Vertical Grants and Local Public Efficiency
Ivo Bischoff, Peter Bönisch, Peter Haug, Annette Illy
Public Finance Review,
Nr. 3,
2019
Abstract
The existing empirical literature on the impact of vertical grants on local public-sector efficiency yields mixed results. Given the fact that vertical financial equalization systems often reduce differences in fiscal capacity, we argue that empirical studies based on cross-sectional data may yield a positive relationship between grants and efficiency of public service production even when the underlying causal effect is not. We provide a simple illustrative theoretical model to show the logic of our argument and illustrate its relevance by an empirical case study for the German state of Saxony-Anhalt. We show that our main argument of an inference-disturbing effect applies to those existing studies that are more optimistic about the impact of vertical grants. Finally, we argue that it may disturb the inference drawn from studies in a number of other countries where vertical grants—intended or not—concentrate in fiscally weak municipalities.
Artikel Lesen
Neues Europa
Neues Europa Die Wirtschaftskrise ist weitgehend überwunden, doch das Vertrauen in die EZB...
Zur Seite
24.06.2016 • 26/2016
Großbritanniens Nein zur EU wird für beide Seiten teuer
Die Briten haben sich heute gegen einen Verbleib ihres Landes in der Europäischen Union entschieden. Sie stimmten heute überraschend klar dafür, den EU-Verbund zu verlassen. Das Ausscheiden Großbritanniens aus der EU hat nicht nur politisch, sondern auch ökonomisch tiefgreifende Konsequenzen für das Land selbst, aber auch für das übrige Europa. „Entscheidend ist jetzt die Reaktion der verbleibenden Länder auf das Votum, insbesondere die Frankreichs und Deutschlands“, sagt Reint E. Gropp, Präsident des Leibniz-Instituts für Wirtschaftsforschung Halle (IWH).
Reint E. Gropp
Pressemitteilung lesen
Vertical Grants and Local Public Efficiency
Ivo Bischoff, Peter Bönisch, Peter Haug, Annette Illy
Abstract
This paper analyses the impact of vertical grants on local public sector efficiency. First, we develop a theoretical model in which the bureaucrat sets the tax price while voters choose the quantity of public services. In this model, grants reduce efficiency if voters do not misinterpret the amount of vertical grants the local bureaucrats receive. If voters suffer from fiscal illusion, i.e. overestimate the amount of grants, our model yields an ambiguous effect of grants on efficiency. Second, we use the model to launch a note of caution concerning the inference that can be drawn from the existing cross-sectional studies in this field: Taking into account vertical financial equalization systems that reduce differences in fiscal capacity, empirical studies based on cross-sectional data may yield a positive relationship between grants and efficiency even when the underlying causal effect is negative. Third, we perform an empirical analysis for the German state of Saxony-Anhalt, which has implemented such a fiscal equalization system. We find a positive relationship between grants and efficiency. Our analysis shows that a careful reassessment of existing empirical evidence with regard to this issue seems necessary.
Artikel Lesen
Ökonomische Bürokratie- und Vollzugstheorien – Lehren für die Umweltpolitik?
Jens Horbach
Externe Publikationen,
1996
Abstract
Artikel Lesen
