Unternehmensinsolvenzen sind nicht nur für Eigentümer und Gläubiger mit erheblichen Unannehmlichkeiten verbunden, sie haben zumeist auch schwerwiegende Auswirkungen auf die Arbeitnehmer, die dadurch in aller Regel ihre Arbeitsplätze verlieren. Insbesondere Insolvenzen großer Unternehmen mit mehreren Tausend Beschäftigten – prominente Fälle sind beispielsweise Schlecker, Praktiker oder Air Berlin – führen gelegentlich dazu, dass die Schicksale der betroffenen Arbeitnehmer auch in den Fokus einer breiteren Öffentlichkeit geraten. Das Interesse von Politik und Medien lässt jedoch meist schnell wieder nach, obwohl Unternehmensinsolvenzen natürlich weitaus häufiger vorkommen. Zwar ist die Zahl der Unternehmensinsolvenzen seit einigen Jahren rückläufig, dennoch waren 2018 deutschlandweit fast 20 000 Unternehmen und 200 000 Arbeitsplätze betroffen.

This paper investigates the consequences of shutdowns during the Corona crisis on the risk of bankruptcy for firms in Germany and United Kingdom. We use financial statements from the period 2014 to 2018 to predict how pervasive risk of bankruptcy becomes for micro, small, medium, and large firms due to shutdown measures. We estimate distress for firms using their capacity to service their debt. Our results indicate that under three months of shutdown almost all firms in shutdown industries face high risk of bankruptcy. In Germany, about 99% of firms in shutdown industries and in the UK about 98% of firms in shutdown industries are predicted to be under distress. The furlough schemes reduce the risk of bankruptcy only marginally to 97% of firms in shutdown industries in Germany and 95% of firms in shutdown industries in the United Kingdom in case of a three-month shutdown. In sectors that are not shutdown under conservative estimates of contagion of sales losses, our results indicate considerable risk of widespread bankruptcies ranging from 76% of firms in Germany to 69% of firms in the United Kingdom. These early findings suggest that the impact of corona crisis on corporate sector via shutdowns can be severe and subsequent policy should be designed accordingly.

Schließungen und Massenentlassungen großer Unternehmen stoßen aufgrund der damit verbundenen Folgen für betroffene Arbeitnehmerinnen und Arbeitnehmer meist auf breites öffentliches Interesse. Tatsächlich zeigt sich, dass die Verdienstausfälle betroffener Arbeitnehmer – bestehend aus Lohneinbußen bei späterer Wiederbeschäftigung und Beschäftigungsausfällen – deutlich mit der Größe des entlassenden Betriebs zunehmen. Dies liegt vor allem daran, dass aus Großbetrieben entlassene Arbeitnehmer im Gegensatz zu denen, die einen Arbeitsplatz in kleinen Betrieben verlieren, deutliche Lohneinbußen hinnehmen müssen, weil sie danach oft in kleineren und schlechter bezahlenden Betrieben beschäftigt sind. Zwar erleiden auch aus Kleinbetrieben entlassene Arbeitnehmer deutliche Verdienstausfälle, ihre Lohneinbußen sind aber geringer. Sie können sich bei der Entlohnung sogar verbessern, sofern sie das Glück haben, eine Anstellung in einem Großbetrieb zu finden.

Wenn große Unternehmen vor der Insolvenz stehen, ist das öffentliche Interesse am Schicksal der Firma wie auch am Verbleib der Mitarbeiter meist beträchtlich. Dennoch liegen bisher nur wenige Informationen zu den Folgen einer Insolvenz für die Beschäftigten vor. Insbesondere die Insolvenzen kleiner Betriebe bleiben oft unbeachtet. Dieser Kurzbericht informiert nicht nur über das generelle Risiko der Beschäftigten, von einer Insolvenz betroffen zu sein. Er zeigt auch, mit welchen kurz- und mittelfristigen Auswirkungen die betroffenen Beschäftigten rechnen müssen. Dabei werden insbesondere die Effekte einer Insolvenz auf die Erwerbseinkommen und auf die Beschäftigungschancen der Betroffenen untersucht.

