Public Bank Guarantees and Allocative Efficiency
Reint E. Gropp, Andre Guettler, Vahid Saadi
Journal of Monetary Economics,
forthcoming
Abstract
In the wake of the recent financial crisis, many governments extended public guarantees to banks. We take advantage of a natural experiment, in which long-standing public guarantees were removed for a set of German banks following a lawsuit, to identify the real effects of these guarantees on the allocation of credit (“allocative efficiency”). Using matched bank/firm data, we find that public guarantees reduce allocative efficiency. With guarantees in place, poorly performing firms invest more and maintain higher rates of sales growth. Moreover, firms produce less efficiently in the presence of public guarantees. Consistently, we show that guarantees reduce the likelihood that firms exit the market. These findings suggest that public guarantees hinder restructuring activities and prevent resources to flow to the most productive uses.
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Banks’ Funding Stress, Lending Supply and Consumption Expenditure
H. Evren Damar, Reint E. Gropp, A. Mordel
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking,
forthcoming
Abstract
We employ a unique identification strategy linking survey data on household consumption expenditure to bank-level data to estimate the effects of bank funding stress on consumer credit and consumption expenditures. We show that households whose banks were more exposed to funding shocks report lower levels of non-mortgage liabilities. This, however, only translates into lower levels of consumption for low income households. Hence, adverse credit supply shocks are associated with significant heterogeneous effects.
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Optimizing Policymakers’ Loss Functions in Crisis Prediction: Before, Within or After?
Peter Sarlin, Gregor von Schweinitz
Macroeconomic Dynamics,
forthcoming
Abstract
Early-warning models most commonly optimize signaling thresholds on crisis probabilities. The expost threshold optimization is based upon a loss function accounting for preferences between forecast errors, but comes with two crucial drawbacks: unstable thresholds in recursive estimations and an in-sample overfit at the expense of out-of-sample performance. We propose two alternatives for threshold setting: (i) including preferences in the estimation itself and (ii) setting thresholds ex-ante according to preferences only. Given probabilistic model output, it is intuitive that a decision rule is independent of the data or model specification, as thresholds on probabilities represent a willingness to issue a false alarm vis-à-vis missing a crisis. We provide simulated and real-world evidence that this simplification results in stable thresholds and improves out-of-sample performance. Our solution is not restricted to binary-choice models, but directly transferable to the signaling approach and all probabilistic early-warning models.
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On the Risk of a Sovereign Debt Crisis in Italy
Oliver Holtemöller, Tobias Knedlik, Axel Lindner
Intereconomics,
forthcoming
Abstract
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Deleveraging and Consumer Credit Supply in the Wake of the 2008-2009 Financial Crisis
Reint E. Gropp, J. Krainer, E. Laderman
International Journal of Central Banking,
forthcoming
Abstract
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Cross-border Transmission of Emergency Liquidity
Thomas Kick, Michael Koetter, Manuela Storz
Journal of Banking & Finance,
forthcoming
Abstract
We show that emergency liquidity provision by the Federal Reserve transmitted to non-U.S. banking markets. Based on manually collected holding company structures, we identify banks in Germany with access to U.S. facilities. Using detailed interest rate data reported to the German central bank, we compare lending and borrowing rates of banks with and without such access. U.S. liquidity shocks cause a significant decrease in the short-term funding costs of the average German bank with access. This reduction is mitigated for banks with more vulnerable balance sheets prior to the inception of emergency liquidity. We also find a significant pass-through in terms of lower corporate credit rates charged for banks with the lowest pre-crisis leverage, US-dollar funding needs, and liquidity buffers. Spillover effects from U.S. emergency liquidity provision are generally confined to short-term rates.
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Do Conventional Monetary Policy Instruments Matter in Unconventional Times?
Manuel Buchholz, Kirsten Schmidt, Lena Tonzer
Deutsche Bundesbank Discussion Paper,
No. 27,
2019
Abstract
This paper investigates how declines in the deposit facility rate set by the ECB affect euro area banks’ incentives to hold reserves at the central bank. We find that, in the face of lower deposit rates, banks with a more interest-sensitive business model are more likely to reduce reserve holdings and allocate freed-up liquidity to loans. The result is driven by well-capitalized banks in the non-GIIPS countries of the euro area. This reveals that conventional monetary policy instruments have limited effects in restoring monetary policy transmission during times of crisis.
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Kommentar: Die Krise von 2008/2009 ist noch nicht vorbei
Reint E. Gropp
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 2,
2019
Abstract
Kurzfristig war die Finanzkrise, ursprünglich ausgelöst durch exzessive Vergabe von Hypotheken an weniger kreditwürdige Haushalte, verbunden mit der weitverbreiteten Verbriefung dieser Hypotheken, mit schweren realwirtschaftlichen Konsequenzen verbunden. Die Volkswirtschaften aller Industrieländer schrumpften stark, die Arbeitslosigkeit stieg kräftig an. Firmen waren nicht in der Lage, neue Investitionen zu finanzieren, da es für Banken in vielen Ländern nicht möglich war, Kredite zu vergeben. Gleichzeitig führten die Rettungsaktionen der Regierungen zu einer starken Erhöhung der Schuldenstände und zu einer Nullzinspolitik, verbunden mit Anleihekäufen, der wichtigsten Zentralbanken.
Wo stehen wir heute, über zehn Jahre nach der Pleite von Lehman, die symbolisch noch immer eng mit der Krise verbunden ist? Und gibt es langfristige Auswirkungen auf die Wirtschaft – Auswirkungen, die wir noch heute spüren und möglicherweise noch viele Jahre spüren werden?
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Langfristige Konsequenzen der Finanzkrise 2008/2009: Nachsichtige Regulierung schadet, flexible Löhne helfen
Reint E. Gropp, Carlo Wix
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 2,
2019
Abstract
Die globale Bankenkrise der Jahre 2008/2009 hatte weltweit signifikant negative Auswirkungen auf die Realwirtschaft, und in vielen Ländern fiel die folgende wirtschaftliche Erholung deutlich langsamer aus als in vorherigen Rezessionen. In den Monaten nach der Insolvenz der amerikanischen Investmentbank Lehman Brothers reduzierten Banken ihre Kreditvergabe an Unternehmen, was zu einem Anstieg der Arbeitslosigkeit, einem Rückgang an Investitionen und einer Verringerung der Produktivität führte. Während diese kurzfristigen Effekte in der bisherigen Forschung gut dokumentiert sind, sind die langfristigen Auswirkungen von Bankenkrisen bisher weit weniger gut verstanden. Zwei aktuelle Studien unter IWH-Beteiligung zeigen, dass Bankenkrisen generell negative langfristige Effekte auf das Wachstum von Firmen haben, dass die Rettung von schwachen Banken während der Krise mit Produktivitätsverlusten in späteren Jahren einhergeht, und dass diese negativen langfristigen Effekte durch die Existenz inflexibler Löhne verstärkt werden.
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26.06.2019 • 14/2019
Study: How financial crises lower life satisfaction and how to prevent this
Financial crises not only result in severe disruptions to the economic system, they also affect people’s life satisfaction. A new study by Martin Luther University Halle-Wittenberg (MLU) and the Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH) shows that weaker members of society are more affected by increased uncertainty during crisis times, even if they may not be speculating on the stock market themselves. This could potentially also lower their propensity to consume, thereby intensifying the impact of a financial crisis. The study was recently published in “The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy”.
Lena Tonzer
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