Sachsen-Anhalt als Wirtschaftsstandort: Wie erfolgreich sind das Land und seine Regionen?
Martin T. W. Rosenfeld
Geographische Rundschau,
2005
Abstract
The article examines the economic performance and the conditions for future economic development in the German Land of Saxony-Anhalt. After the integration of Saxony-Anhalt into the market economy since 1989, strong structural changes have taken place. Nevertheless, agriculture, coal mining and the chemical industry as some of the traditional sectors of the Land’s economy have remained their importance. The weak points of the economy are the low number of entrepreneurs and a low tendency for innovations in the private sector. The Magdeburg region and the Halle region have better conditions for (inter-) national competitiveness than the Altmark region and the Dessau region. But the potentials of the urban centers Magdeburg and Halle are - as compared to other East German cities - not very strong. For improving the eonomic conditions, new instruments for stimulating entrepreneurship and for strengthening the position of the two urban centers should be installed. In addition, innovation activities of private firms could be improved by new linkages between the private sector and Saxony-Anhalt’s public research units.
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Regionalpolitische Optionen für schrumpfende Städte
Peter Franz
Aus Parlament und Zeitgeschichte,
2005
Abstract
The current policy for the treatment of the problems of shrinking East German cities favours too one-sided the demolition of vacant housing units and the economic recovery of large housing enterprises. In addition to this a pessimism spreads that cities with a shrinking population sooner or later will suffer from economic distress. Such policies and attitudes are not suitable to improve the chances of the cities competing interregionally for business locations. It will be recommended to integrate demolition measures in a local strategy aimed to strengthen the existing economic potentials and to ameliorate the image of the city.
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Network Access Charges, Vertical Integration, and Property Rights Structure
Christian Growitsch, Thomas Wein
Energy Economics,
No. 2,
2005
Abstract
After the deregulation of the German electricity markets in 1998, the German government opted for a regulatory regime called negotiated third party access, which would be subject to ex post control by the federal cartel office. Network access charges for new competitors are based on contractual arrangements between energy producers and industrial consumers. As the electricity networks are incontestable natural monopolies, the local and regional network operators are able to set (monopolistic) charges at their own discretion, limited only by their concerns over possible interference by the federal cartel office (Bundeskartellamt). In this paper we analyse if there is evidence for varying charging behaviour depending on a supplier`s economic independence (structure of property rights) or its level of vertical integration. For this purpose we hypothesise that incorporated and vertically integrated suppliers set different charges than independent utility companies. Multivariate estimations show a relation between network access charges and the network operator’s economic independence as well as level of vertical integration. On the low voltage level, for an estimated annual consumption of 1700 kW/h, vertically integrated firms set – as predicted by our hypothesis - significantly lower access charges than vertically separated suppliers, whereas incorporated network operators charge significantly higher charges compared to independent suppliers. There is insufficient evidence available to confirm these results for other consumptions or voltage levels.
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Determinants and Effects of Foreign Direct Investment: Evidence from German Firm-Level Data
Claudia M. Buch, J. Kleinert, A. Lipponer
Economic Policy,
No. 41,
2005
Abstract
Foreign direct investment is an essential aspect of ‘globalization’ yet its empirical determinants are not well understood. What we do know is based either on poor data for a wide range of nations, or good data for the US and Swedish cases. In this paper, we provide evidence on the determinants of the activities of German multinational firms by using a newly available firm-level data set from the Deutsche Bundesbank. The specific goal of this paper is to demonstrate the relative role of country-level and firm-level determinants of foreign direct investment. We focus on three main questions: First, what are the main driving forces of German firms’ multinational activities? Second, is there evidence that sector-level and firm-level factors shape internationalization patterns? Third, is there evidence of agglomeration effects in the foreign activities of German firms? We find that the market access motive for internationalization dominates. Firms move abroad mainly to gain better access to large foreign markets. Cost-saving motives, however, are important for some manufacturing sectors. Our results strongly suggest that firm-level heterogeneity has an important influence on internationalization patterns – as stressed by recent models of international trade. We also find positive agglomeration effects for the activities of German firms that stem from the number of other German firms that are active on a given foreign market. In terms of lessons for economic policy, our results show that lowering barriers to the integration of markets and encouraging the formation of human capital can promote the activities of multinational firms. However, our results related to the heterogeneity of firms and agglomeration tendencies show that it might be difficult to fine-tune policies directed at the exploitation of synergies and at the creation of clusters of foreign firms.
