To Securitize or To Price Credit Risk?
Danny McGowan, Huyen Nguyen
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,
forthcoming
Abstract
Do lenders securitize or price loans in response to credit risk? Exploiting exogenous variation in regional credit risk due to foreclosure law differences along US state borders, we find that lenders securitize mortgages that are eligible for sale to the Government Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs) rather than price regional credit risk. For non-GSE-eligible mortgages with no GSE buyback provision, lenders increase interest rates as they are unable to shift credit risk to loan purchasers. The results inform the debate surrounding the GSEs' buyback provisions, the constant interest rate policy, and show that underpricing regional credit risk increases the GSEs' debt holdings.
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Agency Cost of CEO Perquisites in Bank Loan Contracts
Chia-Ying Chan, Iftekhar Hasan, Chih-Yung Lin
Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting,
forthcoming
Abstract
This study investigates the association between CEO perquisites and bank loan spreads. We collect detailed data on CEO perquisites from the proxy statements of S&P 500 firms between 1993 and 2015 to study this issue. The empirical evidence supports the agency cost view that the lending banks demand significantly higher returns (spread), more collateral, and stricter covenants from firms with higher CEO perquisites. We further confirm that the effect of these perquisites remains after we control for various corporate governance and agency cost factors. We conclude that banks consider CEO perquisites as a type of agency cost when they make lending decisions.
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The (Heterogenous) Economic Effects of Private Equity Buyouts
Steven J. Davis, John Haltiwanger, Kyle Handley, Josh Lerner, Ben Lipsius, Javier Miranda
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 10,
2022
Abstract
The effects of private equity buyouts on employment, productivity, and job reallocation vary tremendously with macroeconomic and credit conditions, across private equity groups, and by type of buyout. We reach this conclusion by examining the most extensive database of U.S. buyouts ever compiled, encompassing thousands of buyout targets from 1980 to 2013 and millions of control firms. Employment shrinks 13% over two years after buyouts of publicly listed firms – on average, and relative to control firms – but expands 13% after buyouts of privately held firms. Post-buyout productivity gains at target firms are large on average and much larger yet for deals executed amidst tight credit conditions. A post-buyout tightening of credit conditions or slowing of GDP growth curtails employment growth and intra-firm job reallocation at target firms. We also show that buyout effects differ across the private equity groups that sponsor buyouts, and these differences persist over time at the group level. Rapid upscaling in deal flow at the group level brings lower employment growth at target firms.
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Gender, Credit, and Firm Outcomes
Manthos D. Delis, Iftekhar Hasan, Maria Iosifidi, Steven Ongena
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,
No. 1,
2022
Abstract
Small and micro enterprises are usually majority-owned by entrepreneurs. Using a unique sample of loan applications from such firms, we study the role of owners’ gender in bank credit decisions and post-credit-decision firm outcomes. We find that, ceteris paribus, female entrepreneurs are more prudent loan applicants than are males, since they are less likely to apply for credit or to default after loan origination. The relatively more aggressive behavior of male applicants pays off, however, in terms of higher average firm performance after loan origination.
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The Role of State-owned Banks in Crises: Evidence from German Banks During COVID-19
Xiang Li
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 6,
2022
Abstract
By adopting a difference-in-differences specification combined with propensity score matching, we provide evidence using the microdata of German banks that stateowned savings banks have lent less than credit cooperatives during the COVID-19 crisis. In particular, the weaker lending effects of state-owned banks are pronounced for long-term and nonrevolving loans but insignificant for short-term and revolving loans. Moreover, the negative impact of government ownership is larger for borrowers who are more exposed to the COVID-19 shock and in regions where the ruling parties are longer in office and more positioned on the right side of the political spectrum.
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Banking Deregulation and Consumption of Home Durables
H. Evren Damar, Ian Lange, Caitlin McKennie, Mirko Moro
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 4,
2022
Abstract
We exploit the spatial and temporal variation of the staggered introduction of inter state banking deregulation across the U.S. to study the relationship between credit constraints and consumption of durables. Using the American Housing Survey from 1981 to 1989, we link the timing of these reforms with evidence of a credit expansion and household responses on many margins. We find evidence that low-income households are more likely to purchase new appliances after the deregulation. These durable goods allowed households to consume less natural gas and spend less time in domestic activities after the reforms.
