Einflüsse des Lebensumfelds auf politische Einstellungen und Wahlverhalten - Eine vergleichende Analyse der Landtagswahlen 2019 in drei ostdeutschen Bundesländern
Matthias Brachert, Everhard Holtmann, Tobias Jaeck
Empirische Sozialforschung 12. Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Berlin,
2020
Abstract
Die vorliegende Studie analysiert die Landtagswahlen 2019 in den Bundesländern Brandenburg, Sachsen und Thüringen und testet die These eines »doppelten Transformationsschocks« für die ostdeutschen Länder auf der Kreisstufe. Die These besagt, dass in »Schockregionen«, die bestimmte prekäre Strukturmerkmale aufweisen, die Entfremdung von der Demokratie höher und das Protestwahlverhalten stärker ausgeprägt sind als in strukturell besser aufgestellten »Gewinnerregionen«. Die Autoren weisen in einer zweistufigen Analyse nahräumliche Kontexteffekte auf politische Einstellungen und auf das Wahlverhalten nach. Generell lockern traditionelle Parteibindungen auf und Präferenzen für Protest und Themenparteien (Zuwanderung, nationale Identität, Klimawandel) werden zunehmend stabiler. Daneben gibt es im regionalen Feld eine besondere Nebenströmung, welche jene Menschen mitnimmt, die ihre politische Weltsicht und ihr Wahlverhalten auch an den Arbeits- und Lebensbedingungen des näheren Umfelds ausrichten.
Read article
Regional Banking Instability and FOMC Voting
Stefan Eichler, Tom Lähner, Felix Noth
Journal of Banking & Finance,
2018
Abstract
This study analyzes if regionally affiliated Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) members take their districts’ regional banking sector instability into account when they vote. Considering the period 1979–2010, we find that a deterioration in a district's bank health increases the probability that this district's representative in the FOMC votes to ease interest rates. According to member-specific characteristics, the effect of regional banking sector instability on FOMC voting behavior is most pronounced for Bank presidents (as opposed to Governors) and FOMC members who have career backgrounds in the financial industry or who represent a district with a large banking sector.
Read article
Career Experience, Political Effects, and Voting Behavior in the Riksbank’s Monetary Policy Committee
Stefan Eichler, Tom Lähner
Economics Letters,
June
2017
Abstract
We find that career experience shapes the voting behavior of the Riksbank’s Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) members. Members with a career in the Riksbank and the government prefer higher rates. During a legislation with a center-right (center-left) party administration, MPC members with a career background in the government favor higher (lower) interest rates. Highlights: • The determinants of voting behavior in the Swedish Riksbank are considered. • Voting is analyzed with random effects ordered logit models for 1999–2013. • Interplay of career experience and political factors shapes voting behavior. • Government or Riksbank background leads to higher interest rate votes. • Partisan voting behavior is detected for members with government background.
Read article
Regional Banking Instability and FOMC Voting
Stefan Eichler, Tom Lähner, Felix Noth
Abstract
This study analyzes if regionally affiliated Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) members take their districts’ regional banking sector instability into account when they vote. Considering the period from 1978 to 2010, we find that a deterioration in a district’s bank health increases the probability that this district’s representative in the FOMC votes to ease interest rates. According to member-specific characteristics, the effect of regional banking sector instability on FOMC voting behavior is most pronounced for Bank presidents (as opposed to governors) and FOMC members who have career backgrounds in the financial industry or who represent a district with a large banking sector.
Read article
Regional House Price Dynamics and Voting Behavior in the FOMC
Stefan Eichler, Tom Lähner
Economic Inquiry,
No. 2,
2014
Abstract
This paper examines the impact of house price gaps in Federal Reserve districts on the voting behavior in the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) from 1978 to 2010. Applying a random effects ordered probit model, we find that a higher regional house price gap significantly increases (decreases) the probability that this district's representative in the FOMC casts interest rate votes in favor of tighter (easier) monetary policy. In addition, our results suggest that Bank presidents react more sensitively to regional house price developments than Board members do.
Read article
