Angewandte Industrieökonomik: Theorien, Modelle, Anwendungen
Ulrich Blum, Simone Müller, Andreas Weiske
,
2006
Abstract
Modern entrepreneurship comprises a mix of bourgeois morale and the striving for adventure: Bourgeois morale implies efficiency, reputation, the rule of the law. And adventure implies new frontiers, the spirit of competition, innovation and a pioneer’s attitude – up to the destruction of competitors. The modern entrepreneur’s social position thus is a ambiguous; the entrepreneur needs a special attitude with respect to economic activity as discussed by Werner Sombard (1913) and Max Weber (1905); society has to accept the positive ethical quality of profit seeking in order to survive. The modern theory of the enterprise promoted by neoclassic theory does not include any of these elements of real entrepreneurship. Industrial organisation theory tries to structure models closer to reality, thus allowing empirical testing. In many aspects, it is based on neoclassic theory, but also accepts the concept of strategic behaviour which includes potential reactions of other market participants in ones own activities. Elements of evolutionary economics, risk theory and modern information theory thus become important. The overarching question of the entrepreneur, who strives for a higher than normal profit in the market becomes: under which conditions should I enter the market and under which conditions will potential entrants do the same? How should I set my prizes and what reactions must I expect? How can I signal friendly behaviour to competitors? How can I differentiate myself from them? What importance do innovations and advertising have? The book roles out these questions in three large chapters on technology and market structure, on prize setting and signalling, and on research, development and innovation. An introduction explains individual behavioural patterns within the societal context – often in a historical perspective. Three methodological chapters introduce the reader into strategic thinking as the core aspect of the industrial organisation theory, the “old industrial organisation theory” and the neoclassic basic models. Each chapter is extended by exercises and tips for solutions.
Read article
Equity and Bond Market Signals as Leading Indicators of Bank Fragility
Reint E. Gropp, Jukka M. Vesala, Giuseppe Vulpes
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking,
No. 2,
2006
Abstract
We analyse the ability of the distance to default and subordinated bond spreads to signal bank fragility in a sample of EU banks. We find leading properties for both indicators. The distance to default exhibits lead times of 6-18 months. Spreads have signal value close to problems only. We also find that implicit safety nets weaken the predictive power of spreads. Further, the results suggest complementarity between both indicators. We also examine the interaction of the indicators with other information and find that their additional information content may be small but not insignificant. The results suggest that market indicators reduce type II errors relative to predictions based on accounting information only.
Read article
Die Bedeutung interner Kapitalmärkte für die Organisationsform von Unternehmen
Diemo Dietrich
WiSt - Wirtschaftswissenschaftliches Studium,
2006
Abstract
Contemporary financial economics has broken new grounds when considering that firms typically have not only a single investment opportunity available conducted by a single manager. A Firm has in fact several projects where headquarters delegates the undertaking to project managers. From this perspective, what conclusions can be drawn regarding the functioning of capital markets? What role do internal capital markets play? What consequences does it have for the borders of a firm?
Read article
Structural Change during Transition: Is Russia Becoming a Service Economy?
Albrecht Kauffmann
Volkswirtschaftliche Diskussionsbeiträge der Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftlichen Fakultät, Universität Potsdam, Nr. 80,
No. 80,
2005
Abstract
This paper analyses the structural change in Russia during the transition from the planned to a market economy. With regard to the famous three sector hypothesis, broad economic sectors were formed as required by this theory. The computation of their shares at GNP at market prices using Input-Output tables, and the adjustment of results from distortions, generated as side effects of tax avoidance practices, shows results that clearly reject claims that Russia would be on the road to a post-industrial service economy. Instead, at least until 2001, a tendency of “primarisation“ could be observed, that presents Russia closer to less-developed countries.
Read article
Non-market Allocation in Transport: A Reassessment of its Justification and the Challenge of Institutional Transition
Ulrich Blum
50 Years of Transport Research: Experiences Gained and Major Challenges Ahead,
2005
Abstract
Economic theory knows two systems of coordination: through public choice or through the market principle. If the market is chosen, then it may either be regulated, or it may be fully competitive (or be in between these two extremes). This paper first inquires into the reasons for regulation, it analyses the reasons for the important role of government in the transportation sector, especially in the procurement of infrastructure. Historical reasons are seen as important reasons for bureaucratic objections to deregulation. Fundamental economic concepts are forwarded that suggest market failure and justify a regulatory environment. The reasons for regulation cited above, however, may be challenged; we forward theoretical concepts from industrial organization theory and from institutional economics which suggest that competition is even possible on the level of infrastructure. The transition from a strongly regulated to a competitive environment poses problems that have given lieu to numerous failures in privatization and deregulation. Structural inertia plays an important role, and the incentive-compatible management of infrastructure is seen as the key element of any liberal transportation policy. It requires that the setting of rules on the meta level satisfies both local and global efficiency ends. We conclude that, in market economies, competition and regulation should not be substitutes but complements. General rules, an "ethic of competition" have to be set that guarantee a level playing field to agents; it is complimented by institutions that provide arbitration in case of misconduct.