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The influence of Vertical Integration and Property Rights on Network Access Charges in the German Electricity Markets
Christian Growitsch, Thomas Wein
External Publications,
No. 6,
2004
Abstract
German Electricity markets were deregulated in the late nineties of the last century. In contrast to other European countries, the German government enacted negotiated third party access instead of installing a regulation authority. Network access charges for new competitors are based on contractual arrangements between energy producers and industrial consumers, which specify the calculation schemes for access charges. Local and regional suppliers are nevertheless able to set (monopolistic) charges at their own discretion, restricted only by the possibility of interference competition authorities. While some of those suppliers have been acquired by one of the four Transmission System Operators and become vertically integrated, the majority is still independent public utility companies. In this paper we analyse if there is evidence for different charging behaviour depending on the supplier’s economic independence or its level of vertical integration. Controlling for other coefficients as the so called structural features and related cost differences as well as the influence of competition law suits, multivariate estimations show significantly lower access charges than vertically separated suppliers, whereas incorporated network operators charge significantly higher charges compared to independent suppliers for at least one typical case.
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Investment, Financial Markets, New Economy Dynamics and Growth in Transition Countries
Albrecht Kauffmann, P. J. J. Welfens
Economic Opening Up and Growth in Russia: Finance, Trade, Market Institutions, and Energy,
2004
Abstract
The transition to a market economy in the former CMEA area is more than a decade old and one can clearly distinguish a group of relatively fast growing countries — including Estonia, Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovenia — and a majority of slowly growing economies, including Russia and the Ukraine. Initial problems of transition were natural in the sense that systemic transition to a market economy has effectively destroyed part of the existing capital stock that was no longer profitable under the new relative prices imported from world markets; and there was a transitory inflationary push as low state-administered prices were replaced by higher market equilibrium prices. Indeed, systemic transformation in eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union have brought serious transitory inflation problems and a massive transition recession; negative growth rates have continued over many years in some countries, including Russia and the Ukraine, where output growth was negative throughout the 1990s (except for Russia, which recorded slight growth in 1997). For political and economic reasons the economic performance of Russia is of particular relevance for the success of the overall transition process. If Russia would face stagnation and instability, this would undermine political and economic stability in the whole of Europe and prospects for integrating Russia into the world economy.
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FDI Subsidiaries and Industrial Integration of Central Europe: Conceptual and Empirical Results
Boris Majcen, Slavo Radosevic, Matija Rojec
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 177,
2003
Abstract
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A Projection of Future Productivity Growth Potentials in the Central and Eastern European Acceding Countries Manufacturing Sector
Johannes Stephan
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 3,
2003
Abstract
The assessment of future economic development in EU accession candidates critically depends on future productivity growth. A projection of future productivity growth in manufacturing industry can make use of experience from other countries developments in the course of their integration into the European Union.
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Macroeconomic Modelling of the German Economy in the Framework of Euroland
Rüdiger Pohl, Heinz P. Galler
Schriften des IWH,
No. 11,
2002
Abstract
An attempt to develop a new macroeconometric model for Germany is confronted with several questions that range from the general rationality of such an approach to specific problems of an appropriate model structure. One important aspect of this discussion is the introduction of the Euro as a common currency of the European monetary union. This institutional change may result in structural breaks due to changing behavior of economic agents. In addition, the definition of the spatial unit that is appropriate for modelling becomes a problem. Additional problems come from the introduction of the European Single Market and the increasing international economic integration not only within the European union but also beyond its borders. And in the case of Germany, the unification of the West and the East demand special attention. Last but not least, the harmonization of national accounting for the member states of the European Union has to be dealt with. Thus, the introduction of the Euro as a common currency is just one problem besides others that must be addressed.
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