Zahlreiche Studien zeigen, dass unfreiwillige Arbeitsplatzverluste zu hohen und langfristigen Einkommensverlusten bei betroffenen Arbeitnehmern führen. Die vorliegende Studie verwendet Befragungsdaten des Sozio-oekonomischen Panels (SOEP), um erstmals umfassend zu untersuchen, ob und in welchem Ausmaß Verluste im individuellen Arbeitseinkommen durch alternative Einkommensquellen, Reaktionen anderer Haushaltsmitglieder und durch staatliche Umverteilung ausgeglichen werden. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass Verdienstverluste vor allem durch staatliche Umverteilung kompensiert werden, wohingegen andere Kanäle nur eine untergeordnete Rolle spielen. Ein Vergleich internationaler empirischer Evidenz zu den Verdienstausfällen nach Arbeitsplatzverlusten spricht nicht dafür, dass staatliche Umverteilung den Anreiz, Verluste durch eigene Anstrengungen selbst auszugleichen, vermindert.

Schließungen nicht wettbewerbsfähiger Betriebe sind ein wesentliches Element der Marktwirtschaft, werden aber oft kontrovers diskutiert. Wie hoch ist das Risiko einer Betriebsschließung überhaupt und wie hat es sich im Lauf der Zeit entwickelt? Welche Betriebe sind besonders gefährdet? Sterben Betriebe eher einen plötzlichen Tod oder zeichnen sich Betriebsschließungen oft schon Jahre im Voraus ab?

Why does job displacement, e.g., following import competition, technological change, or economic downturns, result in permanent wage losses? The job displacement literature is silent on whether wage losses after job displacement are driven by lost firm wage premiums or worker productivity depreciations. We therefore estimate losses in wages and firm wage premiums. Premiums are measured as firm effects from a two-way fixed-effects approach, as described in Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis (1999). Using German administrative data, we find that wage losses are, on average, fully explained by losses in firm wage premiums and that premium losses are largely permanent. We show that losses in wages and premiums are minor for workers displaced from small plants and strongly increase with pre-displacement firm size, which provides an explanation for the large and persistent wage losses that have been found in previous studies mostly focusing on displacement from large employers.

Using survey data from the German Socio‐Economic Panel (SOEP), this paper analyses the extent to which alternative income sources, reactions within the household context, and redistribution by the state attenuate earnings losses after job displacement. Applying propensity score matching and fixed effects estimations, we find that income from self‐employment reduces the earnings gap only slightly and severance payments buffer losses in the short run. On the household level, we find little evidence for an added worker effect whereas redistribution by the state within the tax and transfer system mitigates income losses substantially.

We study the effect of job displacement due to bankruptcies on earnings and employment prospects of displaced workers and analyse whether extended potential unemployment benefit duration (PBD) ameliorates the negative consequences of job loss. Using German administrative linked employer-employee data, we find that job loss has long-lasting negative effects on earnings and employment. Displaced workers also more often end up in irregular employment relationships (part-time, marginal part-time employment, and temporary agency work) than their non-displaced counterparts. Applying a regression discontinuity approach that exploits a three months PBD extension at the age threshold of 50 we find hardly any effects of longer PBD on labour market outcomes of displaced workers.

This article analyzes the development of employment levels and worker flows before bankruptcies, plant closure without bankruptcies and mass layoffs. Utilizing administrative plant-level data for Germany, we find no systematic employment reductions prior to mass layoffs, a strong and long-lasting reduction prior to closures, and a much shorter shadow of death preceding bankruptcies. Employment reductions in closing plants, in contrast to bankruptcies and mass layoffs, do not come along with increased worker flows. These patterns point to an intended and controlled shrinking strategy for closures without bankruptcy and to an unintended collapse for bankruptcies and mass layoffs.

Using German survey data, we investigate the relationship between involuntary job loss and regional mobility. Our results show that job loss has a strong positive effect on the propensity to relocate. We also analyse whether displaced workers who relocate to a different region after job loss are better able to catch up with non-displaced workers in terms of labour market performance than those staying in the same region. Our findings do not support this conjecture as we find substantial long-lasting earnings losses for movers and stayers and even slightly but not significantly higher losses for movers.

We use rich German administrative data to estimate new measures of skill transferability between manufacturing and other sectors. These measures capture the value of workers' human capital when applied in different sectors and are directly related to workers' displacement costs. We estimate these transferability measures using a selection correction model, which addresses workers' endogenous mobility, and a novel selection instrument based on the social network of workers. Our results indicate substantial heterogeneity in how workers can transfer their skills when they move across sectors, which implies heterogeneous displacement costs that depend on the sector to which workers reallocate.

