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Professor Shuo Xia, Ph.D.

Professor Shuo Xia, Ph.D.
Aktuelle Position

seit 9/25

Research Affiliate

Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung Halle (IWH)

seit 9/25

Professor

Dongbei University of Finance and Economics (DUFE)

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Forschungsschwerpunkte
  • Unternehmensführung
  • Unternehmensfinanzierung

Shuo Xia ist seit September 2025 Research Affiliate am IWH. Er forscht zu Themen der Unternehmensfinanzierung und Unternehmensführung.

Shuo Xia ist Professor an der Dongbei University of Finance and Economics (DUFE). Zuvor war er am IWH tätig.

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Professor Shuo Xia, Ph.D.
Professor Shuo Xia, Ph.D.
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Publikationen

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The Corporate Investment Benefits of Mutual Fund Dual Holdings

Rex Wang Renjie Patrick Verwijmeren Shuo Xia

in: Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 60 (2), 2025

Abstract

Mutual fund families increasingly hold bonds and stocks from the same firm. We present evidence that dual ownership allows firms to increase valuable investments and refinance by issuing bonds with lower yields and fewer restrictive covenants, especially when firms face financial distress. Dual holders also prevent overinvestment by firms with entrenched managers. Overall, our results suggest that mutual fund families internalize the agency conflicts of their portfolio companies, highlighting the positive governance externalities of intra-family cooperation.

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Non-Standard Errors

Albert J. Menkveld Anna Dreber Felix Holzmeister Juergen Huber Magnus Johannesson Michael Koetter Markus Kirchner Sebastian Neusüss Michael Razen Utz Weitzel Shuo Xia et al.

in: Journal of Finance, Vol. 79 (3), 2024

Abstract

In statistics, samples are drawn from a population in a data-generating process (DGP). Standard errors measure the uncertainty in estimates of population parameters. In science, evidence is generated to test hypotheses in an evidence-generating process (EGP). We claim that EGP variation across researchers adds uncertainty—nonstandard errors (NSEs). We study NSEs by letting 164 teams test the same hypotheses on the same data. NSEs turn out to be sizable, but smaller for more reproducible or higher rated research. Adding peer-review stages reduces NSEs. We further find that this type of uncertainty is underestimated by participants.

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Arbeitspapiere

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Poison Bonds

Rex Wang Renjie Shuo Xia

in: IWH Discussion Papers, Nr. 3, 2024

Abstract

This paper documents the rise of “poison bonds”, which are corporate bonds that allow bondholders to demand immediate repayment in a change-of-control event. The share of poison bonds among new issues has grown substantially in recent years, from below 20% in the 90s to over 60% since mid-2000s. This increase is predominantly driven by investment-grade issues. We provide causal evidence that the pressure to eliminate poison pills has led firms to issue poison bonds as an alternative. Our analysis suggests that this practice entrenches incumbent managers and destroys shareholder value. Holding a portfolio of firms that remove poison pills but promptly issue poison bonds results in negative abnormal returns of −7.3% per year. Our findings have important implications for the agency theory of debt: (i) more debt may not discipline the management; and (ii) even without financial distress, managerial entrenchment can lead to agency conflicts between shareholders and creditors.

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Trading away Incentives

Stefano Colonnello Giuliano Curatola Shuo Xia

in: IWH Discussion Papers, Nr. 23, 2022

Abstract

Equity pay has been the primary component of managerial compensation packages at US public firms since the early 1990s. Using a comprehensive sample of top executives from 1992-2020, we estimate to what extent they trade firm equity held in their portfolios to neutralize increments in ownership due to annual equity pay. Executives accommodate ownership increases linked to options awards. Conversely, increases in stock holdings linked to option exercises and restricted stock grants are largely neutralized through comparable sales of unrestricted shares. Variation in stock trading responses across executives hardly appears to respond to diversification motives. From a theoretical standpoint, these results challenge (i) the common, generally implicit assumption that managers cannot undo their incentive packages, (ii) the standard modeling practice of treating different equity pay items homogeneously, and (iii) the often taken for granted crucial role of diversification motives in managers’ portfolio choices.

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Corporate Governance Benefits of Mutual Fund Cooperation

Rex Wang Renjie Patrick Verwijmeren Shuo Xia

in: IWH Discussion Papers, Nr. 21, 2022

Abstract

Mutual fund families increasingly hold bonds and stocks from the same firm. We study the implications of such dual holdings for corporate governance and firm decision-making. We present evidence that dual ownership allows financially distressed firms to increase investments and to refinance by issuing bonds with lower yields and fewer restrictive covenants. As such, dual ownership reduces shareholder-creditor conflicts, especially when families encourage cooperation among their managers. Overall, our results suggest that mutual fund families internalize the shareholder-creditor agency conflicts of their portfolio companies, highlighting the positive governance externalities of intra-family cooperation.

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