sizeable inflation surges due to cost-push and demand shocks than a standard linearized model. Finally, our model implies that the central bank faces a more severe trade-off between inflation and output stabilization when inflation is high.
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Capital Requirements, Market Structure, and Heterogeneous Banks
Carola Müller
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 15,
2022
Abstract
Bank regulators interfere with the efficient allocation of resources for the sake of financial stability. Based on this trade-off, I compare how different capital requirements affect default probabilities and the allocation of market shares across heterogeneous banks. In the model, banks‘ productivity determines their optimal strategy in oligopolistic markets. Higher productivity gives banks higher profit margins that lower their default risk. Hence, capital requirements indirectly aiming at high-productivity banks are less effective. They also bear a distortionary cost: Because incumbents increase interest rates, new entrants with low productivity are attracted and thus average productivity in the banking market decreases.
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Firm Subsidies, Financial Intermediation, and Bank Risk
Aleksandr Kazakov, Michael Koetter, Mirko Titze, Lena Tonzer
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 2,
2022
Abstract
We study whether government subsidies can stimulate bank funding of marginal investment projects and the associated effect on financial stability. We do so by exploiting granular project-level information for the largest regional economic development programme in Germany since 1997: the Improvement of Regional Economic Structures programme (GRW). By combining the universe of subsidised firms to virtually all German local banks over the period 1998-2019, we test whether this large-scale transfer programme destabilised regional credit markets. Because GRW subsidies to firms are destabilised at the EU level, we can use it as an exogenous shock to identify bank responses. On average, firm subsidies do not affect bank lending, but reduce banks’ distance to default. Average effects conflate important bank-level heterogeneity though. Conditional on various bank traits, we show that well capitalised banks with more industry experience expand lending when being exposed to subsidised firms without exhibiting more risky financial profiles. Our results thus indicate that stable banks can act as an important facilitator of regional economic development policies. Against the backdrop of pervasive transfer payments to mitigate Covid-19 losses and in light of far-reaching transformation policies required to green the economy, our study bears important implications as to whether and which banks to incorporate into the design of transfer Programmes.
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The Adverse Effect of Contingent Convertible Bonds on Bank Stability
Melina Ludolph
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 1,
2022
Abstract
This paper examines the impact of issuing contingent convertible (CoCo) bonds on bank risk. I apply a matching-based difference-in-differences approach to banklevel data for 246 publicly traded European banks and 61 CoCo issues from 2008−2018. My estimation results reveal that issuing CoCo bonds that meet the criteria for additional tier 1 (AT1) capital results in significantly higher z-scores one to three years after the issuance. Rather than having a net negative impact, issuing CoCos seems to impede a positive time trend towards greater bank stability. This study adds to the empirical literature on the risk-effect of contingent convertibles by identifying the causal effect of AT1 CoCo bonds on reported risk changes over a three-year post-treatment horizon based on a comprehensive sample of European banks. The results confirm theoretical predictions that currently outstanding CoCo bonds create incentives for excessive risk-taking.
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Neue Basel-Regeln: Mehr Stabilität, weniger Kredite?
Reint E. Gropp
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 4,
2021
Abstract
Ein Kernpunkt des geplanten Basel-III-Regelwerks sind die gestiegenen Eigenkapitalanforderungen. Umsetzungsprobleme könnten die gewünschten Effekte der Reformen jedoch konterkarieren. Zum einen könnten Banken ihre Eigenkapitalquote erhöhen, indem sie weniger Kredite an risikoreiche Kreditnehmer vergeben, statt ihr Eigenkapital
aufzustocken. Hiervon wären vor allem mittelständische Unternehmen ohne Kreditrating betroffen. Zum anderen lassen auch die neuen, strengeren Regeln den nationalen Bankenaufsehern Bewertungsspielräume, die von den Banken – politisch geduldet – zu einer Inflationierung ihres Eigenkapitals genutzt werden könnten.
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Political Uncertainty and Bank Loan Contracts: Does Government Quality Matter?
Iftekhar Hasan, Ying-Chen Huang, Yin-Siang Huang, Chih-Yung Lin
Journal of Financial Services Research,
December
2021
Abstract
We investigate the relation between political uncertainty and bank loan spreads using a sample of loan contracts for the G20 firms during the period from 1982 to 2015. We find that banks charge firms higher loan spreads and require more covenants during election years when domestic political risks are elevated. Greater differences in the support ratios of opinion polls on candidates lead to the lower cost of bank loans. This political effect also lessens when the government quality of the borrower’s country is better than that of the lender’s country. Better quality government can lower the political risk component of bank loan spreads.
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