Complexity and Bank Risk During the Financial Crisis
We construct a novel dataset to measure banks’ complexity and relate it to banks’ riskiness. The sample covers stock listed Euro area banks from 2007 to 2014. Bank stability is significantly affected by complexity, whereas the direction of the effect differs across complexity measures.
Aktuelle Trends: Ungewöhnliche Zeiten in der Geldpolitik: Niedriges Zinsniveau begleitet von hohen Zentralbankreserven
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
Mit dem Ausbruch der Finanzkrise 20072008 und der sich anschließenden Staatsschuldenkrise kam es zu zahlreichen Veränderungen in der Implementierung der Geldpolitik im Euroraum. Oberstes Ziel der Europäischen Zentralbank (EZB) ist dabei die Wahrung der Preisstabilität und ein funktionierender Geldtransmissionsmechanismus.
Sovereign Credit Risk Co-movements in the Eurozone: Simple Interdependence or Contagion?
We investigate credit risk co-movements and contagion in the sovereign debt markets of 17 industrialized countries during the period 2008–2012. We use dynamic conditional correlations of sovereign credit default swap spreads to detect contagion. This approach allows us to separate contagion channels from the determinants of simple interdependence. The results show that, first, sovereign credit risk co-moves considerably, particularly among eurozone countries and during the sovereign debt crisis. Second, contagion varies across time and countries. Third, similarities in economic fundamentals, cross-country linkages in banking and common market sentiment constitute the main channels of contagion.
State Aid and Guarantees in Europe
T. Beck, B. Casu (eds): The Palgrave Handbook of European Banking, London,
During the recent financial crisis, governments massively intervened in the banking sector by providing liquidity assistance and capital support to banks in distress. This helped stabilize the financial system in the short run. However, public bailouts also bear the risk of longer-term distortions, for example, by affecting bailout expectations of banks. In this chapter, the authors first provide an overview of state aid interventions during the recent crisis episode. The third section then analyzes the effects of state aid on financial stability from a theoretical view. This is followed by the description of results obtained from empirical studies. The link between the provision of state aid and politics is discussed in the section “Institutional Design and Policy Implications”. Finally, in the section “The European Banking Union” the authors describe the elements of the European Banking Union meant to resolve and restructure banks in distress and to lower the need for public intervention. Based on the preceding analysis, conclusions are drawn regarding the new design.
Mortgage Supply and the US Housing Boom: The Role of the Community Reinvestment Act
IWH Discussion Papers,
This paper studies the role of the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) in the recent US housing boom-bust cycle. Using a difference-in-differences matching estimation, I find that the enhancement of CRA enforcement in 1998 caused a 7.7 percentage points increase in annual growth rate of mortgage lending by CRA-regulated banks to CRA-eligible census tracts relative to a group of similar-income CRA-ineligible census tracts within the same state. Financial institutions which are not subject to the CRA, however, do not show any change in their mortgage supply between these two types of census tracts after 1998. I take advantage of this exogenous shift in mortgage supply within an instrumental variable framework to identify the causal effect of mortgage supply on housing prices. I find that every 1 percentage point higher annual growth rate of mortgage supply leads to 0.3 percentage points higher annual growth rate of housing prices. Reduced form regressions show that CRA-eligible neighborhoods experienced higher house price growth during the boom and sharper decline during the bust period. I use placebo tests to confirm that this effect is in fact channeled through the shift in mortgage supply by CRA-regulated banks and not by unobserved demand factors. Furthermore, my results indicate that CRA-induced mortgages went to borrowers with lower FICO scores, carried higher interest rates, and encountered more frequent delinquencies.
18.10.2016 • 46/2016
No Sign of Price Distortions – Lack of Evidence for Effects of US Bank Bailouts
There has been much political and public controversy surrounding the very large rescue packages offered to the banking sector in the course of the financial crisis of 2007 to 2009. The aim of the packages was to stabilise the financial sector and, therefore, the development of the real economy. The downsides of these bailouts were the enormous financial cost to the taxpayer, increased assumption of risk by the government and possible distortive effects on competition in the banking market – since not all banks were given financial support. Researchers at the Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH) – Member of the Leibniz Association led by Professor Felix Noth have now studied the long-term, indirect and possible market-distorting effects of the US rescue packages.
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Bank Recapitalization, Regulatory Intervention, and Repayment
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking,
We use prudential supervisory data for all German banks during 1994–2010 to test if regulatory interventions affect the likelihood that bailed-out banks repay capital support. Accounting for the selection bias inherent in nonrandom bank bailouts by insurance schemes and the endogenous administration of regulatory interventions, we show that regulators can increase the likelihood of repayment substantially. An increase in intervention frequencies by one standard deviation increases the annual probability of capital support repayment by 7%. Sturdy interventions, like restructuring orders, are effective, whereas weak measures reduce repayment probabilities. Intervention effects last up to 5 years.
29.09.2016 • 40/2016
Joint Economic Forecast: German Economy on Track – Economic Policy needs to be Realigned
Thanks to a stable job market and solid consumption, the German economy is experiencing a moderate upswing. The GDP is expected to increase by 1.9 percent this year, 1.4 percent in 2017, and 1.6 percent in 2018, according to the Gemeinschaftsdiagnose (GD, joint economic forecast) that was prepared by five of Europe’s leading economic research institutes on behalf of the Federal Government. The most recent GD, which was released in April, predicted a GDP growth rate of 1.6 percent for 2016 and 1.5 percent for 2017.
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02.09.2016 • 35/2016
The German Economy: Still Robust Despite Sliding Sentiment
The prospects for the German economy are still quite favorable. While sentiment indicators suggest that growth will slow at the end of the year, domestic demand will continue on an upward trend. The German GDP should increase by 1.9% in 2016. For 2017 we expect a lower growth rate of 1.2%“Weaker export volumes and higher growth of imports are the relevant factors for the slowdown”, says Prof Oliver Holtemöller, IWH Vice president. Unemployment will rise a bit as more refugees enter the labor market. Consumer price inflation remains moderate. The general government balance (cyclically ad¬justed as well as unadjusted) will be in surplus in both 2016 and 2017.
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11.08.2016 • 34/2016
2016 stress tests: Italian banks don’t look worse than German large commercial banks
The European Banking Authority today presented the results of the 2016 stress tests. They show that most European banks appear more or less stable. “What worries me is, however, that the Italian banks do not look worse than the large German commercial banks,” says Reint E. Gropp, president of the Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH). “It appears that both Deutsche Bank and Commerzbank would benefit significantly from an increase in equity. The stress test was also missing two crucial points: One, the effect of a long lasting low interest rate environment on banks was not simulated. And second, the test did not take into consideration that many small institutions could fail at the same time. This is not an unlikely scenario, given how small banks in particular struggle with shrinking interest margins,“ says Gropp. Finally, the stress test should not distract from the urgency to solve the problems in the Italian banking system.
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