Read article
Quality of Service, Efficiency, and Scale in Network Industries: An Analysis of European Electricity Distribution
Christian Growitsch, Tooraj Jamasb, Michael Pollitt
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 3,
2005
Abstract
Quality of service is of major economic significance in natural monopoly infrastructure industries and is increasingly addressed in regulatory schemes. However, this important aspect is generally not reflected in efficiency analysis of these industries. In this paper we present an efficiency analysis of electricity distribution networks using a sample of about 500 electricity distribution utilities from seven European countries. We apply the stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) method on multi-output translog input distance function models to estimate cost and scale efficiency with and without incorporating quality of service. We show that introducing the quality dimension into the analysis affects estimated efficiency significantly. In contrast to previous research, smaller utilities seem to indicate lower technical efficiency when incorporating quality. We also show that incorporating quality of service does not alter scale economy measures. Our results emphasise that quality of service should be an integrated part of efficiency analysis and incentive regulation regimes, as well as in the economic review of market concentration in regulated natural monopolies.
Read article
Negotiated Third Party Access - an Industrial Organisation Perspective
Christian Growitsch, Thomas Wein
European Journal of Law and Economics,
2005
Abstract
In the course of the liberalization of European energy markets, the German government opted – diverging from all other European countries – for Negotiated Third-Party Access. In this article we analyze if, theoretically, this institutional regime can be superior to regulation. We review empirically whether certain aspects of the actual implementation, in particular publication of the network access charges for each network supplier, facilitated or inhibited competition. In the first place we reconsider previous research, showing that NTPA can – under certain conditions – be economically effective. Our empirical analysis shows that the duty of publishing access charges supported market transparency and imposed a regulatory threat, particularly to suppliers with significantly above-average charges. On the other hand observable price adjustments over time serve as an indicator of tacit collusion. Although the expensive suppliers cut their prices, the cheaper ones raised theirs.
Read article
Sachsen-Anhalt als Wirtschaftsstandort: Wie erfolgreich sind das Land und seine Regionen?
Martin T. W. Rosenfeld
Geographische Rundschau,
2005
Abstract
The article examines the economic performance and the conditions for future economic development in the German Land of Saxony-Anhalt. After the integration of Saxony-Anhalt into the market economy since 1989, strong structural changes have taken place. Nevertheless, agriculture, coal mining and the chemical industry as some of the traditional sectors of the Land’s economy have remained their importance. The weak points of the economy are the low number of entrepreneurs and a low tendency for innovations in the private sector. The Magdeburg region and the Halle region have better conditions for (inter-) national competitiveness than the Altmark region and the Dessau region. But the potentials of the urban centers Magdeburg and Halle are - as compared to other East German cities - not very strong. For improving the eonomic conditions, new instruments for stimulating entrepreneurship and for strengthening the position of the two urban centers should be installed. In addition, innovation activities of private firms could be improved by new linkages between the private sector and Saxony-Anhalt’s public research units.
Read article
An analysis of household electricity price developments in Germany since liberalization
Christian Growitsch, Felix Müsgens
External Publications,
2005
Abstract
Despite the liberalization of energy markets in 1998, household electricity prices in 2004 are nearly the same as 1998, indicating a failure of market restructuring. However, such a general consideration is misleading for two main reasons. Firstly, the price development shows significant differences among the stages of the value chain. Secondly, the underlying cost structure might have changed from 1998 to 2004. While such effects can be expected to level out over time, they can distort the comparison of a small period of observation. For these reasons, we analyzed the different price components at a detailed level, finding a considerable price reduction of about 32% in generation and a much lower reduction of 13% in transmission and distribution tariffs. These decreases have been mostly compensated by a significant increase in taxes and subsidies (+56%).
Read article
Network Access Charges, Vertical Integration, and Property Rights Structure
Christian Growitsch, Thomas Wein
Energy Economics,
No. 2,
2005
Abstract
After the deregulation of the German electricity markets in 1998, the German government opted for a regulatory regime called negotiated third party access, which would be subject to ex post control by the federal cartel office. Network access charges for new competitors are based on contractual arrangements between energy producers and industrial consumers. As the electricity networks are incontestable natural monopolies, the local and regional network operators are able to set (monopolistic) charges at their own discretion, limited only by their concerns over possible interference by the federal cartel office (Bundeskartellamt). In this paper we analyse if there is evidence for varying charging behaviour depending on a supplier`s economic independence (structure of property rights) or its level of vertical integration. For this purpose we hypothesise that incorporated and vertically integrated suppliers set different charges than independent utility companies. Multivariate estimations show a relation between network access charges and the network operator’s economic independence as well as level of vertical integration. On the low voltage level, for an estimated annual consumption of 1700 kW/h, vertically integrated firms set – as predicted by our hypothesis - significantly lower access charges than vertically separated suppliers, whereas incorporated network operators charge significantly higher charges compared to independent suppliers. There is insufficient evidence available to confirm these results for other consumptions or voltage levels.
Read article
