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30.11.2022 • 28/2022
Stricter rules for banks can relieve real estate markets
Exuberant price levels in the German real estate market could further exacerbate an economic crisis. Fiscal instruments exert too little influence to contain this danger, shows a study by the Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH).
Michael Koetter
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Real Estate Transaction Taxes and Credit Supply
Michael Koetter, Philipp Marek, Antonios Mavropoulos
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 26,
2022
Abstract
We exploit staggered real estate transaction tax (RETT) hikes across German states to identify the effect of house price changes on mortgage credit supply. Based on approximately 33 million real estate online listings, we construct a quarterly hedonic house price index (HPI) between 2008:q1 and 2017:q4, which we instrument with state-specific RETT changes to isolate the effect on mortgage credit supply by all local German banks. First, a RETT hike by one percentage point reduces HPI by 1.2%. This effect is driven by listings in rural regions. Second, a 1% contraction of HPI induced by an increase in the RETT leads to a 1.4% decline in mortgage lending. This transmission of fiscal policy to mortgage credit supply is effective across almost the entire bank capitalization distribution.
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Completing the European Banking Union: Capital Cost Consequences for Credit Providers and Corporate Borrowers
Michael Koetter, Thomas Krause, Eleonora Sfrappini, Lena Tonzer
European Economic Review,
September
2022
Abstract
The bank recovery and resolution directive (BRRD) regulates the bail-in hierarchy to resolve distressed banks in the European Union (EU). Using the staggered BRRD implementation across 15 member states, we identify banks’ capital cost responses and subsequent pass-through to borrowers towards surprise elements due to national transposition details. Average bank capital costs increase heterogeneously across countries with strongest funding cost hikes observed for banks located in GIIPS and non-EMU countries. Only banks in core E(M)U countries that exhibit higher funding costs increase credit spreads for corporate borrowers and contract credit supply. Tighter credit conditions are only passed on to more levered and less profitable firms. On balance, the national implementation of BRRD appears to have strengthened financial system resilience without a pervasive hike in borrowing costs.
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26.01.2022 • 2/2022
Investment, output gap, and public finances in the medium term: Implications of the Second Supplementary Budget 2021
With the Second Supplementary Budget 2021, the German government plans to allocate a reserve of 60 billion euros to the Energy and Climate Fund. This additional spending is also meant to reduce the macroeconomic follow-up costs of the pandemic. According to the IWH’s medium-term projection, the expenditure is expected to increase output by about 0.5% at the peak of its impact in 2024. “While this macroeconomic effect is welcome, the additional investment will by no means compensate for the lack of investment activity since the beginning of the pandemic,” says Oliver Holtemöller, head of the Department Macroeconomics and vice president at Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH). Moreover, the supplementary budget is likely to reduce confidence in the reliability of the debt brake.
Oliver Holtemöller
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Neue Basel-Regeln: Mehr Stabilität, weniger Kredite?
Reint E. Gropp
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 4,
2021
Abstract
Ein Kernpunkt des geplanten Basel-III-Regelwerks sind die gestiegenen Eigenkapitalanforderungen. Umsetzungsprobleme könnten die gewünschten Effekte der Reformen jedoch konterkarieren. Zum einen könnten Banken ihre Eigenkapitalquote erhöhen, indem sie weniger Kredite an risikoreiche Kreditnehmer vergeben, statt ihr Eigenkapital
aufzustocken. Hiervon wären vor allem mittelständische Unternehmen ohne Kreditrating betroffen. Zum anderen lassen auch die neuen, strengeren Regeln den nationalen Bankenaufsehern Bewertungsspielräume, die von den Banken – politisch geduldet – zu einer Inflationierung ihres Eigenkapitals genutzt werden könnten.
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Warum Boni im Bankenbereich scheitern (müssen)
Reint E. Gropp, Andre Guettler
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 3,
2021
Abstract
In der Finanzkrise sind Boni für Bankmanager in die Kritik geraten. Bonussysteme stehen im Verdacht, Anreize für eine zu riskante Kreditvergabe zu setzen. Der vorliegende Beitrag untersucht am Beispiel einer großen internationalen Geschäftsbank, wie sich ein Bonussystem, das ein hohes Volumen neu vergebener Kredite belohnt und den Ausfall von Krediten bestraft, auf das Verhalten von Kreditsachbearbeitern auswirkt. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass Kreditsachbearbeiter die Anbahnung neuer und die Überwachung bestehender Kredite verstärken, wenn sie ihren monatlichen Bonus zu verlieren drohen. Eine genauere Prüfung von Kreditanträgen findet dagegen nicht statt. Kreditsachbearbeiter passen ihr Verhalten besonders gegen Monatsende an, wenn die Bonuszahlung herannaht. Langjährige Mitarbeiter reagieren stärker auf das System als jüngere Kollegen. Komplexe Produktivitätsaspekte wie die Teamfähigkeit können mit Bonussystemen nicht erfasst werden.
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