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Firm Subsidies, Financial Intermediation, and Bank Risk
Aleksandr Kazakov, Michael Koetter, Mirko Titze, Lena Tonzer
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 2,
2022
Abstract
We study whether government subsidies can stimulate bank funding of marginal investment projects and the associated effect on financial stability. We do so by exploiting granular project-level information for the largest regional economic development programme in Germany since 1997: the Improvement of Regional Economic Structures programme (GRW). By combining the universe of subsidised firms to virtually all German local banks over the period 1998-2019, we test whether this large-scale transfer programme destabilised regional credit markets. Because GRW subsidies to firms are destabilised at the EU level, we can use it as an exogenous shock to identify bank responses. On average, firm subsidies do not affect bank lending, but reduce banks’ distance to default. Average effects conflate important bank-level heterogeneity though. Conditional on various bank traits, we show that well capitalised banks with more industry experience expand lending when being exposed to subsidised firms without exhibiting more risky financial profiles. Our results thus indicate that stable banks can act as an important facilitator of regional economic development policies. Against the backdrop of pervasive transfer payments to mitigate Covid-19 losses and in light of far-reaching transformation policies required to green the economy, our study bears important implications as to whether and which banks to incorporate into the design of transfer Programmes.
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26.01.2022 • 2/2022
Investment, output gap, and public finances in the medium term: Implications of the Second Supplementary Budget 2021
With the Second Supplementary Budget 2021, the German government plans to allocate a reserve of 60 billion euros to the Energy and Climate Fund. This additional spending is also meant to reduce the macroeconomic follow-up costs of the pandemic. According to the IWH’s medium-term projection, the expenditure is expected to increase output by about 0.5% at the peak of its impact in 2024. “While this macroeconomic effect is welcome, the additional investment will by no means compensate for the lack of investment activity since the beginning of the pandemic,” says Oliver Holtemöller, head of the Department Macroeconomics and vice president at Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH). Moreover, the supplementary budget is likely to reduce confidence in the reliability of the debt brake.
Oliver Holtemöller
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Neue Basel-Regeln: Mehr Stabilität, weniger Kredite?
Reint E. Gropp
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 4,
2021
Abstract
Ein Kernpunkt des geplanten Basel-III-Regelwerks sind die gestiegenen Eigenkapitalanforderungen. Umsetzungsprobleme könnten die gewünschten Effekte der Reformen jedoch konterkarieren. Zum einen könnten Banken ihre Eigenkapitalquote erhöhen, indem sie weniger Kredite an risikoreiche Kreditnehmer vergeben, statt ihr Eigenkapital
aufzustocken. Hiervon wären vor allem mittelständische Unternehmen ohne Kreditrating betroffen. Zum anderen lassen auch die neuen, strengeren Regeln den nationalen Bankenaufsehern Bewertungsspielräume, die von den Banken – politisch geduldet – zu einer Inflationierung ihres Eigenkapitals genutzt werden könnten.
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Warum Boni im Bankenbereich scheitern (müssen)
Reint E. Gropp, Andre Guettler
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 3,
2021
Abstract
In der Finanzkrise sind Boni für Bankmanager in die Kritik geraten. Bonussysteme stehen im Verdacht, Anreize für eine zu riskante Kreditvergabe zu setzen. Der vorliegende Beitrag untersucht am Beispiel einer großen internationalen Geschäftsbank, wie sich ein Bonussystem, das ein hohes Volumen neu vergebener Kredite belohnt und den Ausfall von Krediten bestraft, auf das Verhalten von Kreditsachbearbeitern auswirkt. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass Kreditsachbearbeiter die Anbahnung neuer und die Überwachung bestehender Kredite verstärken, wenn sie ihren monatlichen Bonus zu verlieren drohen. Eine genauere Prüfung von Kreditanträgen findet dagegen nicht statt. Kreditsachbearbeiter passen ihr Verhalten besonders gegen Monatsende an, wenn die Bonuszahlung herannaht. Langjährige Mitarbeiter reagieren stärker auf das System als jüngere Kollegen. Komplexe Produktivitätsaspekte wie die Teamfähigkeit können mit Bonussystemen nicht erfasst werden.
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