Professor Stefano Colonnello, Ph.D.

Professor Stefano Colonnello, Ph.D.
Aktuelle Position

seit 3/20

Research Affiliate

Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung Halle (IWH)

seit 11/22

Außerordentlicher Professor für Wirtschaftspolitik

Ca' Foscari University of Venice, Italien

Forschungsschwerpunkte

  • empirische Unternehmensfinanzierung
  • Relationship Banking
  • Unternehmensführung
  • Rechts- und Finanzwissenschaft

Stefano Colonnello ist seit März 2020 Research Affiliate am IWH. Seine Forschungsinteressen liegen in den Bereichen Rechts- und Finanzwissenschaft, empirische Unternehmensfinanzierung, Unternehmensführung sowie Finanzinstitutionen.

Stefano Colonnello studierte an der Bocconi University in Mailand. Seine Promotion erfolgte an der École Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne und am Swiss Finance Institute. Von 2015 bis 2019 war er als wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter in der Abteilung Finanzmärkte am IWH und als Juniorprofessor an der Otto-von-Guericke-Universität Magdeburg tätig.

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Professor Stefano Colonnello, Ph.D.
Professor Stefano Colonnello, Ph.D.
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Publikationen

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Delisting and Emission Intensity

Monica Billio Stefano Colonnello Ivan Gufler

in: Applied Economics Letters, im Erscheinen

Abstract

We focus on listed non-financial companies from the largest European economies to explore the impact of rising stakeholders’ attention towards climate risk on firms’ probability to delist. An aggregate analysis shows that, despite growing awareness about the climate problem, enhanced scrutiny over more polluting firms and improved access to information about corporate sustainability over the last two decades, the share of carbon-intensive industries has not significantly declined in the listed sector relative to the whole economy. Also at the micro-level, firms in carbon-intensive sectors have not become more likely to delist, even in periods of enhanced stakeholders’ concern about climate risk, potentially because they experienced a shift towards lower emissions over the same period. We confirm this result by means of a quasi-natural experiment centered around the enhanced disclosure requirements introduced by the EU Non-Financial Reporting Directive of 2014.

Publikation lesen

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The Reverse Revolving Door in the Supervision of European Banks

Stefano Colonnello Michael Koetter Alex Sclip Konstantin Wagner

in: International Journal of Central Banking, im Erscheinen

Abstract

We assemble data about executives on the boards of national supervisory authorities (NSA) in European banking, which reveal that 40% have an employment history in the financial industry. Appointment patterns to NSA boards differ substantially across countries. Generally, the appointment of former finance professionals as prudential supervisors is inconsequential for banks‘ valuations, capitalization, and asset growth. The exception are positive, but short-lived valuation effects for those banks whose alumni are appointed as executives of directly responsible NSA boards. Circumstantial evidence suggests that a “proximity bias“ is a more likely driver of this effect instead of superior financial expertise or intrinsic skills of the designated NSA executives.

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Housing Yields

Stefano Colonnello Roberto Marfè Qizhou Xiong

in: Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, im Erscheinen

Abstract

We build a granular dataset of residential property yields using rental and sale listings from a major German real estate platform. With more than 1.5 million property-level rent-to-price ratios, we document a novel heterogeneity puzzle. About two-fifths of yield dispersion remains unexplained after controlling for extensive observable property characteristics and postal code-level time-varying factors using fixed effects. When we absorb finer neighborhood amenities through richer fixed effects, the unexplained share remains close to one-third. This evidence points to the importance of investors’ beliefs and preferences—rather than several alternative explanations we test—as sources of heterogeneity in risk premia.

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Arbeitspapiere

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Trading away Incentives

Stefano Colonnello Giuliano Curatola Shuo Xia

in: IWH Discussion Papers, Nr. 23, 2022

Abstract

Equity pay has been the primary component of managerial compensation packages at US public firms since the early 1990s. Using a comprehensive sample of top executives from 1992-2020, we estimate to what extent they trade firm equity held in their portfolios to neutralize increments in ownership due to annual equity pay. Executives accommodate ownership increases linked to options awards. Conversely, increases in stock holdings linked to option exercises and restricted stock grants are largely neutralized through comparable sales of unrestricted shares. Variation in stock trading responses across executives hardly appears to respond to diversification motives. From a theoretical standpoint, these results challenge (i) the common, generally implicit assumption that managers cannot undo their incentive packages, (ii) the standard modeling practice of treating different equity pay items homogeneously, and (iii) the often taken for granted crucial role of diversification motives in managers’ portfolio choices.

Publikation lesen

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Dynamic Equity Slope

Matthijs Breugem Stefano Colonnello Roberto Marfè Francesca Zucchi

in: University of Venice Ca' Foscari Department of Economics Working Papers, Nr. 21, 2020

Abstract

The term structure of equity and its cyclicality are key to understand the risks drivingequilibrium asset prices. We propose a general equilibrium model that jointly  explainsfour important features of the term structure of equity: (i) a negative unconditionalterm premium, (ii) countercyclical term premia, (iii) procyclical equity yields, and (iv)premia to value and growth claims respectively increasing and decreasing with thehorizon. The economic mechanism hinges on the interaction between heteroskedasticlong-run growth — which helps price long-term cash flows and leads to countercyclicalrisk premia — and homoskedastic short-term shocks in the presence of limited marketparticipation — which produce sizeable risk premia to short-term cash flows. The slopedynamics hold irrespective of the sign of its unconditional average. We provide empirical support to our model assumptions and predictions.

Publikation lesen

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Internal Governance and Creditor Governance: Evidence from Credit Default Swaps

Stefano Colonnello

in: IWH Discussion Papers, Nr. 6, 2017

Abstract

I study the relation between internal governance and creditor governance. A deterioration in creditor governance may increase the agency costs of debt and managerial opportunism at the expense of shareholders. I exploit the introduction of credit default swaps (CDS) as a negative shock to creditor governance. I provide evidence consistent with shareholders pushing for a substitution effect between internal governance and creditor governance. Following CDS introduction, CDS firms reduce managerial risk-taking incentives relative to other firms. At the same time, after the start of CDS trading, CDS firms increase managerial wealth-performance sensitivity, board independence, and CEO turnover performance-sensitivity relative to other firms.

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