The Cleansing Effect of Banking Crises
Reint E. Gropp, Steven Ongena, Jörg Rocholl, Vahid Saadi
Economic Inquiry,
forthcoming
Abstract
We assess the cleansing effects of the 2008–2009 financial crisis. U.S. regions with higher levels of supervisory forbearance on distressed banks see less restructuring in the real sector: fewer establishments, firms, and jobs are lost when more distressed banks remain in business. In these regions, the banking sector has been less healthy for several years after the crisis. Regions with less forbearance experience higher productivity growth after the crisis with more firm entries, job creation, and employment, wages, patents, and output growth. Forbearance is greater for state-chartered banks and in regions with weaker banking competition and more independent banks.
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26.04.2022 • 10/2022
Regional effects of a recession in Germany triggered by an import stop for Russian gas
A halt in Russian gas deliveries would lead to a recession in the German economy. Not all regions would be equally affected: The Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH) expects a significantly stronger slump in economic output in regions where the manufacturing sector has a large weight than elsewhere.
Oliver Holtemöller
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13.04.2022 • 9/2022
Economy in East Germany will not suffer more from the war in Ukraine than in Germany as a whole – Implications of the Joint Economic Forecast Spring 2022 and new data for the East German economy
The recovery of the East German economy, like that of Germany as a whole, will weaken considerably due to Russia’s war in Ukraine. However, the economic slump and recovery were not as pronounced as in West Germany. In 2021, East German output grew by 2.3%, less than in Germany as a whole (2.9%). According to the Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH), GDP growth in East Germany is also likely to be lower than in Germany as a whole in 2022 (2.1% in East Germany vs. 2.7% in Germany) and 2023 (2.5% vs. 3.1%).
Oliver Holtemöller
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13.04.2022 • 8/2022
From Pandemic to Energy Crisis: Economy and Politics under Permanent Stress
The German economy is steering through difficult waters and faces the highest inflation rates in decades. In their spring report, the leading German economic research institutes revise their outlook for this year significantly downward. The recovery from the COVID-19 crisis is slowing down as a result of the war in Ukraine, but remains on track. The institutes expect GDP to increase by 2.7% and 3.1% in 2022 and 2023 respectively. In the event of an immediate interruption to Russian gas supplies, a total of 220 billion euros in German economic output would be at risk in both years.
Oliver Holtemöller
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17.03.2022 • 6/2022
Price shock jeopardises recovery of German economy
Russia’s war in Ukraine is hitting the German economy primarily via an energy price shock, but also by disrupting trade flows and causing general uncertainty. At the same time, however, the economy is receiving a strong boost from the lifting of many pandemic restrictions. The Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH) forecasts that gross domestic product will increase by 3.1% in 2022. The consumer price index will be 4.8% higher than one year ago. The war affects the East German eco-nomy about as hard as the economy in Germany as a whole.
Oliver Holtemöller
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Inflation Puzzles, the Phillips Curve and Output Expectations: New Perspectives from the Euro Zone
Alessandro Sardone, Roberto Tamborini, Giuliana Passamani
Empirica,
February
2022
Abstract
Confidence in the Phillips Curve (PC) as predictor of inflation developments along the business cycle has been shaken by recent “inflation puzzles” in advanced countries, such as the “missing disinflation” in the aftermath of the Great Recession and the “missing inflation” in the years of recovery, to which the Euro-Zone “excess deflation” during the post-crisis depression may be added. This paper proposes a newly specified Phillips Curve model, in which expected inflation, instead of being treated as an exogenous explanatory variable of actual inflation, is endogenized. The idea is simply that if the PC is used to foresee inflation, then its expectational component should in some way be the result of agents using the PC itself. As a consequence, the truly independent explanatory variables of inflation turn out to be the output gaps and the related forecast errors by agents, with notable empirical consequences. The model is tested with the Euro-Zone data 1999–2019 showing that it may provide a consistent explanation of the “inflation puzzles” by disentangling the structural component from the expectational effects of the PC.
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IWH-Flash-Indikator I. Quartal und II. Quartal 2022
Katja Heinisch, Oliver Holtemöller, Axel Lindner, Birgit Schultz
IWH Flash Indicator,
No. 1,
2022
Abstract
Nach der wirtschaftlichen Erholung im Sommerhalbjahr kam es im vierten Quartal 2021 wieder zu einem kräftigen Rückschlag. Das Bruttoinlandsprodukt sank um 0,7%, nachdem es im Vorquartal trotz der Probleme durch Lieferengpässe noch um 1,7% zugelegt hatte. Der Aufschwung wird wohl auch im ersten Quartal 2022 gedämpft sein, da die Infektionszahlen in Deutschland anders als in einigen anderen europäischen Ländern derzeit kräftig steigen und noch starke Pandemierestriktionen gelten. Auch die anhaltend kräftige Inflation dürfte Bremsspuren bei den wirtschaftlichen Aktivitäten hinterlassen. Insgesamt wird die Wirtschaft in Deutschland laut IWH-Flash-Indikator im ersten Quartal 2022 um 0,7% zurückgehen und im zweiten Quartal 2022 um 2,0% zulegen (vgl. Abbildung 1).
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The Role of State-owned Banks in Crises: Evidence from German Banks During COVID-19
Xiang Li
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 6,
2022
Abstract
By adopting a difference-in-differences specification combined with propensity score matching, we provide evidence using the microdata of German banks that stateowned savings banks have lent less than credit cooperatives during the COVID-19 crisis. In particular, the weaker lending effects of state-owned banks are pronounced for long-term and nonrevolving loans but insignificant for short-term and revolving loans. Moreover, the negative impact of government ownership is larger for borrowers who are more exposed to the COVID-19 shock and in regions where the ruling parties are longer in office and more positioned on the right side of the political spectrum.
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Kommentar: Weniger Krisenmodus und wieder mehr Wettbewerb, bitte!
Steffen Müller
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 4,
2021
Abstract
Ende November kam die frohe Kunde aus Nürnberg: Die Arbeitslosenzahlen sind weiter gesunken, sogar den zehnten Monat in Folge. Was auf der einen Seite erfreulich ist, zeigt auf der anderen Seite, dass Arbeitskräftemangel eines der größten Probleme der deutschen Wirtschaft ist.
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Aktuelle Trends: Weniger Gewerbeabmeldungen seit Beginn der Pandemie
Steffen Müller
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 4,
2021
Abstract
Insolvente Unternehmen sind zahlungsunfähig oder überschuldet und werden in den allermeisten Fällen geschlossen. Dagegen wird ein Gewerbe nicht nur bei der Insolvenz eines Betriebes abgemeldet, sondern z. B. auch, wenn ein Weiterbetrieb nicht lohnend erscheint. Somit sollte sich die gegenwärtige Corona-Krise auch in einer höheren Zahl an Gewerbeabmeldungen spiegeln.
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