To assess to what extent collective job displacements can be regarded as unanticipated exogenous shocks for affected employees, we analyze plant-level employment patterns before bankruptcy, plant closure without bankruptcy, and mass layoff. Utilizing administrative data covering all West German private sector plants, we find no systematic employment reductions prior to mass layoffs, a strong and long-lasting reduction prior to closures, and a much shorter shadow of death preceding bankruptcy. Our analysis of worker flows underlines that bankruptcies seem to struggle for survival while closures follow a shrinking strategy. We conclude that the scope of worker anticipation of upcoming job loss is smallest for mass layoffs and largest for closures without bankruptcy.

Using a 50 % sample of all private sector establishments in Germany, we report that spinoffs are larger, initially employ more skilled and more experienced workers, and pay higher wages than other startups. We investigate whether spinoffs are more likely to survive than other startups, and whether spinoff survival depends on the quality and size of their parent companies, as suggested in some of the theoretical and empirical literature. Our estimated survival models confirm that spinoffs are generally less likely to exit than other startups. We also distinguish between pulled spinoffs, where the parent company continues after they are founded, and pushed spinoffs, where the parent company stops operations. Our results indicate that in western and eastern Germany and in all sectors investigated, pulled spinoffs have a higher probability of survival than pushed spinoffs. Concerning the parent connection, we find that intra-industry spinoffs and spinoffs emerging from better-performing or smaller parent companies are generally less likely to exit.

This paper introduces a large-scale administrative panel data set on corporate bankruptcy in Germany that allows for an econometric analysis of involuntary exits where previous studies mixed voluntary and involuntary exits. Approximately 83 % of all bankruptcies occur in plants with not more than 10 employees, and 61 % of all bankrupt plants are not older than 5 years. The descriptive statistics and regression analysis indicate substantial negative age dependence with respect to bankruptcy risk but confirm negative size dependence for mature plants only. Our results corroborate hypotheses stressing increasing capabilities and positional advantage, both predicting negative age dependence with respect to bankruptcy risk due to productivity improvements. The results are not consistent with the theories explaining age dependence via imprinting or structural inertia.

Using a large administrative data set for Germany, this article compares employment developments in exiting and surviving establishments. Applying a matching approach, we find a clear “shadow of death” effect reflecting lingering illness: in both West and East Germany establishments shrink dramatically already several years before closure, employment growth rates differ strongly between exiting and surviving establishments, and this difference becomes stronger as exit approaches. Moreover, we provide first evidence that prior to exit the workforce becomes on average more skilled, more female, and older in exiting compared to surviving establishments. These effects are more clearly visible in West than in East Germany.

Anhand umfangreicher administrativer Daten vergleicht diese Studie die Entwicklung der Überlebenschancen neu gegründeter Betriebe in West- und Ostdeutschland für die Jahre 1994 bis 2008. Eine zentrale Frage lautet dabei, ob eine Angleichung der Überlebensraten zwischen West- und Ostdeutschland zu beobachten ist. Anhand von Methoden der Verweildaueranalyse kommt die Studie zu dem Ergebnis, dass sich die Überlebenschancen neu gegründeter Betriebe zu Beginn des Beobachtungszeitraums nicht stark zwischen West- und Ostdeutschland unterscheiden. In den Jahren 1998 und 1999 steigt die Schließungswahrscheinlichkeit in Ostdeutschland stark an, in Westdeutschland jedoch nicht, was vermutlich auf eine Änderung der Subventionspolitik für Betriebe in Ostdeutschland zurückzuführen ist. Seit der Jahrtausendwende nimmt der Unterschied in den Schließungswahrscheinlichkeiten zwischen West- und Ostdeutschland ab, was auf eine Angleichung der Überlebenschancen hindeutet.

Using comprehensive data for West Germany, this paper investigates the determinants of establishment exit. We find that between 1975 and 2006 the average exit rate has risen considerably. In order to test various “liabilities” of establishment survival identified in the literature, we analyzed the impact of establishment size and put a special focus on differences between young and mature establishments. Our empirical analysis shows that the mortality risk falls with establishment size, which confirms the liability of smallness. The probability of exit is substantially higher for young establishments which are not more than 5 years old, thus confirming the liability of newness. There also exists a liability of aging since exit rates first decline over time, reaching a minimum at ages 15–18, and then rise again somewhat. The determinants of exit differ substantially between young and mature establishments, suggesting that young establishments are more vulnerable in a number of ways.