The Economics of Restructuring the German Electricity Sector
Christian Growitsch, Felix Müsgens
Zeitschrift für Energiewirtschaft,
No. 3,
2005
Abstract
The debate about the development of German electricity prices after the liberalization of energy markets in 1998 raises the question of failures in market restructuring. However, a general statement would be misleading for two main reasons. Firstly, the price development, analyzed for the exemplary case of household prices, shows significant differences among the stages of the value chain. Secondly, the underlying cost structure might have changed from 1998 to 2004. While such effects can be expected to level out over time, they can distort the comparison of a small period of observation. For these reasons, we analyzed the different price components at a detailed level, finding a considerable price reduction of about 32% in generation and a much lower reduction of 13% in transmission and distribution tariffs. These decreases have been mostly compensated by a significant increase in taxes and subsidies (+56%).
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Negotiated Third Party Access - an Industrial Organisation Perspective
Christian Growitsch, Thomas Wein
European Journal of Law and Economics,
2005
Abstract
In the course of the liberalization of European energy markets, the German government opted – diverging from all other European countries – for Negotiated Third-Party Access. In this article we analyze if, theoretically, this institutional regime can be superior to regulation. We review empirically whether certain aspects of the actual implementation, in particular publication of the network access charges for each network supplier, facilitated or inhibited competition. In the first place we reconsider previous research, showing that NTPA can – under certain conditions – be economically effective. Our empirical analysis shows that the duty of publishing access charges supported market transparency and imposed a regulatory threat, particularly to suppliers with significantly above-average charges. On the other hand observable price adjustments over time serve as an indicator of tacit collusion. Although the expensive suppliers cut their prices, the cheaper ones raised theirs.
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An analysis of household electricity price developments in Germany since liberalization
Christian Growitsch, Felix Müsgens
External Publications,
2005
Abstract
Despite the liberalization of energy markets in 1998, household electricity prices in 2004 are nearly the same as 1998, indicating a failure of market restructuring. However, such a general consideration is misleading for two main reasons. Firstly, the price development shows significant differences among the stages of the value chain. Secondly, the underlying cost structure might have changed from 1998 to 2004. While such effects can be expected to level out over time, they can distort the comparison of a small period of observation. For these reasons, we analyzed the different price components at a detailed level, finding a considerable price reduction of about 32% in generation and a much lower reduction of 13% in transmission and distribution tariffs. These decreases have been mostly compensated by a significant increase in taxes and subsidies (+56%).
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Network Access Charges, Vertical Integration, and Property Rights Structure
Christian Growitsch, Thomas Wein
Energy Economics,
No. 2,
2005
Abstract
After the deregulation of the German electricity markets in 1998, the German government opted for a regulatory regime called negotiated third party access, which would be subject to ex post control by the federal cartel office. Network access charges for new competitors are based on contractual arrangements between energy producers and industrial consumers. As the electricity networks are incontestable natural monopolies, the local and regional network operators are able to set (monopolistic) charges at their own discretion, limited only by their concerns over possible interference by the federal cartel office (Bundeskartellamt). In this paper we analyse if there is evidence for varying charging behaviour depending on a supplier`s economic independence (structure of property rights) or its level of vertical integration. For this purpose we hypothesise that incorporated and vertically integrated suppliers set different charges than independent utility companies. Multivariate estimations show a relation between network access charges and the network operator’s economic independence as well as level of vertical integration. On the low voltage level, for an estimated annual consumption of 1700 kW/h, vertically integrated firms set – as predicted by our hypothesis - significantly lower access charges than vertically separated suppliers, whereas incorporated network operators charge significantly higher charges compared to independent suppliers. There is insufficient evidence available to confirm these results for other consumptions or voltage levels.
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The influence of Vertical Integration and Property Rights on Network Access Charges in the German Electricity Markets
Christian Growitsch, Thomas Wein
External Publications,
No. 6,
2004
Abstract
German Electricity markets were deregulated in the late nineties of the last century. In contrast to other European countries, the German government enacted negotiated third party access instead of installing a regulation authority. Network access charges for new competitors are based on contractual arrangements between energy producers and industrial consumers, which specify the calculation schemes for access charges. Local and regional suppliers are nevertheless able to set (monopolistic) charges at their own discretion, restricted only by the possibility of interference competition authorities. While some of those suppliers have been acquired by one of the four Transmission System Operators and become vertically integrated, the majority is still independent public utility companies. In this paper we analyse if there is evidence for different charging behaviour depending on the supplier’s economic independence or its level of vertical integration. Controlling for other coefficients as the so called structural features and related cost differences as well as the influence of competition law suits, multivariate estimations show significantly lower access charges than vertically separated suppliers, whereas incorporated network operators charge significantly higher charges compared to independent suppliers for at least one typical case.
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The Contestable Markets Theory - Efficient Advice for Economic Policy
Christian Growitsch, Thomas Wein
External Publications,
2004
Abstract
During the nineties of the last century several formerly monopolistic markets (telecommunication, electricity, gas, and railway) have been deregulated in Germany based on European directives and theoretically inspired by the theory of contestable markets. The original contestable market theory implied three assumptions necessary to be satisfied to establish potential competition: Free market entry, market exit possible without any costs, and the price adjustment lag exceeding the entry lag. Our analysis shows that if the incumbent reduces its prices slowly (high adjustment lag) and the market entry can be performed quickly (low entry lag), a new competitor will be able to earn back sunk costs. Therefore it is not necessary that all three conditions be complied with for potential competition to exist. Applying this „revised“ contestable market theory to the deregulated sectors in Germany, natural monopolies can be identified in telecommunication sections local loops and local/regional connection networks, in the national electricity grid and the regional/local electricity distribution networks, in the national and regional/local gas transmission/distribution sections, and in the railroad network. These sections are not contestable due to sunk costs, expected high entry lags and a probably short price adjustment lag. They are identified as bottlenecks, which should be regulated. The function of system operators in energy and railroad are closely related to the non-contestable monopolistic networks.
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Liberalization of Electricity Markets in Selected European Countries
Albrecht Kauffmann, M. Keim, P. J. J. Welfens
Diskussionsbeiträge des Europäischen Instituts für Internationale Wirtschaftsbeziehungen (EIIW), Bergische Universität Wuppertal, Nr. 124,
No. 124,
2004
Abstract
We look into liberalization issues in the context of the EU Electricity Liberalization. Taking a look at principal issues reveals that the Community Directive 96/92/EC does not really take into account the interdependencies of energy markets. Moreover, third party access is not effectively enforced, particularly not in Germany, where mergers between a major electricity company and the dominant gas company have raised particular issues. Electricity liberalization in Scandinavia is working relatively well. EU accession countries are considered potential electricity exporters in the long run as full restructuring will drive down both energy intensities and electricity intensities. Russia would be wise to quickly become a member country of WTO, not in the least to gain access to Western Europe’s electricity market; the role of Russia so far has been neglected in the discussion of electricity liberalization. Excess capacities in EU-27 can be expected in the medium term. There is considerable doubt that politicians – often with ambitious goals in the field of environmental policy – will allow for a pan-European liberalization of electricity. We also take a closer look at regulatory policy issues.
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Deregulation and liberalization in European electricity industry
Constanze Kreis
Schriften des IWH,
No. 17,
2004
Abstract
Seit Ende der 80er Jahre ist weltweit eine zunehmende Liberalisierung und Deregulierung von Wirtschaftsbereichen zu verzeichnen, in denen der Ausschluss von Wettbewerb durch das Vorherrschen von Monopolstrukturen und deren Regulierung kennzeichnend war. Im Zuge dieser Entwicklung wurde mit der Verabschiedung der EU-Richtlinie zur Schaffung eines Binnenmarktes für Elektrizität im Jahre 1996 auch in Europa ein neuer energiepolitischer Ordnungsrahmen geschaffen, nachdem hier zunächst kontroverse Debatten für eine zögerliche Herangehensweise an Strukturreformen auf diesem Gebiet geführt haben. Die Umsetzung der Richtlinie hat seither, wenn auch in unterschiedlichem Maße, in den nationalen Strommärkten zu tiefgreifenden strukturellen Umbrüchen geführt. Die Reorganisation dieses Wirtschaftszweigs ist aber im europäischen Maßstab bisher keineswegs abgeschlossen und der transnationale Handel mit Strom noch eingeschränkt. Die vorliegende Arbeit wendet sich angesichts der dynamischen Situation auf diesem noch jungen Wettbewerbsmarkt einer Reihe interessanter wissenschaftlicher Fragestellungen zu, die sich aus dem Prozess der Deregulierung und Liberalisierung der Stromwirtschaft ergeben. Wegen der Besonderheiten des Gutes „Elektrizität“ sind die Erkenntnisse, die über Marktvorgänge in anderen Wirtschaftsbereichen gewonnen wurden, nicht uneingeschränkt auf die Elektrizitätswirtschaft zu übertragen. Die Thematik weist damit eine große Heterogenität und Komplexität auf. Die Autorin trägt diesem Umstand Rechnung, indem sie mehrere Kapitel aus jeweils unterschiedlicher Perspektive mit verschiedenen Methoden den Deregulierungsprozess analysiert. Im Ergebnis lässt sich festhalten, dass der Bereich der Elektrizitätswirtschaft ein Sektor bleiben wird, der nicht nur während seiner Umbruchphase, sondern grundsätzlich auch weiterhin besonderer wettbewerbspolitischer Aufmerksamkeit bedarf, da trotz bereits zu verzeichnender Effizienzgewinne nicht davon ausgegangen werden kann, dass im Zuge der Deregulierung und Liberalisierung eine erhöhte Effizienz allein durch Regulierungsabbau erzielt wird.
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Employment effects of development of renewable energies
Steffen Hentrich, Jürgen Wiemers, Joachim Ragnitz
IWH-Sonderhefte,
No. 1,
2004
Abstract
Die Bundesregierung strebt bis zum Jahr 2010 eine Verdopplung des Anteils erneuerbarer Energien am Primärenergie- sowie am Bruttostromverbrauch an. Das vorrangige Ziel der damit verbundenen Umstrukturierung des Energiesektors ist die Verbesserung der Umweltqualität. Es darf jedoch nicht außer Acht gelassen werden, dass die Förderung erneuerbarer Energien zwangsläufig auch gesamtwirtschaftliche Auswirkungen hat. Angesichts der anhaltend angespannten Lage am Arbeitsmarkt stehen dabei insbesondere die Beschäftigungseffekte der Förderung erneuerbarer Energien im Mittelpunkt des öffentlichen und wirtschaftspolitischen Interesses. Vor diesem Hintergrund hat das Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung Halle im Auftrag des Bundesministeriums für Wirtschaft und Arbeit (BMWA) die gesamtwirtschaftlichen und insbesondere beschäftigungsrelevanten Auswirkungen des angestrebten Ausbaus erneuerbarer Energien untersucht. Im Gegensatz zu anderen Studien dieser Art wurde dabei besonderer Wert auf eine dynamische Analyse gelegt, die neben den expansiven Beschäftigungsimpulsen im Bereich der erneuerbaren Energien auch die gegenläufigen Beschäftigungswirkungen berücksichtigt, die durch Verdrängung konventioneller Energieträger und durch erhöhte Steuern zur Finanzierung von Subventionen für regenerative Energien entstehen. Die vorliegende Untersuchung gibt eine zusammenfassende Darstellung der Vorgehensweise und der Ergebnisse des Forschungsprojekts. Es zeigt sich, dass per saldo durch den verstärkten Ausbau erneuerbarer Energien keine zusätzliche Beschäftigung generiert wird.
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Wind power utilization: Whats the advantage of being the world champion? - Commentary
Steffen Hentrich
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 11,
2002
Abstract
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